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This thesis examines capital structure theories and debt level determinants to develop 
a better understanding, and to establish the most appropriate theory to explain the 
behaviour of firms‟ debt and equity choices. It tests three major capital structure 
theories (e.g. the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories) using static and 
dynamic statistical models and 13 capital structure determinants, based on three 
major capital structure theories. The study uses 4,598 sample companies from 11 
countries and 27 industries over a 20 year period. This method provides a clear 
insight into firms‟ debt and equity choice behaviours.  
 
The static trade-off theory is tested by first searching for similarities and differences 
between industries, countries and time periods and, second, by observing whether 
firms change their capital structures towards optimal levels and whether the 
coefficient signs are the same as the predictions. The „stock price effect‟ on debt 
levels is used to examine the pecking order and market timing theories. The pecking 
order theory is likewise tested by confirming whether firms issue debt when they 
face a financial deficit. Furthermore, these theories are tested using cluster analyses. 
The sample examines 11 different characteristics, which include firm size, debt level, 
and bankruptcy probability. As each characteristic is related to one or more capital 
structure theories, the most appropriate theory can be derived, based on such 
characteristics. 
 
There are five main findings. First, firms which are financial stable issue relatively 
more debt. Second, they have a preference for moderate debt levels and thus limit 
their bankruptcy probability. They also try to exploit opportunities from 
overestimated stock price by issuing stocks to increase cash inflows. Third, the 
effects from bankruptcy costs are greater than transaction costs in terms of capital 
structure adjustment. Fourth, during the sample period, firms continuously decrease 





There are three main conclusions. First, the behaviour of firms appears generally 
aligned with the trade-off theory, although the pecking order and market timing 
theories also partially explain the equity issuance condition.  Second, the „equity and 
debt choice modes‟ can likewise be explained by the use of a theoretically combined 
approach, using the three major capital structure theories. In this approach, firms 
increase their value by both increasing debt for tax benefits and low adverse selection 
costs, and by issuing equity when the stock price is high. Third, this second 
conclusion implies that the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories can 
be combined on the assumption that firms maximise their values under conditions of 
the existence of asymmetric information, tax shields and bankruptcy probability. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the answers to three questions related to „capital structure 
decision.‟ First, is there an optimal capital structure? Alternately, is there a systemic 
difference in debt levels based on firms‟ various characteristics, such as country, 
industry, and between different time periods? Second, if there is an optimal capital 
structure, what are the most important capital structure determinants? Third, among 
the various different theories, which is the most appropriate capital structure theory 
for explaining firms‟ debt level changing behaviours?  
 
These research questions follow logically from the first question: if there is an 
optimum gearing level, where is it and what determines it? The next question follows: 
what theory is the most appropriate to explain a firm‟s observed debt and equity 
choices, and its gearing alteration behaviours? There is currently no capital structure 
theory that can explain observed leverage level choice behaviours with a single 
general assumption (or explanation), although all theories seek ways to increase a 
firm‟s value or minimise its costs when faced with the issue of either equity or debt. 
Therefore, this thesis considers the probability of combining these theories together 
with firms‟ common motivation (value maximisation).  
  
Even though the static trade-off and pecking order theories are based on different 
assumptions, both suggest that issuing debt is a better policy than issuing equity. In 
the pecking order theory, issuing debt lessens asymmetric information and issuing 
costs. In the static trade-off theory, issuing debt increases a firm‟s value by 
increasing its tax shield. This is the reason why Myers (2001) and Fama and French 
(2005) argue that one debt ratio changing behaviour can be interpreted in two 
different ways based on the two different theories. In addition, both theories also 




In fact, in pecking order theory, using internal funds by accumulating retained 
earnings, is the best financing policy to minimise asymmetric information costs. 
Pecking order theory is one of the most important inertia theories (Welch, 2004). 
Inertia theory suggests that firms avoid any action to change their capital structure 
because of transaction costs (Welch, ibid.) and that capital structure change is deeply 
related to stock price changes. The latter implies that a firm‟s capital structure is 
changed by retained earnings and stock price changes, which alter the size of a firm‟s 
assets.  
 
As described, in terms of the inertia theory (including pecking order theory), using 
internal funds (not issuing both equity and debt) is the best policy, and both trade-off 
and pecking order theories suggest that debt issuance is the better policy, rather than 
equity issuance. However, over the last twenty years, firms have decreased their debt 
levels by issuing equity. Our results also show that firms have actively issued equity 
and debt during the sample time period. Firms even issue equity and debt 
simultaneously. 
 
This equity-issuing phenomenon cannot be explained by either the pecking order or 
inertia theory, where firms accumulate retained earnings when there is significant 
asymmetric information. A possible explanation for this result is that the financial 
distress risk increases globally in terms of the trade-off theory, or that asymmetric 
information costs are not great in terms of the pecking order theory. In fact, the best 
financing policy in the pecking order theory is issuing over-priced equity. 
 
Considering the world economy over the last twenty years, the phenomenon of 
equity issuing might indicate that managements are more concerned with financial 
distress rather than with asymmetric information costs. Alternatively, equity issue 
might be reflected by the market participants‟ concerns. In other words, markets 
might have considered firms‟ financial stability more during the sample period. In 
addition, the results of this thesis also indicate that tax shields or issuing costs do not 
play an important part compared with other factors, such as industry trends or macro-
economic impacts, viz. financial crises.    
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1.1 Motivation 
The study of capital structure has raised the question of how firms have determined 
an appropriate debt level over the last sixty years. Early research by Chundson (1945) 
found that firms in the same industry had similar cash to asset ratios, and that those 
with more profits had lower leverage ratios. Even though capital structure theory has 
a long history, there is no theory that explains gearing ratio change by using one 
general assumption, rather than their special presumptions. Myers (2001) and Fama 
and French (2002) therefore confirmed that there is no theory that explains general 
capital structure decision methods; similarly, a recent working paper by Binsbergen 
et al. (2011) also mentions a lack of consensus with regard to optimal capital 
structures. 
 
Capital structure theories are mainly based on three important assumptions, tax 
benefits, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information. Myers (2001) arranges each 
specific assumption in terms of its theory, tax benefits and bankruptcy costs for the 
trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 
1977; Kane, 1984), underwriting costs and under-pricing of new securities for the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency costs for 
the free cash-flow theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Additionally, 
the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) shows that high stock prices 
reduce the gearing ratio. 
 
Nevertheless, the determinants of one theory are often correlated with those of other 
theories because, as Megginson (1997) and Ross (1995) suggest, there are a number 
of common motivations for gearing ratio changing behaviour with regard to each 
theory. We presume that the common motivations are that firms try to increase their 
values and reduce their financial distress costs simultaneously. This correlation 
between theories can bring a risk of misinterpretation. According to Myers (2001), 
researchers may consider that generated results accord with one theory, but the 
financing decisions are actually engendered by another1. Similarly, Fama and French 
                                               
1 Myers (2001, p.91) mentions that “… a statistical finding is often consistent with two or more competing 
capital structure theories.”  
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(2005) imply that both trade-off and pecking order theories might be regarded as 
theories that help each other to explain some aspects of financing decision 
behaviours.  
 
The first motivation of this thesis is to explain the three different capital structure 
theories using one principle in that all firms try to increase their values. The idea 
comes from Ross (1995), Megginson (1997) and Myers (2001). They assert that the 
common motivation associated with capital structure is about knowing whether there 
are ways to increase a firm‟s value by gearing level choice. This is achieved by 
having optimal debt levels, by the issuance of securities with high prices, and by 
accumulating operating profits based on the trade-off, market timing and pecking 
order theories, respectively. A large number of previous studies have shown that 
firms behave in this way. In other words, the three major theories can partially 
explain firms‟ debt and equity choice modes. This phenomenon implies that these 
three theories might be integrated in such a way as to explain increase in a firm‟s 
value.  
 
The idea that firms search for ways to increase their own values can be equally 
applied to the behaviour of [potential] market participants. Consequently, the three 
major capital structure theories imply that market expectations about future cash 
flows, brought about by outside (including, potential) investors in a firm‟s securities, 
is the most important capital structure determinant. This arises because over- or 
under-valued security prices and the firm‟s high capital costs are signals from the 
financial market about the firm‟s future cash-flow expectations. In other words, 
asymmetric information costs in the pecking order theory and the cost of capital in 
the static trade-off theory are decided by the reaction of market participants based on 
a firm‟s actions (or expectations of the firms‟ future values). Therefore, the fact that 
both firms and external individuals attempt to increase their own value or wealth will 
decide the capital structure. In addition, according to Myers (2001), there is no work 
that focuses on external financing, e.g. equity or debt issue, which uses the 
relationship between internal and external investors. 
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The second motivation for this thesis is to find the most appropriate capital structure 
theory by investigating important „gearing ratio choice determinants.‟ Previous 
research shows that different firms‟ characteristics and the macro-economic 
environment would bring about different „debt ratio choice behaviours.‟ Thus, the 
investigation on into relationships between firms‟ characteristics and their „debt or 
equity choice modes‟ will indicate the most appropriate capital structure theory, 
because each characteristic is related to one or more capital structure theories. 
Bankruptcy probability, for instance, is more likely to be related to the static trade-
off theory. 
 
Thereby, the observed leverage levels can be by-products of market participants‟ 
(both firm‟s and outside investor‟s) wealth increasing behaviours by considering a 
firm‟s characteristics (Hennessy and Whited, 2005).  
 
1.2 Research objectives 
 
Objective 1. To test if there are systematic patterns in debt ratios based on a 
firm‟s characteristics, e.g. different industries, countries and time periods. 
 
If there were no optimal capital structure, observed leverage levels would be 
randomly distributed. The fact is that having systemic differences in debt ratios, 
based on firms‟ characteristics, can prove that there are some desirable (or optimal) 
gearing levels and important capital structure determinants. Previous research has 
found differences in debt ratios caused by country differences, industrial differences 
and the firm’s size (Scott, Jr. and Martin, 1975; Collins and Sekely, 1983; Mackay, 
2005), the probability of bankruptcy, the previous years’ gearing level and firm value 
(Ross, 1977), cultural differences (Sekely and Collins, 1988) and legal institutional 
differences (Wald, 1999). In Chapter 4, the systemic differences are tested across 
industries, countries and time. 
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Objective 2. To explain the new security issuing decision process using the 
notion of firms‟ value increasing behaviours. For instance, debt or equity 
choice modes are related to their stock prices in the financial market. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), Noe (1988), Diamond (1989), Zwiebel 
(1996), Berkovitch (2000), Douglas (2006), and others explain capital structure 
based on asymmetric information. Asymmetric information raises the free cash-flow, 
pecking order and market timing theories. In particular, the pecking order and market 
timing theories suggest that new security issues (either IPOs or SEOs) depend upon 
securities’ issuing prices in the market. Firms increase their values by issuing equity 
when stock prices are high and debt when asymmetric information is high. 
 
Objective 3. To investigate the trade-off idea with tax shield and other costs and 
benefits, e.g. discounting issuance of securities, transaction costs, financial distress 
costs and other benefit factors viz. securities issuied at over-estimated value. That 
is to say, to examine how the idea of trade-off relationship between benefits and 
costs caused by gearing or debt equity choice modes can include the ideas from the 
pecking order and the market timing theories, in terms of a wider trade-off notion.   
 
The traditional trade-off theory deals only with tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. 
Recently, the trade-off theory has begun to include the costs and benefits associated 
with agency problems (Fama and French, 2005). This implies that the territory of the 
trade-off theory is larger and includes more determinants, which possibly change a 
firm‟s value and capital structure. In other words, the wider trade-off theory includes 
all elements that can affect a firm‟s value due to gearing level alterations.  
 
Objective 4. To determine the most appropriate capital structure theory by 
considering a firm‟s characteristics e.g. a firm‟s age, size, leverage level, 
bankruptcy probability, stock return, growth, profitability, asset tangibility, 
and different time periods.  
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As each capital structure model has key elements which explain some aspects of a 
firm‟s „financial decision making policies‟ (Fama and French, 2005; Hovakimian et 
al., 2001), this thesis aims to tests three main capital structure theories, the trade-off, 
pecking order and market timing theories using the various characteristics (elements) 
of a firm. A characteristic, in our sample, is more closely related to a specific capital 
structure theory than to the other theories, in general. Bankruptcy probability, for 
example, is more closely related to the trade-off theory, than to the pecking order 
theory. Thus, this method raises the validity of certain capital structure theories if 
these elements show a strong association with a firm‟s debt ratio changing 
behaviours as these theories predict. 
 
Objective 5. To investigate the most important capital structure determinants. 
As each debt ratio determinant is directly or indirectly related to one or more 
capital structure theories, these relationships between them will also indicate 
the most appropriate capital structure determinants.  
 
As will be described in Section 2.1, all different capital structure theories explain 
ways to increase a firm‟s value or to reduce its costs whilst altering gearing levels, 
although each theory suggests different methods. For instance, according to the static 
trade-off theory, firms try to achieve the optimal leverage level to increase their 
values, whereas in terms of the pecking order theory, they try not to lose their values 
caused by asymmetric information costs. As have already been mentioned, without 
doubt the two theories have a common motivation. Overall, this thesis tries to explain 
firms‟ „leverage level adjustment behaviours‟ in terms of this common motivation.  
   
1.3 Contributions 
1.3.1 Contribution to theory 
First, this thesis investigates the most appropriate capital structure theory in order to 
explain gearing ratio change with different characteristics. In this thesis we show that 
the debt ratio changing actions of firms are mainly explained by the trade-off theory, 
but the effect of tax benefits is not great. This study also finds that both the pecking 
order theory and the market timing theory only partially explain debt ratio changes. 
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For example, they cannot give us the reason why firms have continuously issued 
equity over the last twenty years, but they do show the negative relationship between 
gearing levels and profits.  
  
Second, the results of this thesis show that transaction costs are the second most 
important matter, after bankruptcy costs. For example, firms adjust their capital 
structure more rapidly when they have financial problems. The results also show that 
firms generally change gearing ratios when „capital structure adjustment costs‟ are 
low. This conclusion indirectly suggests that firms with good financial positions 
(ones which are likely have low adjustment costs), such as high stock returns or 
profitability, show fast adjustment performance. The overall conclusion is 
inconsistent with previous claims that „capital structure adjustment speed‟ is 
primarily related to adjustment costs. 
 
Third, this thesis finds that survival is the most important matter, and that other 
determinants, such as high-price-new-securities issuing or tax benefits, are of 
secondary importantance. The results continuously suggest the importance of 
bankruptcy probability. This indirectly implies the importance of the trade-off theory 
and „optimal capital structure existence.‟  
 
Fourth, the thesis might suggest that debt-equity choice can be a tactic to maximise a 
firm‟s value by having extra incoming cash-flows. For example, 1) firms issue equity 
when stock prices are high, and 2) firms with high leverage levels come back to 
normal very quickly. This might be the firms who put themselves into high leverage 
by having more tax benefits, and come back to normal when they face financial 
difficulties. If they are truly in financial difficulty, they could not escape from it 
owing to high financing costs.     
 
1.3.2 Contribution to methodologies 
First, the use of cluster analysis using firm characteristics that is a major component 
of this research is new addition to the literature, although prior researchers have 
alluded to it. This is because firms with different characteristics are likely to behave 
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differently. These clustered characteristics are related to one or more capital structure 
theories, as will be described in the next chapter. The cross-sectional relationships 
between capital structure and a firm‟s characteristics indicate the most important 
capital structure determinants and the most appropriate theory. Furthermore, our 
results using cluster analyses suggest different conclusions compared to the results 
using conventional regression methods. The firm‟s characteristics include country, 
economy, industry, stock prices, different time periods, size, age, bankruptcy 
probability, growth, and profitability. 
 
Second, this thesis uses three different kinds of issuance, stock, debt and „pure debt 
issuance‟ (net debt issue - net equity issue), for testing the pecking order theory. 
Previous research generally used leverage level change and debt issue for testing 
„financial deficit‟ and firms‟ securities issuance behaviours. In particular, „pure debt 
issue‟ has not been used before and can indicate what is a „firm‟s true choice of 
security issuance.‟ This variable is important because, as firms occasionally issue 
equity and debt simultaneously, we can easily mis-understand the real purpose of 
issuing securities. Our results, using these three different issuances, indicate that 
equity issuance shows a stronger relationship with „financial deficit‟ than does debt 
issuance. This is inconsistent with the pecking order theory. 
 
Third, in this thesis, the analysis makes use of the General Method of Moments 
(GMM) as this addresses methodological issues relating to time series panel data 
since there is a high likelihood that variables that explain capital structure are highly 
correlated over time. It is therefore presumed that the results are more accurate than 
when using normal OLS. Furthermore, the GMM is a relatively new method in 
finance research, as well as capital structure research. 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis  
 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters and five appendices, all providing 
supplementary material.  
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The research motivations, objectives and contributions are outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure and 
emphasis on them from a critical viewpoint. The three most important capital 
structure theories are explained with their relative determinants. Important capital 
structure determinants that affect new debt or equity issuing choices are introduced. 
The hypotheses based on capital structures continue in the following section. The 
hypotheses will be tested in later chapters. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodology related items, data set, static and dynamic 
models for statistical analyses. Static and dynamic analysing methods which will be 
used in later chapters are described. The criteria for a firm‟s characteristic decision; 
and data-snooping bias, caused by cluster analyses, are described in this chapter. For 
the bankruptcy probability decision, Altman‟s Z-score models are described. The 
models will be used in later chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 examines Modigliani and Miller‟s irrelevance theory (1958), to find out 
whether there are systemic differences in debt ratio based on industry, country and 
time. The results show that leverage levels have changed over time and that there are 
similarities and differences in terms of debt ratios among industries and countries 
during the sample time period. The results imply that a firm‟s value might be 
affected by leverage levels and that there might be an optimal capital structure. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 compare three different major capital structure theories, trade-off, 
pecking order, and market timing theories, in order to decide which is the most valid. 
This comparison is based on the hypotheses from three major capital structure 
theories. We have considered these hypotheses in Chapter 2. Static and dynamic 
models are used for the analysis. In confirming the predictions of the three theories, 
the results indicate that the trade-off theory has the strongest validity. The results 
show that the pecking order theory does not indicate that firms with a funding 
requirement issue debt. Nor can the market timing theory generally explain the 
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results in this chapter, because firms continuously release equity regardless of the 
equity price during the sample period.  
 
Chapter 7 tests the three major capital structure theories, and describes the different 
debt-equity choice modes of firms, again based on firms‟ characteristics. The results 
in this chapter mainly indicate that the most important matter for firms is financial 
distress or survival. For example, firms shift gearing levels more rapidly if they are 
in financial difficulty; and those with relatively strong financial positions use more 
debt. 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 8 examines whether the aims of the research have been 
achieved, describes the contributions to the research and indicates future studies 
which, based on this thesis, would widen the research area. 
 
Finally, there are five appendices. The first appendix provides details of the number 
of sample firms based on industry, country and economy, and the theoretical 
background of a variable selection for analysis. The second appendix provides 
additional literature that describes, in detail, the capital structure theory‟s 
development with regard to tax and optimal debt levels. The third appendix describes 
statistical considerations when using panel data and variable choice criteria in 
statistical terms. The fourth and fifth appendices report the complete statistical 
results for Chapters 4 and 7.  
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Chapter II Literature review of capital structure theory 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Academic researchers have developed a number of capital structure theories. This 
chapter reviews these theoretical and empirical literatures, with particular emphasis 
on those theories that are examined from Chapter 4 to Chapter 7.  
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) published their seminal paper proposing the 
irrelevance theorem, the „capital structure decision problem‟ has puzzled researchers, 
and they have begun to investigate the relationship between leverage levels and firms‟ 
values. In a perfect capital market, Modigliani and Miller argue that the value of 
firms is not affected by the choice of gearing ratio (see Section 2.1 of the Appendix 2 
in which the full assumptions of irrelevance theory are described). This argument 
however, has been challenged by subsequent researchers, who have found that 
several other factors influence capital structure decisions. There are four major 
capital structure theories based on three assumptions. The four major capital 
structure theories are: (1) the static trade-off, (2) pecking order, (3) market timing, 
and (4) free cash-flow theories; and the three assumptions are: (1) the tax benefits of 
gearing, (2) bankruptcy costs and (3) asymmetric information. The static trade-off 
theory is based on the tax benefits of gearing and bankruptcy costs; and the pecking 
order, free cash-flow and market timing theories are based on asymmetric 
information. In this thesis, only three major capital structure theories, the static trade-
off, pecking order, and market timing theories, with the exception of the free cash-
flow theory, are tested across the chapters.  
 
In the static trade-off theory, firms endeavour to maximise their value by balancing 
the tax benefits against financial distress cost. In other words, firms can increase their 
value by increasing the tax shield, as long as the bankruptcy costs do not exceed the 
tax benefits. The optimal capital structure is where the firm‟s value is maximised; 
and it is only the static trade-off theory that argues the existence of an optimum 
gearing level in the four major capital structure theories. To investigate whether 
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firms change their debt ratios to achieve the optimal level, the „dynamic leverage 
level adjustment behaviours‟ across time are tested. A drawback of the static trade-
off theory is that this approach considers only one benefit (from a tax shield) and one 
cost (related to financial distress), even though the idea of the theory relates to the 
increasing of a firm‟s value, and there are many other ways of increasing such a 
value. Therefore, as will be described later on, much empirical research indicates the 
unimportance of tax benefits and the denial of an optimal capital structure. 
 
On the other hand, in the pecking order and market timing theories, firms do not 
consider increasing their value by leverage level choice. However, they do try to 
reduce asymmetric information costs, which are represented by new securities‟ 
issuing costs. For instance, firms in the pecking order theory endeavour to minimise 
issuing costs, while those in the market timing theory try to increase their benefit by 
issuing stock at high (overvalued) prices. This implies that these theories also 
presume that firms attempt to increase their value by having overestimated issuing 
opportunities, or by avoiding the undervalued issuing from IPOs or SEOs. A 
drawback of these theories is that they only consider reducing the asymmetric 
information costs although there are other opportunities to increase benefits such as 
through the use of a tax shield.   
 
As described, a leverage level at which a firm‟s value is maximised by the choice of 
debt ratio is called an „optimal capital structure‟ in the static trade-off theory. In the 
static trade-off world, a firm‟s debt ratios, of course, move towards the optimal 
gearing level in order to increase their value. Namely, the optimal capital structure is 
a target gearing ratio that firms attempt to achieve. No other theory suggests the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. However, at the end of the pecking order 
article, Myers (1984) suggests a dynamic version of gearing ratio choice in the 
pecking order world. Fama and French (2005) named this as the „complex pecking 
order theory‟ (see Section 2.2.4.1 in which the complex pecking order theory is 
explained, with a theoretical introduction and empirical research results). Myers 
(ibid.) argues that firms seek the temporal optimum gearing ratios (or optimum cash 
holding) and attempt to achieve them in order to increase their debt capacity when 
14 
they come to borrowing to meet the firms‟ future cash need (e.g. for new investment) 
in the complex pecking order theory. Therefore, the temporal target leverage level in 
the complex pecking order world is not the same as the optimal capital structure (or 
target) in the static trade-off theory. However, both theories indicate desirable target 
gearing levels. In other words, firms achieve their targets by maximising their value 
in terms of the trade-off theory, and by minimising their issuing costs (asymmetric 
information costs) according to the complex pecking order theory. This implies that 
the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory have the same motivation, 
that is, to increase a firm‟s value. 
 
Last but not least, in practice there are many other elements that influence capital 
structure decisions. In a large number of empirical studies, capital structure is 
affected by other determinants such as industry, country and different periods of time 
(macro-economic conditions). These determinants might make it difficult to observe 
a typical „capital structure decision making behaviour‟ on the part of firms. In other 
words, if firms have many capital-structure-decision determinants, they should 
consider all of them, which leads to a different „leverage ratio choice mode‟ for each 
firm because all firms face different leverage level decision circumstances as 
regarding these various determinants. These determinants are not considered as being 
important debt ratio decision elements in the major capital structure theories. 
However, they are, in general, conceptually related to the major capital structure 
theories. Firm size and age, for example, are related to both bankruptcy costs and 
asymmetric information. A difference in time might be related to the asymmetric 
information costs that change over time as regarding financial market conditions.    
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 describes the 
major capital structure theories that are then tested in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. This section also shows how the different capital structure theories are 
connected. Section 2.3 introduces other important capital structure determinants that 
influence the leverage level. The determinants are indirectly related to the major 
capital structure theories, although they are not a major concern of these theories. 
Section 2.4 describes hypotheses based on different capital structure theories and 
15 
determinants. These are the hypotheses that will be tested in later chapters. Finally, 
the main theoretical and research issues are summarised in Section 2.5.  
 
2.2 Three major capital structure theories 
The irrelevance theory put forward by Modigliani and Miller (1958) was proposed to 
operate under perfect capital market conditions. The resultant disagreement about the 
applicability of the theory led academic researchers to subsequently relax the 
conditions of perfect capital markets in line with the observed condition in the real 
world. The three major restrictions that academic researchers have focused on are: (1) 
the existence of tax shields, (2) bankruptcy costs and (3) asymmetric information. 
Figure 2.1 shows the „major capital structure theories developments‟ with three 
critical restrictions. The figure shows that all these „major capital structure theories‟ 
are affected by bankruptcy costs and incoming cash-flows. In other words, the 
incoming cash-flows are generated by maximising tax benefits in the static trade-off 
theory, and by maximising incoming cash-flows from the issue of new securities in 
the market timing theory, and minimising asymmetric information costs in the 
pecking order theory and in the free cash-flow theory. 
 
At the end of Figure 2.1, it is illustrated that all theories converge to the „wider trade-
off theory,‟ which considers all the determinants that can change a firm‟s value when 
it chooses a leverage level. Moles et al. (2011) and Leland (1998) also imply that all 
theories should be jointly recognised in terms of capital structure determination. The 
„wider trade-off theory‟ is based on Megginson‟s (1977) and Ross‟s (1995) 
arguments that leverage level choice is based on a common motivation that a firm 
seeks opportunities to increase its value by having the „appropriate-capital-structure-
choice modes.‟ In other words, the „wider trade-off theory‟ enlarges traditional static 
trade-off theory by including all other costs and benefits that occur during the 
„capital structure decision process‟ (Fama and French, 2005). Namely, unlike the 
original static trade-off theory that considers only two factors (tax benefits and 
bankruptcy costs), the idea of „wider trade-off theory‟ is driven by the idea that firms 
consider all costs- and benefits-making opportunities, such as transaction costs, 
agency costs, tax shields, the issue of overvalued new-securities, and stock buybacks 
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(or debt-for-equity swaps) when the stock price is low. All these matters can change 
a firm‟s value as a result of its mode of leverage level decisions. This thesis tests the 
wider trade-off theory by indicating how the three major capital structure theories 
together can explain firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours. 
 
Finally, Table 2.1 shows that each capital structure theory considers different 
assumptions when it comes to explaining firms‟ „leverage level changes.‟ Since each 
theory concerns debt-equity-choice modes under different assumptions, the different 
explanations of „leverage level changing behaviours‟ and optimal capital structure 
are expected. The table indicates that most theories consider financial distress costs 
and the value maximisation of a firm.  
 
Table 2.1 Major considerations associated with different capital structure theories 
Each capital structure theory considers gearing levels based on different assumptions which determine 
the different „leverage level changing behaviours.‟ This table indicates that different capital structure 













Irrelevance theory √      
Static trade-off 
theory 
 √ √   √ 
Pecking order 
theory 
  √ √ √ √ 
Market timing 
theory 
  √ √ √ √ 
Free cash-flow 
theory 
  √  √  
Wider trade-off 
theory 





Figure 2.1 Capital structure theories development 
Using three major restrictions on capital structure decisions and by studying previous research which is related to these restrictions, we create Figure 2.1. Major capital 
structure theories have been developed through the addition of some further assumptions since Modigliani and Miller‟s (1958) irrelevance theory which was assumed 
to operate under perfect capital market conditions. Modigliani and Miller (1963) then relaxed the perfect capital market assumption by considering tax shields, and 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) introduced the static trade-off theory as operating under two conditions: tax benefits, and bankruptcy costs. The pecking order, free 
cash-flow and market timing theories have been developed based on an asymmetric information assumption. Recently, economists have opened up the idea of the 
trade-off theory to involve more „firm-value-changing opportunities‟ when firms choose leverage levels.   
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Market timing theory 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
Each firm has optimal debt ratios 
Wider trade-off theory, Morellec (2004), Fama and French (2005) 




2.2.1 Taxes and debt ratios 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) amend their irrelevance theory. They address the tax 
effect and find that, owing to tax shields on interest, gearing increases the value of a 
firm. Their model does not take bankruptcy costs into account. Furthermore, Miller 
(1977) shows that, when personal tax is taken into account, the irrelevance theory is 
still right, and argues that bankruptcy costs are too small to consider. Extending 
Miller‟s analysis, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) assert that each firm has a different 
optimal gearing ratio, based on different debt and equity issuing prices, earnings and 
tax rates. In other words, this unique optimal leverage level leads to capital structure 
differences across industries, time and tax rates (see Appendix 2, which gives a full 
explanation of Modigliani and Miller, 1958; and their later amendment, 1963; Miller, 
1977; and DeAngelo and Masulie‟s model, 1980). 
 
2.2.1.1 How big is the tax shield? 
In Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963) amended theorem, a firm‟s value is increased as 
leverage levels increase, which is caused by tax shields. However, in the pecking 
order theory, this assumption is less important because, it assumes that the tax 
benefits are generally smaller than asymmetric costs (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999).  
 
On the other hand, a large number of previous articles have proved the existence of 
the taxation effect. Kemsley and Nissim (2002) and Graham (2003), for instance, 
estimate the tax shield at about 10% of a firm‟s value and Korteweg (2010) estimates 
about 5.5% within a controlling homogeneity industry. Huizinga et al. (2008) also 
show that multi-national firms vary their capital structures across countries in which 
they operate because when there is a change of tax policy in a country, the tax shield 
leads to a change in debt ratio. Moreover, Graham (2003) and Booth et al. (2001) 
show that the tax rate is positively related to a firm‟s leverage ratio. Similarly, Desai 
et al. (2004) show, by using multi-national affiliates, that the debt ratio rises by 2.8% 
if local tax rates increase by 10%. Guenther and Willenborg (1999), Poterba and 
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Weisbenner (2001) and Klein (2001) also find indirectly that personal taxes affect 
share trading volumes and share prices (Dai, 2008).  
 
Without a doubt, taxes affect a firm‟s value as well as leverage levels, even though 
the importance is not as much as Modigliani and Miller (1963) expected. 
Furthermore, a number of previous studies, such as Shefrin (2007) and Beattie et al. 
(2006), find that tax is not a major matter compared with survival. The overall 
implications of tax benefits are, therefore, that there are tax shields but (direct and 
indirect) bankruptcy costs in static trade-off theory and asymmetric information costs 
in the pecking order theory reduce them; and in the static trade-off theory, 
bankruptcy costs might be greater than the tax shields. Bankruptcy costs are 
discussed in Section 2.2.2.1. 
 
2.2.2 Trade-off theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) suggest the static trade-off theory in an imperfect 
capital market condition, using two assumptions, (1) bankruptcy costs and (2) tax 
shield. On the one hand, as the leverage ratio increases, a firm‟s value also increases 
because of the tax shield effect. On the other hand, the cost of capital increases as the 
gearing level rises by increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Contrary to 
Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963) proposition, the static trade-off theory asserts that 
bankruptcy costs overwhelm the tax shield when firms have too much debt. At least, 
from the empirical evidence, if a firm has too high a gearing level, the probability of 
bankruptcy increases rapidly. Thus, the firm selects its leverage level to obtain the 
lowest cost of capital (generally, minimising its Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC)) to maximise firm value. Figure 2.2 illustrates the changes of WACC as a 
firm increases its leverage level. Damodaran (1999) and Altman (1984) suggest that 
the optimum debt level is achieved when tax shields and bankruptcy costs are the 
same; at which time the WACC is minimised (Ross et al., 1995: Appendix 2 in 
which the relationship between debt level, WACC and optimal debt level is 
explained). As Figure 2.2 illustrates it is the relationship between debt level and 
WACC that decides the optimal leverage level.  
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Figure 2.2 Optimal capital structure in static trade-off theory 
The static trade-off theory assumes that firms balance the tax shields against financial distress costs. 
The WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) indicates that an optimal capital structure is placed 
where the firm‟s highest market value is at the same point at which the WACC is at its lowest level.    
 
 
2.2.2.1 Bankruptcy probability and costs  
Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963) and Miller‟s (1977) argument is that bankruptcy 
costs are not great compared to the tax shield; and, in terms of asymmetric 
information theories, such as those of Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Harvey et al. (2004) and others, agency costs are greater than bankruptcy costs. All 
this research suggests that bankruptcy costs are too small to be considered. 
  
Miller (1977) argues that bankruptcy costs are not important compared to tax shields 
in a determining a firm‟s value. He adds that bankruptcy costs are “mainly [about] the 
Firm value 
Total cost 
Financial distress costs 
Firm value under all equity finance 
Optimum                                                    Debt 
 
WACC 
  Tax shield 
Cost under all equity finance 
  Tax shield 
Financial distress costs 
Cost with MM (1963) 
where,  : Firm value without financial distress costs 
: WACC without financial distress costs 
: Firm value with tax shield and financial distress costs 
: WACC with tax shield and financial distress costs 
: Firm value under all equity finance 
: WACC under all equity finance 
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bankruptcies of individuals, with small businesses, mostly proprietorships and typically 
undergoing liquidation rather than reorganization (p.262).” These matters are generally not 
related to the firm‟s value, especially for big firms. Similarly, Haugen and Senbet 
(1978) argue that direct bankruptcy costs are small [1% of a firm‟s value according 
to Warner (1977) for example] and liquidation costs, including indirect costs, are not 
related to bankruptcy costs. For example, the liquidation costs of unprofitable firms 
are a matter of capital budgeting, rather than capital structure; and if the firm is likely 
to go bankrupt it needs to go into liquidation or to be sold to new stock buyers. If the 
firm is sold in the competitive financial market, new shareholders regard the direct 
and indirect bankruptcy costs when they buy the firm; namely, the price will fetch a 
fair price with regard to all other costs and benefits; and the liquidation occurs when 
dismantled-asset values exceed market values. Therefore bankruptcy costs do not 
greatly affect a firm‟s value. 
   
However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Marsh (1982), Mayers and Smith (1990), 
Bris et al. (2006) and others show that bankruptcy costs significantly affect the 
financial structure of a firm. Therefore, firms with high bankruptcy costs cannot hold 
too much debt even though there are tax benefits. Previous research shows that 
bankruptcy costs are even greater than tax benefits. Shefrin (2007), for example, 
argues that tax shields are a secondary matter [compared with survival]. Beattie et al. 
(2006) find that, in the UK, „long-term survivability‟ is the most important capital 
structure determinant and, in the US, financial flexibility and credit ratings are the 
most important factors (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Furthermore, Graham (2000) 
adds that if firms increase their leverage levels up to a certain point where their 
increasing-marginal-tax-shield effect becomes zero and moves towards a negative 
(the point where „kink‟ becomes less than one
2
 or the lowest WACC), these firms 
would obtain up to 15% of their values, but firms use just 9.7% tax shield, because 
managers might consider that the costs of financial distress are too severe to increase 
leverage levels to obtain full benefit from the tax shield effect. Recent working 
                                               
2 Graham (2000, p.1902) defines kinks as “…the ratio of the amount of interest required to make the tax rate 
function slope downward (in the numerator) to actual interest expense (in the denominator).” In other words, 
increasing interest rate is greater than increasing tax benefit after the point of kink if a firm raises its 
debt level. 
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papers by Binsbergen et al. (2010; 2011) also argue that the cost of using too little 
debt is smaller than the cost of using too much debt. All this literature indicates the 
importance of bankruptcy costs in capital structure theories. 
 
There are two kinds of bankruptcy costs, direct and indirect (Warner, 1977). Direct 
costs occur when a firm goes bankrupt, but indirect costs can occur before 
bankruptcy. Direct bankruptcy costs include fees for lawyers, accountants, and other 
professionals, and the managerial costs involved in administering the bankruptcy. On 
the other hand, Altman (1984) indicates that indirect bankruptcy costs include the 
reduction of product demand, increasing production costs due to increasing tension 
between raw material suppliers and firms, and leaving key employees, are all 
significant. From the causality study by Opler and Titman (1994), highly leveraged 
firms lose market shares to less leveraged rivals in the event of an industry‟s 
downturn.  
 
There are a number of previous articles that have studied bankruptcy costs. They 
show a wide range of such costs. For example, Warner (1977), using 11 bankrupt 
railroad companies, shows that the average direct bankruptcy costs are just about 1% 
of a firm‟s value prior to bankruptcy. Ang et al. (1982) estimate the administrative 
costs of bankruptcy at 7.5%. Altman (1984) suggests that bankruptcy costs are 
between 11% and over 20% of a firm‟s value, based on one year prior to the 
bankruptcy. He separates the bankruptcy costs into direct and indirect costs and 
suggests that the direct and indirect bankruptcy costs are 6.2% and 10.5% of a firm‟s 
value, respectively. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) also estimate that financial distress 
costs are between 10% and 20% of a firm‟s value. Bris et al. (2006) add that 
bankruptcy costs vary, and are predictable from each case, and that these costs are 
approximately between 2% and 20% of assets. Therefore, in general, managers are 
more concerned about bankruptcy than tax benefits from debt, particularly where 




Last but not least, Damodaran‟s formula
3
 (1999: see Section 2.3 in Appendix 2 for 
the related topics) documents that expected bankruptcy costs can be calculated by 
multiplying the actual bankruptcy costs (BC) that firms have to spend when they go 
into bankruptcy by the bankruptcy probability (πa); namely, BC× πa. As described, 
Bris et al. (2006) also suggest that bankruptcy costs are predictable. Furthermore, 
Altman (1993) documents that bankruptcy can be predictable by as much as two 
reporting periods before the bankruptcy happens. There are two ways to assess 
bankruptcy probability: (1) using accounting financial data, and (2) using market 
stock price data, based on the „structural models‟ (see Section 1.2.2. in Appendix 1, 
in which both accounting- and market-based bankruptcy probability models are fully 
explained). Altman‟s Z-score (1968), modified Z-score (2000), Emerging Market 
Score model (EMS, 2005) and Ohlson‟s O-score models (1980) are based on an 
accounting measure. The distance to default model (EDF: Expected Default 
Frequency) by using the Black-Sholes-Merton approach (Merton, 1974) is based on 
stock prices. Agarwal and Taffler (2008), who make comparisons between 
accounting-based and market-based bankruptcy prediction models, indicate that there 
is little difference between them in terms of predictive accuracy. In this thesis, the 
accounting-based measures are used.  
 
2.2.2.2 Wider trade-off with other costs 
Unlike the assumption of the traditional static trade-off theory that only considers tax 
shields and bankruptcy costs, in the real world there are a number of other 
opportunities to increase a firm‟s value and to decrease its costs, when it comes to a 
firm choosing its debt levels. Therefore, the wider trade-off theory considers more 
determinants associated with generation of costs and benefits in line with debt ratio 
changes.    
 
For example, Hovakimian et al. (2004), Morellec (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009) 
and others consider the cost of agency problems. Morellec (2004) includes the 
                                               
3
 The value of leveraged firms =(FCFF0(1+g)/(ρu-g))+tcD-πaBC, where FCFF0(1+g)/(ρu-g): the 
unleveraged firm‟s value, FCCF: the current after-tax operating cash-flow to the firm, ρu: the 
unlevered cost of equity, g: the expected grow rate, tc: tax rate, D: debt, πa: the probability of 
bankruptcy, and BC: present value of bankruptcy cost 
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agency problem between shareholders and managers, as well as between tax benefits 
and bankruptcy costs in his study of trade-off capital structures. He explains 
observations of low debt levels, in practice, using agency costs. Fama and French 
(2005) also consider the benefits of free cash-flows and the cost of conflicts between 
stockholders and bondholders, by explaining the costs and benefits of the trade-off 
theory. They imply that the pecking order theory is only about the cost of issuing 
new securities caused by asymmetric information; and the issuing cost may be no 
more than a transaction cost. Overall, all these studies suggest the same motivation as 
traditional trade-off theory though they take more variables into account. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Agency costs in the capital structure decision 
Since Berle and Means (1932), research on the consequences of the separation of 
ownership and control of firms started (Myers, 2001) and the agency theory as 
studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976) builds on previous work by Fama and Miller 
(1972) (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
problems have become an important matter in the capital structure theory (Bancel 
and Mittoo, 2004). There are generally two different agency problems, which exist 
between shareholders and bondholders, and between shareholders and managers.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) document three agency costs caused by increasing debt. 
They argue that high debt is the cause of (1) losing opportunities to increase a firm‟s 
wealth, (2) monitoring and bonding expenditures
4
, and (3) bankruptcy and 
reorganisation costs. Importantly, they suggest that bankruptcy costs and 
reorganisation costs are agency costs. Myers (1977) suggests the existence of an 
under-investment problem, caused by a conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders, similar to the arguments put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Leland and Toft (1996). They mention that firms with high debt ratios need to 
give enough compensation to bondholders, such as renegotiating debt contracts or 
shortening debt maturity. Therefore, firms with good investment opportunities cannot 
                                               
4 Bonding costs are paid to agents to guarantee that borrowers will not harm the principal by taking 
any action (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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invest when they have high leverage levels, as it could be of more benefit to 
bondholders than to shareholders (Brounen et al., 2006). As described, Leland and 
Toft (1996) suggest short-term debt, and Green (1984) suggests convertible debt to 
solve this under-investment problem. 
  
There are also agency problems between shareholders and managers. As the 
managers are employed by the stockholders, it is not necessary for them to invest all 
their efforts into managing the firms. To entice managers to use all their ability to 
increase the firm‟s value, they are offered stock options or stocks by the shareholders. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) also argue that inefficiency in managing firms can be 
reduced if managers hold the firms‟ equity or the firms use more debt.  
 
2.2.2.2.2 Transaction costs 
Myers (1984), in the pecking order theory, suggests the presence of „capital structure 
adjustment costs‟ and suggests how they are related to the trade-off theory. He points 
out that: 
 
Large adjustment costs could possibly explain the observed wide variation in 
actual debt ratios, […] If adjustment costs are large, […] then we ought to 
give less attention to refining our static trade-off stories and relatively more to 
understanding what the adjustment costs are, why they are so important and 
how rational managers would respond to them (p.587). 
 
This implies that transaction costs reduce the effects of the trade-off theory. 
Moreover, under the traditional static trade-off view, transaction costs are not 
included in the theory. Transaction cost, however, is an important factor as part of 
the dynamic trade-off and the pecking order theories. Hennessy and Whited (2005) 
also suggest the important role of transaction costs in the capital structure movement 
towards optimal debt ratios. If transaction costs were nil or negligible, firms would 
change debt ratios immediately, and the leverage levels would always be at an 
optimal level. In the real world, firms could not change them immediately because 
there are transaction costs involved. In practice, firms adjust their capital structure 
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infrequently and in clusters (Hovakimian et al., 2004; Leary and Roberts, 2005). This 
also implies that transaction costs, together with bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, 
play a major role when explaining „dynamic capital structure adjustment behaviours.‟ 
In other words, the pecking order theory might be part of a wider trade-off theory in 
the bigger picture, because issuing costs in the pecking order theory is a kind of 
transaction cost. 
 
2.2.3 Dynamic capital structure adjustment  
„Dynamic capital structure adjustment‟ is based on the static trade-off theory because 
it argues that firms try to achieve optimal leverage levels. Firms, in general, cannot 
maintain optimal leverage levels for various reasons. For example, companies have 
too much (or too little) revenue to stay at the optimal level, and they prepare cash for 
new investment purposes. In the dynamic trade-off theory, when firms deviate from 
target debt ratios by more than their tolerable ranges, they attempt to return to the 
optimal or normal levels. The dynamic trade-off theory, therefore, focuses more on 
the behaviour of firms than on the static situation. 
 
Studies by Fischer et al. (1989) and Hovakimian et al. (2004) suggest that, with the 
existence of agency costs, firms passively change their capital structure by earnings 
and losses, and let the debt ratios deviate from the target until adjustment costs are 
exceeded by the cost of having a non-optimal leverage level. It is, therefore, the 
expected debt ratio changes, based on dynamic movements, which point in the same 
direction as the (complex) pecking order theory, as long as the „capital structure 
adjustment cost‟ is greater than the staying costs in the non-optimal capital structure 
(see Section 2.2.4.1, which describes the details of complex pecking order theory). 
This implies that profits and losses from a firm‟s operation of business are negatively 
and positively related, respectively, to debt ratios, until the firm adjusts its capital 
structure. A large body of research, such as that of Mitton (2007), Antoniou et al. 




2.2.3.1 Target capital structure 
A large number of researchers have been continuously looking for the optimal debt 
ratio because the trade-off theory is accepted if there is an optimal capital structure 
(or a target leverage level). The target should be an optimal debt level at which firms 
will have a maximal value. When a firm‟s capital structure is not at the optimal level, 
the firm, as a matter of course, moves toward the targets to increase its value.  
 
According to Graham and Harvey (2001), 71% of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 
have target debt ratios and they like to remain at that chosen leverage levels (Fischer 
et al., 1989; Goldstein et al., 2001). Bancel and Mittoo (2004) also show that two-
thirds of firms in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands have target debt ratios and 
that 10% of them attempt to maintain strict targets. Leary and Roberts (2005) also 
find that companies try to stay within optimal levels in terms of capital structure. In 
addition, Remmers (1974) and Masulis (1983) argue that firms like to have stable 
capital structures if their leverage levels are in efficient ranges, such as the average 
for a certain industry. Recently, Lemmon et al. (2008) observe that debt ratios are 
stable whether they are at low or high levels. Furthermore, Harford et al. (2009) 
show the existence of capital structures by studying the acquisition of firms. They 
show that, after completing an acquisition, firms go back to their normal debt level, 
generally within five years. These facts imply that firms attempt to sustain their 
capital structure at their preferred debt levels, though we do not know whether the 
levels are optimal.  
  
Contrary to this, much previous research has asserted no target debt ratios. For 
instance, Miller (1977) questions why debt ratios change so little if the optimal 
capital structure is a matter of balancing debt ratio. Baker and Wurgler (2002) state 
that debt ratios are decided by issuing new stocks, and firms just issue new equities 
when stock prices are high. Hennessy and Whited (2005) also argue that capital 
structure is decided by lagged cash-flows from investments and Tobin‟s Q. This 
implies that leverage levels are decided by residual effects from a firm‟s operation of 
business and stock price alterations, rather than a manager‟s will. This is consistent 
with the pecking order and inertia theories.  
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2.2.3.2 Dynamic capital structure adjustment 
The capital structure adjusting process is mostly concerned with three factors: (1) 
debt ratio changing speed, (2) the availability of new projects and (3) adjustment 
costs. As described, Fischer et al. (1989), Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Leary and 
Robert (2005) show infrequent capital structure adjustments. They argue that there 
will be too much cost if firms adjust their gearing levels frequently.  
 
There are more studies that investigate „capital structure adjustment speed‟ and the 
factors that affect this speed. Damodaran (1999), for example, indicates that firms 
decrease their leverage levels gradually by the implementation of new good projects 
which use new debt. Namely, a firm can increase or decrease its leverage level by the 
implementation of a project. Fama and French (2002) and Opler et al. (1999) show 
that firms adjust debt ratios toward their targets at different speeds (Driffield et al., 
2005). Antoniou et al. (2008) also show that firms, in different countries, move 
towards their targets at different speeds, with French firms being the fastest and 
Japanese firms being the slowest. Furthermore, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) argue 
that the speed of adjustment vary over time and companies, and also mention that a 
firm‟s size, interest rates, and stock prices affect the adjustment speed. With regard 
to these previous studies, we can expect that firms adjust their capital structures, 
which in turn are affected by various elements. 
 
2.2.4 Pecking order theory 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) explain the „debt and equity issue‟ using 
asymmetric information. According to Myers (2001), the pecking order theory would 
achieve the same conclusion as Modigliani and Miller (1963) if there was no 
asymmetric information problem. In the world where asymmetric information exists 
between market participants however, external investors have less information than 
management. Thus, external investors ask for discounted prices for new issues of 
stocks or bonds (Autore and Kovacs, 2004); otherwise internal investors would 
benefit because they could release new securities with the wrong information. 
Therefore, in the pecking order theory, firms generally issue secure securities first, 
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because external investors require small discounts on them. There is a hierarchy of 
confidence from a secure security to a less secure one, based on security types. By 
using the hierarchy, firms can minimise asymmetric information costs. The best 
policy in the pecking order theory is to use internal funds and issue debt, if necessary.  
 
However, from the study by Fama and French (2005) at least, during their sample 
period, from 1973 to 2002, more than 67% of the sample firms issue some equities 
each year, and a small number of firms repurchase equity to offset the issuance. This 
implies that asymmetric information may bring the opposite result (e.g. over-
estimated stock prices), or that managements are risk averse or pessimistic, or that 
asymmetric information costs are not as high as Myers thought. This thesis also 
arrives at a similar conclusion in that firms had more net stock issues than net debt 
issues during the sample period. 
 
In addition, as firms use only internal funds, there is no optimal leverage level in the 
pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Debt ratio is just changed by 
an imbalance of inward and outward cash-flows, such as operating income, dividends 
and investment. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (ibid.) also mention that, if financial 
distress costs are ignored, firms, in general, issue debt. Conversely, firms issue equity 
when they face high financial distress costs, or when managers are less optimistic. 
This is consistent with the static trade-off theory.  
 
2.2.4.1 Complex pecking order theory 
Myers (1984, pp.589-590) suggests “…an „optimal dynamic issue strategy‟ for firms under 
asymmetric information” called the „complex (or modified) pecking order theory,‟ 
which considers asymmetric information, new investment opportunities and financial 
distress costs. He explains this by saying that “…we could start with a story based on 
asymmetric information and expand it by adding only those elements of the static trade-off […]” 
Myers, therefore, suggests an equity issue when asymmetric information is low. This 
implies issuing equity when the stock price is abnormally high (over-estimated or 
fair-priced) in the market. 
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Fama and French (2005, p.31) suggest a firm‟s behaviour within the complex 
pecking order theory as: “…firms balance current and expected future financing costs.” 
Firms, therefore, lower dividend payouts and leverages, issue equity when agency 
costs are low, and accumulate retained earnings to increase the debt capacity for 
future large-scale investment (Fama and French, 2002). This model, as Fama and 
French mention, might be a hybrid theory between the trade-off and the pecking 
order theories. This complex pecking order theory implies that firms should consider 
their capital structure in the longer term than is the case with the simple pecking 
order theory. Therefore, there is no target debt ratio according to the simple pecking 
order theory (Myers, 1984) whereas, under the complex model a company may have 
a temporal target capital structure for its future needs.  
 
In other words, in the trade-off theory, optimal capital structure leads to high firm 
values, while the temporal target debt ratios in the complex pecking order theory 
lessen financing costs. Fama and French (2002) therefore assert that low leverage 
firms attempt to increase their debt levels with the trade-off theory, but not with the 
complex pecking order theory when they have investment opportunities (see Section 
6.3.3 for more details). 
 
2.2.5 Market timing and pecking order theory 
According to Shefrin (2007), market timing, financial flexibility and issuing costs are 
the primary matters with regard to deciding on capital structure, at least in the short-
term, and traditional considerations, such as taxes and the cost of financial distress, 
are secondary matters. Miller (1977) has already noticed that, during economic 
expansion, leverage levels tend to fall because equity financing increase with a bull 
stock market. In other words, firms simply issue new securities whenever the 
financial market conditions favour issuing, namely issuing at low (asymmetric) costs 
(Opler et al., 1999; Mayer, 1984; Mayer and Majluf, 1984; Lucas and McDonald, 
1990; Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
 




 […] most new issues are sold under „favourable market conditions‟ – which 
means favourable for the seller and consequently less favourable for the buyer 
[…] this is one aspect of general tendency to sell new securities of all types 
when conditions are most favourable to the issuer […] Bull market periods are 
usually characterized by the transformation of a large number of privately 
owned businesses into companies with quoted shares […] In many cases the 
issues lose 75% and more of their offering price (pp.139-144).  
 
Namely, that the market is favourable to the seller, meaning that stocks are over-
priced in the market which benefits companies. 
 
There are a large number of empirical studies about the relationship between security 
issues and market conditions. Brau and Fawcett (2006) argue that CFOs rely strongly 
on overall stock market conditions for the timing of their IPOs. Korajczyk et al. 
(1991) and Leary and Roberts (2005) show, for instance, that equity issues are 
clustered after earning announcements. Leary and Roberts (2005) also show that 
„capital structure adjustments‟ are made when security issuing costs are low. In the 
market timing theory, as Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue, the leverage level is 
decided by an accumulation of residual effects from the new security issuances under 
good market conditions. That is, the present gearing ratio is an outcome of historical 
IPOs and SEOs, and is no more than market timing.  
 
This also implies that CFOs attempt to maximise firms‟ incoming cash-flows by 
selling stocks when the stock price is high, or bonds when interest rates are low. This 
not only increases cash-flows for firms, but also increases their values. This is 
consistent with the pecking order theory, which suggests that firms only use internal 
funds because newly issueed securities are discounted by the market, and the firms 
make a loss on the issue. On the contrary, the market timing theory suggests that 
firms issue equity when the stock price is high (namely, when overvalued) and the 
firms make profits on the issue. The market timing theory, therefore, is another 
version of the pecking order theory. This idea is consistent with a large body of 
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earlier research. For example, according to Elliott et al. (2008), since the market 
timing theory uses misvaluation of stock prices in the financial market, the 
conclusion of Baker and Wurgler (2002) is a sort of extension of Myers‟ (1984) 
pecking order theory.  
 
2.2.5.1 Market timing and asymmetric information 
As discussed above, both the pecking order theory and the market timing theory are 
based on asymmetric information. In the pecking order theory, a firm‟s value is 
under-estimated by market participants owing to the scepticism with regard to 
management‟s announcement of the firm‟s future cash-flow, whereas outside 
investors over-estimate the firm‟s future cash-flow due to asymmetric information in 
the market timing theory (Yuan, 2005). In other words, both a firm‟s over- and 
under-estimated values are caused by high asymmetric information. If there is no 
asymmetric information or a low level of asymmetry, a firm‟s value should be close 
to the intrinsic value. Furthermore, as the pecking order and market timing theories 
assume the opposite market situation, the phenomena of the pecking order and the 
market timing theories never appear simultaneously. Using the ideas from Myers 
(1984), Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Yuan (2005), we create Figure 2.3 which 
illustrates firms‟ values in terms of the pecking order theory and the market timing 




Figure 2.3 The relationship between market timing and pecking order theories 
Using the ideas from Myers (1984), Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Yuan (2005), we create Figure 2.3 
which illustrates firms‟ values in terms of the pecking order theory and the market timing theory under 
the condition of the existence of asymmetric information. The figure illustrates that a firm‟s value is 
[near] its intrinsic value in a perfect capital market situation. However, under an asymmetric 
information condition, external investors can over- or under-estimate a firm‟s value. If they over-
estimate a firm‟s value, then the market timing theory will be applicable, whereas if they under-
estimate it, then it is assumed that the pecking order theory is relevant. As the pecking order and the 
market timing theories assume an opposite market situation, the phenomena of the pecking order 
theory and the market timing theory never appear simultaneously. 
 
 
Even though asymmetric information obstructs equity issues, firms continuously 
issue equity. Myers (1984, p.585) notices that, from the manager‟s viewpoint, 
“…firms will issue equity only when it is overpriced, and debt otherwise.” Myers and Majluf 
(1984, p.220) also argue that “…[one] way to build financial slack was by issuing of stocks 
when manager‟s information advantage is small.” This argument is supported by empirical 
research (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Elliott et al., 2008; Bessler et al., 2011; and 
others).  
 
Elliott et al. (2008), for instance, suggest two reasons for equity issue under 
asymmetric information conditions: (1) the asymmetric information cost is not 
significant unlike the argument of the pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002); 
and (2) managers have superior information about the future of a firm‟s prospects. In 
other words, internal managers expect that future earnings will not be as great as 
external investors expect. As Elliott et al. (ibid.) mention, the second reason is based 
on external investors‟ irrationality. Similarly, Autore and Kovacs (2010) also argue 
that adverse selection costs are low when: (1) firms release all private information to 
the market (Korajczyk et al., 1991); (2) investors have better prospects than 
Market timing theory                                                           Pecking order theory 
Perfect capital market  Over-estimated value Under-estimated value 
                                         Increasing asymmetric information 
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managers (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Autore and Kovacs, ibid.); and (3) firms face 
periods of business expansion (Choe et al., 1993). 
 
This indicates that the pecking order theory (including the market timing theory) and 
the static trade-off theory, are fundamentally the same. Both theories try to reduce 
financing costs. In other words, in the pecking order theory, firms try to reduce 
asymmetric information costs, while in the static trade-off theory they try to 
minimise the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) in order to maximise their 
value. Using the same logic, in the pecking order theory, firms maximise their value 
by minimising financing costs. Flannery and Rangan (2006) also conclude that the 
pecking order theory is a part of the trade-off theory, rather than a unique leverage 
determinant. 
 
In short, our argument is that the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories 
are all based on costs and benefits, and together with value maximising motivation.  
 
2.3 The other capital structure determinants 
We have considered different capital structure theories with tax benefits, bankruptcy 
costs, and asymmetric information costs. A number of previous pieces of research 
have shown that capital structure is affected by some other determinants, such as 
country, industry, firm size, firm age and market situations. Thus, we need to 
consider these determinants, which are generally related to the economic 
environment, and a firm‟s characteristics. These determinants are used in the thesis 
as criteria for a firm‟s characteristics.  
  
2.3.1 Country 
Antoniou et al. (2008) suggest that capital structure is decided by a firm‟s own 
characteristics, as well as, by the environmental situation and the traditions in which 
they are operating. Notably, they assert that the same capital structure determinants 
affect leverage level in the same ways with different strengths in different countries. 
Song and Philippatos (2004), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Daskalakis and Psillaki 
(2008) and others show there exists capital structure differences between countries. 
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In addition, Booth et al. (2001) and Jong et al. (2008) argue that the debt ratio 
differences are caused by country-specific factors such as GDP growth and capital 
market development.  
 
One notable issue in the matter of country is that each country has a different 
economic philosophy and history. For example, Collins and Sekely (1983), by using 
different cultural groups, argue that capital structures are, significantly different in 
places where the headquarters of companies are and that a country more significantly 
affects capital structures than industry. Wald (1999) suggests that different countries 
may have different sensitivities towards bankruptcy probability; namely, firms in the 
US are more sensitive than Japanese firms. Moreover, Anglo-Saxon countries 
(particularly the US and the U.K) generally follow the classical microeconomic 
market theory viewpoint compared with European nations. German and Japanese 
economies are more likely to be classified as welfare economies (Galbraith, 1991; 
Dore, 2000). Even though firms in the UK and the US are in the same Anglo-Saxon 
economy, US firms are more competitive and pro-shareholders than British firms 
(Dore, 2000). There are also historical differences between the two groups of 
economies. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon economies, the industrial development of Japan, 
Germany and France is led by their governments, an idea which has been followed in 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan. 
 
The second distinguishable matter is the legal system. The UK, the US, Canada and 
Australia‟s legal systems are based on a common law system. France, Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan follow a civil (code) law system
5
 (Antoniou et al., 
2008; La Porta et al., 2000). Jong et al. (2008) find, by using the definition of La 
Porta et al. (1998), the importance of legal enforcement, e.g. creditor or shareholder 
rights protection. Jong et al. (2008) show, for instance, that legal enforcement 
increases the strength of the bond market. La Porta et al. (2000) also argue that firms 
in countries with better protection of small shareholders pay more dividends. 
Contractual priority is also different between countries. For example, while Britain 
                                               
5 On some occasions, Korea, Japan and Taiwan are classified as hybrid systems. (Antoniou, Guney 
and Paudyal, 2008) 
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and Germany have tough bankruptcy procedures, this is not the case in the US 
(Hackbarth et al., 2007). Hackbarth et al. (2007) argue that when contractual 
priorities can be easily violated, firms are more likely to go to the financial market 
for financing instead of going to a bank. In fact, firms in the US finance about 25% 
of their total debt from the market, but less than 1% in Germany and only 4.4% in 
Britain (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
 
Thirdly, firms rely on different financing methods across countries. Firms in the 
Anglo-Saxon economy, for example, are more likely to be financial market based for 
finance but those in the European economy (particularly France and Germany) and 
Japan are more likely to be bank based when it comes to finance (Antoniou et al., 
2008). Antoniou et al. (2008) expect that firms in bank-orientated economies have 
lower agency costs between borrowers (firms) and creditors (banks). We may 
presume that European economy firms also suffer less from asymmetric information 
matters because firms in the European Continent borrow more from banks. 
 
Fourth, the different conglomerate systems associated with different countries lead to 
capital structure differences. Korea and Japan have similar company systems called 
„Chaebol‟ and „Keiretsu‟ respectively. Big Japanese firms come under the heading of 
„Keiretsu‟ and are connected to banks. The banks hold the stock of firms that are in a 
„Keiretsu‟ group and the firms borrow from these banks (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). 
The largest lenders in 72% of Japanese firms were one of the firm‟s top five 
shareholders in 1980 (Sheard, 1989). Firms within the group of „Keiretsus‟ have 
different capital structures, and show different performances when they are in 
financial distress, compared with firms that do not relate to „Keiretsus‟ (Hoshi et al., 
1990). For example, firms under „Keiretsu‟ invest and sell more when they are in 
financial distress than firms that do not have a special relationship with „Keiretsu.‟ 
Since banks are shareholders and bondholders of firms at the same time, there are 
fewer agency problems; and as the banks appoint executives who represent their 
benefits, there is an appropriate monitoring system.  
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Unlike Japan, there is no proper monitoring system in Korean „chaebols‟ even though 
they generally have a high level of debt. For example, the five largest „chaebols‟ in 
Korea lent 20% of outstanding debt and made 75% of new borrowings in 1996 
(Campbell II and Keys, 2002). In some ways, Korean „chaebols‟ are between German 
and Japanese models (Gugler et al., 2004). They are like German firms, as the 
families of founders still control the companies though they have a very small 
portion of equity like Japanese firms. In Japan, unlike Korean „chaebols,‟ the families 
of founders cannot control companies, even though the families have a small portions 
of equity like in the Korean „chaebols.‟  
 
Fifth, the managing system also shows the difference between countries, based on 
economic philosophy. For example, the Anglo-Saxon economy, e.g. the US or the 
UK, has external boards as well as executives (Gugler et al., 2004). Continental 
economies, on the other hand, are more likely to have firms that belong to the 
ultimate owners, and have „Aufsichtsrats‟ that represent employees and other 
stockholders (small stockholders). These „Aufsichtsrats‟ come from Austria, Germany 
and France, and are generally in the European Continental economy. This difference 
brings a different financial structure. Generally, firms held by ultimate owners have 
higher levels of debt ratio compared with firms whose ownership is widely spread 
(Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Gonedes et al., 1988).  
 
Last but not least, as a matter of course, capital structure is also affected by political 
conditions. Qi et al. (2010) assert that financial markets and the costs of debt are 
affected by political rights and legal institutions. They studied 39 countries and found 
that greater political rights are associated with a lower cost of debt. They also explain 
that political stability leads to the stability of debt contracts and the macro-economic 
situation. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) indicate that institutional 
differences between developed and developing countries explain the use of long-term 
debt. They find that firms in developed countries have more long-term debt. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that capital structure is influenced by factors related to 
countries, which are due to different laws, cultures, economic philosophies, corporate 
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governance systems and political stability. Furthermore, Antoniou et al. (2008) add 
that: (1) lessons learned from one economy are not necessarily a generalisation with 
regard to firms operating in other economies; (2) while managers decide their capital 
structures, they consider not only a firm‟s specific factors, but also general market 
conditions; and (3) firms go towards their target debt ratios at different speeds across 
countries.  
 
2.3.1.1 Macro-economic factors  
Most previous research has ignored the effects of macro-economic factors (Antoniou 
et al., 2008). Inflation and the GDP growth rate in a country, for example, influence 
the capital structure. For instance, if a country has a high rate of inflation, or has a 
rapidly developing economy, firms in that country would use more debt than firms 
who are in a country in recession or in a stable developing stage. Booth et al. (2001) 
show that the proportion of liquid liabilities is positively related to the GDP and is 
negatively connected to inflation, though Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) mention that 
high debt ratios could hedge high levels of inflation. Fitzpatrick and Ogden (2011) 
also find that recession significantly affects the bankruptcy of high leveraged firms.  
 
In this research, long-term interest rates, real GDP growth, GDP deflator and stock 
and bond market capitalisation are considered as country macro-economic indicators 
(see Section 7.11). The average interest rates and GDP deflators have generally 
reduced in the second period (1999-2008) compared with the first period (1989-1998) 
in the sample countries. The real GDP growths show a stable rate of change over 




Table 2.2 Average long-term interest rate, real GDP growth and GDP deflator
6
 
The averages long-term interest rates, real GDP growth and GDP deflators are described during the 
two sample time periods (1989-1998 and 1999-2008) in the table. The data with regard to each 
country‟s long-term interest rates, real GDP growth and GDP deflator are collected annually at the end 
of each year, from 1989 to 2008. Here, LT: long-term, GDP: Gross Domestic Product                                                               
 LT Interest rate (%) Real GDP growth (%) GDP deflator (%) 
 89- 98 99- 08 89- 98 99- 08 89- 98 99- 08 
Australia 9.11 5.75 3.7 3.39 1.9 3.81 
Austria 6.99 4.44 2.54 2.36 2.08 1.6 
Canada 8.04 4.77 2.14 2.95 1.92 2.74 
France 7.44 4.37 1.94 2.04 1.81 1.87 
Germany 6.87 4.22 2.51 1.66 2.38 0.86 
Italy 9.76 4.62 1.32 1.31 2.84 2.39 
Japan 4.29 1.48 2.05 1.31 0.9 -1.12 
Korea - 5.52 5.98 4.39 7.15 1.87 
Taiwan7 - - 5.95 4.57 3.73 0.96 
UK 8.53 4.81 2.11 2.62 4.11 2.41 
USA 6.95 4.69 3.02 2.66 2.46 2.77 
 
2.3.1.2 Financial market condition 
As described, market timing is closely related to the issuing choice with regard to 
new securities. Therefore, if stock prices are positively related to issuing stock, stock 
indices are also positively related to IPOs and SEOs. Namely, when the stock indices 
increase more than a certain level (GDP growth, for example), firms should issue 
more stock. This strategy brings more cash-inflows to the firms, than for firms who 
issue stocks in a bear market.  
 
According to Table 2.3, Korea, Britain, the US and Taiwan have seen a big shift in 
average stock price indices between the first and the second period. Austria, Korea 
and Taiwan show big differences in standard deviations between these periods. 
Therefore, we may presume that Korea and Taiwan have shifted their debt ratios the 
most if the capital structure changes are related to stock prices. In fact, Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan and Australia have changed their gearing ratios the most (see Chapter 4).  
  
                                               
6 OECD Factbook 2007 except the data for Taiwan 
7 The data of real GDP and GDP deflator are from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic 




Table 2.3 Average change in stock indices 
The indices are selected from the representable index in each country. The values are an average of 
stock index changes and standard deviations in each year for each index. The data with regard to each 
country‟s stock price indices are collected annually at the end of each year from 1987 to 2005, with 
the exception of Taiwan. For the Taiwanese index, TAIEX, we use annual average values from the 
Taiwan stock market. 










Australia ASX 9 0.19 9 0.10 
Austria ATX 16 0.42 17 0.24 
Canada S&P/TSX60 9 0.14 1 0.16 
Germany DAX 15 0.21 9 0.26 
France CAC40 12 0.23 1 0.25 
Great Britain FTSE100 11 0.14 3 0.15 
Italy MIB 5 0.18 9 0.20 
Japan TOPIX 3 0.22 5 0.30 
Korea KOSPI 6 0.29 23 0.37 
Taiwan TAIEX 13 0.14 4 0.25 
United States NYSE 13 0.13 7 0.14 
 
Table 2.5 also shows capital market developments by following the definition of 
Jong et al. (2008). The table presents market capitalisation as a proxy of stock market 
development, and bond market capitalisation as a proxy of bond market development. 
Booth et al. (2001) indicate the importance of market capitalisation. They find a 
negative relationship between stock market capitalisation and debt ratios, and a 
positive relationship between bond market capitalisation and debt ratios. Deesomsak 
et al. (2004) also presume a negative relationship between debt ratio and stock 
market capitalisation, because increasing stock issue in the financial market implies a 
decreased debt ratio; and find the negative association, as they have assumed. 
Giannetti (2003) suggests that high bond market capitalisation increases the ability of 
firms to access the bond market. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show both stock-market-
capitalisation to GDP and bond-market-capitalisation to GDP. The figures show that 
stock-market-capitalisation to the GDP ratio is greater than the bond-market-
capitalisation to the GDP ratio, throughout the time period under consideration. 




Finally, Table 2.4 shows the major topics and authors of studies into capital structure 
in terms of country characteristics.  
 




Booth et al. (2001), Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008) 
Financial market 
system 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Antoniou et al. (2008), Sheard (1989), Hoshi et al. 
(1990), Gugler et al. (2004), Qi et al. (2010),  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
Legal system 
Antoniou et al. (2008), La Porta et al. (1998, 2000), Jong et al. (2008), 
Hackbarth et al. (2007) 
Culture Collins and Sekely (1983), Wald (1999), Galbraith (1991), Dore (2000) 
Firms‟ 
organisation 
Gugler et al. (2004), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Gonedes et al. (1988) 
Capital market 
development 
Jong et al. (2008), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Giannetti (2003),  






Table 2.5 Bond and stock market capitalisation from the sample countries 
The table presents market and bond capitalisation and the number of listed firms in each country. Source: Financial data from the World Federation of Exchange 
(WFE), GDP data from the International Monetary Fund, and the World Economic Outlook Database. Data of bond market capitalisation of France are from Euronext 
Paris. In 2002, Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Euronext Lisbon, and Euronext Paris were consolidated into a single entity. In the Canadian data, TSX group 
included Toronto Exchange and TSX venture from 2002. In the Korean data, the Korea Exchange figures include Kosdaq. In Germany, the Deutsche Böse excludes the 
market segment “Freiverkehr.” Market capitalisation=share pricenumber of shares outstanding. Bond market capitalisation=total listed bonds value, the number of 
listed firms is the number of domestically incorporated companies on the countries‟ stock exchanges. na: no data. 
 Market capitalisation Number of 
Listed firms 
Bond market capitalisation 
 $ Billions % of GDP $ Billions % of GDP 
Countries 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 
Austria 35.5 76.3 16.7 18.4 128 118 122.9 372.6 57.9 89.8 
France na na na na na na 886.8 na 60.2 na 
Germany 1,086.8 1,110.6 49.7 30 662 832 na na na na 
Italy 566 522.1 46.4 22.6 243 300 na 52.2 na 2.3 
Japan 2,439.6 3,356.4 63.3 68.3 3,162 3,786 4,472.7 12,587.7 116 256.3 
S. Korea 114.6 470.8 31.8 50.7 748 1,793 277.8 654.8 77.1 70.5 
Taiwan 260.5 356.7 94.3 91.2 437 722 36.6 114.2 13.3 29.2 
Australia 328.9 683.9 88.2 67.4 1,222 2.009 68.3 na 18.3 na 
Canada 543.4 1,033.5 88.1 68.9 1,433 3,841 na na na na 
U.K 2,372.7 1,868.2 162.9 69.7 2,423 3,096 1,232.7 2,734.4 84.7 102 

























Figure 2.5 Bond market capitalisation over GDP (total listed bonds value/GDP) 
 


















Industry is related to several factors in the capital structure theory, such as 
bankruptcy costs, liquidation value, asymmetric information, collateral value and 
macro-economic industrial trends. Firms with tangible assets could retain more value 
when firms go into bankruptcy, than firms with intangible assets, because tangible 
assets will have a higher liquidation value and fewer asymmetric information costs. 
For example, firms with high levels of asset tangibility, such as, firms in the hotel or 
marine transportation industries (see Chapter 4), therefore, have more debt.  
 
Scott, Jr. and Martin (1975) examine industry‟s influence on financial structure by 
considering 12 different industries and suggest the importance of industry factors in 
financial structure decisions because there are clear differences in debt ratios 
between industries. Purnanandam (2008), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Chevalier 
(1995) also suggest that industry characteristics are the most basic factors in capital 
structure policy, that firms have a similar debt ratio within the same industry, and 
that, in general, firms retain their debt ratios over time. Harris and Raviv (1991) also 
mention, by citing prior research, that it is widely agreed that firms in drugs, 
instruments and food industries have low leverage, while firms in paper, steel and the 
airline industry have high leverage, while telephone and gas utilities are among the 
highest leveraged industry group.  
 
Moreover, Hovakimian et al. (2001) show that firms slowly adjust their debt ratios 
towards the industry average. In addition, Graham and Harvey (2001) offer modest 
evidence that financial managers consider the leverage levels of competitors. They 
also argue that the factor of industry is important for credit ratings. Similarly, 
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that firms in fast growing industries do not go 
bankrupt easily, compared with firms in slower growing industries.  
 
2.3.3 Firm size 
It is widely accepted that a firm‟s size is positively associated with its debt level, 
since large or multi-product firms are generally less risky than small ones (Ojah and 
Marnique, 2005; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). The firm‟s size is related to several 
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topics in the capital structure theory, such as asymmetric information, financial 
distress costs, transaction costs, and accessibility to the financial market. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that firms use different financing 
institutions based on their size. They argue that the leverage use of large firms is 
related more to financial market activity than to the banking sector. On the other 
hand, small firms‟ debt ratios are more likely to be related to the banking sector, as 
they do not have the ability to access the public market and attempt to avoid issuing 
costs (Hackbarth et al., 2007). Similarly, as small firms have higher asymmetric costs, 
using bank debt would be cheaper (Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
 
In addition, the firm‟s size also relates to the length of financing. Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Hackbarth et al. (2007) 
argue that large firms use more long-term debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) add that 
the transaction costs of small firms are too high to finance long-term debt. 
Furthermore, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) suggest that large firms adjust capital 
structure faster for long-term debt than do small firms. This may imply that adjusting 
costs are smaller for larger firms. This is consistent with our results. 
 
2.3.4 Firm history (age) 
It is likely to be presumed that firms with a long history have a higher reputation for 
debt repayment and they have lower asymmetric formations. Diamond (1989) argues 
that firms frequently borrow using short-loans, in order to increase their reputation, 
and then use long-term debt later on. Therefore, long history firms probably borrow 
more. Hackbarth et al. (2007) mention that young firms do not have enough 
bargaining power and use bank debt, generally because of the barriers to entering 
public financial markets and because financing costs could be expensive. Since 
younger firms have higher asymmetric costs, using bank debt would be cheaper in 
terms of the pecking order theory. This also implies that young firms use less debt.  
 
On the other hand, Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest lower debt ratios for firms with a 
longer history because these firms generally use low risk projects in order to build 
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their reputation for repaying their debt. Overall, we can presume that a firm‟s age 
relates to the asymmetric information, transaction costs, and bankruptcy probability 
in the capital structure theory. 
 
2.3.5 Time 
The financial markets conditions, economic cycle and economic impact on the world 
economy alter over time. Consequently, firms use this changing trend as 
opportunities to increase their value and to decrease their financing costs as changing 
their debt ratios. For example, the study by Bates et al. (2009) shows that firms‟ cash 
holdings in the U.S. have continually increased since 1980, while debt levels have 
continued to decrease because industry is reorganised based on Information 
Technology (IT) and on more risky industries. Hovakimian et al. (2001) also suggest 
that firms change their target gearing ratios over time. This suggestion implies that 
the capital structure policy should adapt to economic trends and macro-economic 
changes. 
 
First, the financial market condition is not the same over time. Bull and bear markets 
exist in the financial markets in order. Opler et al. (1999) argue that information 
asymmetries can change over time. When information asymmetries are high, the firm 
would experience difficulties when it comes to accessing the financial markets 
(Antunovich, 1996 cited by Opler, 1999), because markets would under-price a 
firm‟s securities more severely.  
 
Second, macro-economic trends or cycles also influence the capital structure. Many 
firms in the financial market will face the same situation. For example, at the end of 
the 1990s, many dot-com companies went public and their stock prices hit the roof 
(Bates et al., 2009). This phenomenon was observed on a global scale.  
 
There is one other example of economic influence on capital structure. Following the 
credit crunch in the United States caused by the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the 
Korean financial market also showed bad performances over the next year. The 
Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) announced that the number of firms 
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which went public and who issued new stocks had decreased by about 70% and 10.9% 
respectively until October, 2008 compared with the year before.
8
 This implies that 
firms do not issue stocks with low prices unless they face financial difficulties.  
 
2.3.6 Observed gearing ratio patterns 
We have reviewed several important capital structure theories with their different 
assumptions and phenomena and have considered other determinants which are 
likely to influence companies‟ debt ratio choices. Furthermore, Megginson (1997) 
points out nine clear patterns in leverage levels. These nine patterns are consistent 
with some theories, but do not follow their rules entirely. It is therefore a good idea 
to consider these patterns for a better understanding of capital structure. The nine 
patterns that were observed in terms of debt ratios show: 1) that capital structure has 
differences between countries 2) that industries demonstrate patterns in that firms in 
the same industries have a similar debt ratio around the world 3) that there is a 
negative relationship with profitability 4) there is a tax influences, but it is not 
decisive on its own 5) there is a negative relationship with the perceived costs of 
financial distress 6) there is a positive consideration on the part of old shareholders 
with leverage-increasing events and, vice versa 7) firms are little affected by 
transaction cost changes 8) firms are affected by ownership structures, though the 
relationship is ambiguous and 9) that [non-distressed] firms tend to achieve their 
target debt ratios. 
 
2.4 Predicted signs and hypotheses with capital structure theories 
This section produces the predicted signs based on different capital structure theories. 
The table shows the differences and similarities of predicted signs with different 
capital structure theories. The predicted signs are generally similar between theories. 
As Myers (2001) mentions, this might be evidence for the correlation between capital 
structure theories. Flannery and Rangan (2006) also conclude that the pecking order 
theory is a part of the trade-off theory, rather than a unique leverage determinant, 
                                               
8 Younhapnews, internet version, 16 Dec, 2008. 
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because the variable „financial deficit‟ does not change the other variables‟ signs and 
significant levels. 
 
Table 2.6 Summary of predicted signs with different capital structure theories 
The table shows the differences and similarities of predicted signs with different capital structure 
















Market-to-book - - - - - 
Financial slack      
Firm size +  +/- +  
Asset tangibility +  +/-   
Capital expenditure +/-  + -  
Tax rate +     
Earnings volatility - -  -  
R&D expense/asset +/-  + -  
ROA(profitability) + - - -  
Bankruptcy 
probability 
- - - -  
 
2.4.1 The hypotheses of trade-off theory 
 
Hypothesis 1. Tax is positively associated with debt issuance. 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1963), tax levels should be positively related to 
leverage levels because higher tax levels increase tax shields. This implies that 
higher tax levels entice firms to increase debt levels to have more tax shields. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Earnings volatility is negatively associated with debt issuance. 
 
Earnings volatility increases the probability of bankruptcy by increasing lower 
expected tax rates and higher expected bankruptcy costs (Fama and French, 2002).  
 
Hypothesis 3. Profitability is positively associated with debt issuance. 
 
Firms with high profitability could have high target debt ratios (Kayhan and Titman, 
2007; Hovakimian et al., 2004) because they can have higher tax shields. In the 
pecking order theory, ROA (return on asset) increases net cash-income that in turn 
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decreases debt levels (Donaldson, 1961) but in the trade-off theory, ROA allows 
firms to have more valuable assets and higher debt ratios (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
 
Hypothesis 4. Firm size is positively associated with debt issuance. 
 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) hypothesise that bigger firms have lower volatility in cash-
flows that allow them to use bigger tax shields and reduce bankruptcy costs. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002) also expect a positive association 
between firm size and leverage levels, since large firms are generally more 
diversified in product lines, and probably they could access the bond market with 
lower costs. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Capital expenditure is negatively/positively associated with debt levels. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2009) predict that growth (capital expenditure, market-to-book 
ratio) reduces debt levels because firms with high growth opportunities have a 
greater firm value. Capital expenditure typically has greater collateral value 
compared to R&D expense, and this can increase debt levels.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Research and development expenses are positively/negatively 
associated with debt levels.  
 
Research and development expenses (R&D) are related to future growth, just as is 
capital expenditure (Goyal et al., 2002), so it is possible that growth opportunities 
increases stock price. Graham (2000) and Cloes et al. (2006) suggest that R&D 
expenses are positively related to financial distress, which could increase bankruptcy 
costs. These could be negatively associated with debt levels because R&D increases 






Hypothesis 7. Asset tangibility is positively associated with debt issuance. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2009) predict that asset tangibility is positively associated with 
debt levels because high asset tangibility reduces financial distress costs.  
 
Hypothesis 8. The market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
When we use „market based debt ratio‟, high stock prices increase the asset value, 
and total debt levels will be reduced by them. 
 
Hypothesis 9. Bankruptcy probability is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Since bankruptcy probability increases bankruptcy costs, a firm will reduce such 
costs by reducing its debt level. 
 
2.4.2 The hypotheses of the pecking order theory 
In the pecking order theory, the most important matter is asymmetric information 
costs.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
There can be two reasons for this. First, a high market-to-book ratio may represent 
lower asymmetric information costs. Second, since a high market-to-book ratio is 
understood as being a high growth opportunity in the market, firms may finance with 
equity to reserve future borrowing (or financial flexibility).  
 
Hypothesis 2. Capital expenditure is positively associated with debt levels. 
 
Capital expenditure is a proxy of growth and leads to cash-outflows. Thus, it 
increases the financial deficit (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 
2009) and needs to be financed with debt issuance.  
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Hypothesis 3. R&D expenses are positively associated with debt levels. 
 
R&D expenses likely increase an adverse selection and financial deficit (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Unlike capital expenditure, R&D expenses involve fewer tangible 
assets and this increases more severe asymmetric information (Fama and French, 
2002).  
 
Hypothesis 4. Profit is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Profitability is independent of the leverage level in the pecking order model (Kayhan 
and Titman, 2007) because the pecking order theory is about costs associated with 
asymmetric information. In the pecking order theory, financing costs, even for debt, 
are more expensive than the costs from internal capital. Thus, there is a negative 
relationship (Hovakimian et al., 2004) because profits will be accumulated as an 
internal fund for future investment.  
 
Hypothesis 5. Firm size is positively/negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Firm size has a positive relationship with the leverage level, as larger firms have less 
asymmetric information than smaller firms, and this reduces asymmetric information 
costs. This is, however, extended by Frank and Goyal (2009) in that if firms reduce 
asymmetric information, then they can issue equity without an adverse selection 
matter.   
 
Hypothesis 6. Asset tangibility is positively/negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Bharath et al. (2009) argue that asset tangibility and firm size, as proxies of 
asymmetric information, presume a positive relationship with debt ratio. Frank and 
Goyal (2009) however, predict a negative relationship because asset tangibility 




2.4.3 The hypothesis of market timing  
 
Hypothesis 1. Market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with leverage levels. 
 
The variable „market-to-book ratio‟ is the most important variable in the market 
timing theory. This is because firms issue equity when the stock price is high. The 
market timing hypothesis does not predict profitability, because it is only concerned 
with overvalued stock prices.   
 
2.4.4 Dynamic models 
2.4.4.1 Dynamic trade-off theory 
 
Hypothesis 1. Profit is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
The predicted result of dynamic trade-off is similar to the (complex) pecking order 
theory in some aspects, such as that firms accumulate their losses and earnings in 
their capital structures (Leary and Roberts, 2005). However, it has a different 
reasoning from the pecking order theory. Firms accumulate cash from operating 
profits, owing to „capital structure adjustment costs.‟ Firms will change their 
leverage levels when the adjustment costs are smaller than the costs caused by a 
deviated debt ratio. Thus, if adjustment costs are low enough or the deviation costs 
caused by staying at a non-optimal leverage level are high enough, a firm will change 
its gearing level.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Market-to-book ratio is negatively related to debt levels as the higher the market-to-
book ratio, the lower the capital structure adjustment costs (Hovakimian et al., 2004). 
High market-to-book ratios reduce the costs of issuance, as well as the agency costs 
of future under-investment.  
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Hypotheses 3 and 4. Earnings volatility and bankruptcy probability are negatively 
associated with debt levels. 
 
They have the same reasons as for the static trade-off theory in Section 2.4.1. 
 
2.4.4.2 Complex pecking order theory 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Capital expenditure and R&D expense are negatively associated 
with debt levels. 
 
When preparing future investment, firms need to increase future debt capacity. 
Therefore, expected investment (capital expenditure and R&D expenses) is 
negatively associated with debt levels because firms keep a „low-risk debt capacity‟ 
for future large investment purposes (Fama and French, 2002); and they keep 
accumulating capital for „future low-risk debt capacity,‟ for future financing, and for 
the new investment. Myers (1977) shows that firms with high leverage costs and 
high growth opportunities have low levels of debt ratio, as high financing costs could 
lead to future under-investment. This implies that firms with high growth 
opportunities are, generally, negatively associated with the issuing of debt.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
In the pecking order theory, firms never issue equity unless they face serious 
financial problems, or the issuing costs are cheaper than using internal funds. Myers 
(1984, p.590) argues that “if the information asymmetry disappears from time to time, then 
the firm clearly should stock up with equity before it reappears.” This implies that when 







Hypothesis 4. Profitability is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Myers (1984) suggests that in a dynamic version of the pecking order theory, high 
growth firms reduce debt levels for future investment without issuing equity (for debt 
capability).  
 
Hypothesis 5. Earnings volatility is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
High earnings volatility leads to low leverage levels because high earnings volatility 
increases the volatility of cash-inflows that makes future investments unavailable 
(Fama and French, 2002).  
 
Hypothesis 6. Firm size is positively associated with debt levels. 
 
Fama and French (2002) assume a positive relationship with debt levels because 
larger firms have a less risky cash-flow. They also have low asymmetric information 
costs. 
 
Hypothesis 7. Bankruptcy probability is negatively associated with debt levels. 
 
Fama and French (2002) imply that both simple and complex pecking order theories 
suggest that firms with a high bankruptcy probability issue equity. 
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2.4.5 Predicted signs from previous studies 
To sum up, according to all the theories that we have considered, there are 
differences and similarities in the debt ratio predictions from different theories. Table 
2.7 summarises the different expectations, based on previous studies. 
 
Table 2.7 Summary of predicted signs from previous research associated with 
different capital structure theories 
This table presents the predicted signs from various previous pieces of research associated with 
different capital structure theories. Some determinants such as inflation and financial slack, show 
different signs, even in the same theory. This implies that authors have different opinions about the 
roles of some determinants within the same capital structure theory. Importantly, as we have seen 
from Table 2.5, most signs show the same expectations, even with different capital structure theories.  
Determinants 
 Static trade-off  Dynamic trade-off 
Signs Authors Signs Authors 
Market-to-book - 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) 
Frank and Goyal (2009) 
- Hovakimian et al. (2004) 
Firm size + 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) 




DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
Desai et al. (2004) 
Huizinga et al. (2008)   
+ 
Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) 
Myers (2001) 
Asset tangibility + 
Jensen and Mckling (1976) 
Fama and French (2002) 





Frank and Goyal (2009) 
Fama and French (2002) 
  
Tax rate + 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
Huizinga et al. (2008) 





Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Fama and French (2002)9 
  
R&D expense - 
Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) 





Fama and French (2002) 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) 
Donaldson (1961)  




DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 




                                               
9 They predict the relationship between the volatility of net cash-flows and leverage compared with 
the relationship between earnings volatility and leverage in the trade-off theory. 
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Table 2.7 Continued  
 
Determinants 
 Agency theory  Simple Pecking order 
Signs Authors Signs Authors 
Market-to-book   
- 
Fama and French (2002) 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
+ Frank and Goyal (2009) 
Financial slack 
- Myers and Majluf (1984) 
  
+ Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) 
Firm size   
+ Bharath et al. (2009) 
- Frank and Goyal (2009) 
Asset tangibility + Harris and Raviv (1991) 
+ Bharath et al. (2009) 
- Frank and Goyal (2009) 
Capital 
expenditure 
  + Frank and Goyal (2009) 
R&D expense   + Fama and French (2002) 
ROA 
(profitability) 
+ Ross (1977) 
- 
Myers (1984) 
Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) 
Fama and French (2002) 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
- Jensen (1986) 
Bankruptcy 
probability 
+ Harris and Raviv (1991) - Fama and French (2002) 
Determinants 
 Complex pecking order  Market timing 
Signs Authors Signs Authors 
Market-to-book - Myers (1984)  - 
Elliott et al. (2008)  
Baker and Wurgler (2002)  
Myers (1984)  
Firm size + Fama and French (2002)    
Capital 
expenditure 
- Fama and French (2002)    
Earnings 
volatility 
- Fama and French (2002)    




Baker and Wurgler (2002)  
Myers (1984)  




- Fama and French (2002)    
 
2.5 Summary of review and conclusions 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature in terms of the capital 
structure. Various hypotheses, based on this literature review, will be tested in later 
chapters. Collating the major capital structure theories by considering similarities 
between them, this thesis endeavours to introduce one general debt-ratio-choice 
explanation. The major tools for combination are searching for the important capital 
structure determinants by testing our hypotheses, and indicating that firms‟ debt ratio 
changing behaviours are motivated by firms‟ value maximisation.  
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From Table 2.6, the predicted signs are similar in different capital structure theories. 
This table supports the Myers‟ (2001) argument that major capital structure theories 
might be correlated with one another. Namely, one observed fact is often consistent 
with two or more capital structure theories, and it is not clear whether the observed 
fact originates from one specific theory. This thesis argues that this correlation is 
caused by Megginson‟s (1997) and Ross‟ (1995) common motivation that capital 
structure policies maximise the value of firms.  
 
This chapter also describes the additional determinants that probably influence the 
gearing ratio decision, whereas major capital structure theories do not seriously take 
them into account. These determinants are used in the later part of this thesis to 
investigate the most appropriate capital structure theory and to understand firms‟ 
financing modes. 
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Chapter III Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses research methods that are based on, and related to, capital 
structure theories. As the static trade-off and pecking order theories have different 
assumptions with regard to firms‟ equity and debt issuing choices, the two theories 
should be tested by different methodologies. For example, the static trade-off theory 
is based on a firm‟s static leverage level with gearing determinants, whilst the 
pecking order theory is more related to debt and equity choice. In addition, unlike the 
static trade-off theory, the dynamic capital structure and complex pecking order 
theories suggest that firms adjust their leverage levels. If we use the „dynamic partial 
adjustment method,‟ which provides „capital structure adjustment speed,‟ we will 
have evidence of whether firms change their leverage levels. Thus, the static and 
dynamic models are described in this chapter. 
 
As this thesis uses cluster analyses in Chapter 7, we describe the inevitability of bias 
owing to using this method. In other words, beside asymmetric information costs, 
bankruptcy costs and tax shields, firms‟ characteristics, such as their size and age 
also affect capital structure. Thus, cluster analyses that are based on those firms‟ 
characteristics are used to investigate different debt-equity choices. Additionally, as 
the cluster effect can lead to a bias, justification is given as to why and how cluster 
analysis is appropriate for this research. Finally, the criteria involving a firm‟s 
characteristics, which are used in later chapters, are introduced with the support of 
previous research that justifies the choice of a firm‟s characteristics.  
  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data used in this 
thesis. Section 3.3 describes statistical methodologies with different capital structure 
analyses. Static and dynamic models are introduced; and the ways of obtaining target 
debt ratios are introduced with some examples. Section 3.4 presents the details of 
firms‟ characteristics with a consideration of the capital structure. It explains the 
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purpose of data clustering and why clustered data, based on a firm‟s characteristics, 
is important when it comes to studying that firm‟s capital structure.  
 
3.2 Data 
Firms‟ fiscal data were collected from Thomson One Banker for 11 countries and 27 
industries over a 20 year period. There are 4,598 sample companies.  
 
The sample consists of all companies that had the following characteristics: (1) the 
company had  to be quoted on a stock exchange (2) the headquarters were in one of 
the following countries, Australia, Canada, Britain, the United States, Austria, 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Korea and Taiwan (3) the main activity of the 
company had to be in at least one of the following industries, Aluminium, Steel, 
Heavy Construction, Delivery Service, Marine Transportaion, Automobiles, Brewers, 
Distillers and Vintners, Soft Drink, Food Products, Home Construction, Health Care 
Providers, Biotechnology, Drug Retailers, Broad-line Retailers, Broadcasting and 
Entertainment, Airlines, Gambling, Hotels, Travel and Tourism, Fixed Line 
Telecommunications, Mobile Telecommunications, Computer Services, Internet, 
Software, Computer Hardware and Semiconductors (4) the required data was 
available in Thomson One Banker and (5) the company had to be in operation in at 
least two of the years between 1989 to 2008 inclusive. 
 
Concerning the share issues included in the empirical work, we consider all share 
issues including conversions of debt to equity and conversions of preferred shares to 
common equity. Unfortunately, we are unable to separately identify share issues to 
external investors from those issued to employees as part of a remuneration package. 
 
The real GDP is from the OECD Factbook, and the GDP deflator has been obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Economic Outlook 
Database. The long-term interest rates come from the OECD Factbook, with the 
exception of Taiwan. The data for stock price indexes are collected from the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the Taiwanese Stock Market. Tax data were 
taken from the websites www.worldwide-tax.com and 
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www.globalpropertyguide.com, the Federation of International Trade Association 
(FITA), the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, KPMG in Canada, and OECD. 
Table 3.1 summarises the data and their sources. 
 
The sample countries were chosen from three different groups of economies (which 
are also refered to as economic system or an economic capitalism), based on the 
Anglo-Saxon economy (including, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States), the European Continental economy (including, Austria, Germany, 
France, and Italy), and the Far Eastern economy (including, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan). The Anglo-Saxon economy is a market-based model, and the European 
Continental economy is a bank-based model in financial terms (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Sauve and Scheure, 1999). There are also differences in their legal systems (La 
Porta et al., 1998, 2000). The East Asian economy is, in general, placed between 
them, both legally and ideologically. The theoretical back-ground and differences 
between different economies are described in Sections 2.3.1 and 3.4.2. 
 
Table 3.1 Data and their origin 
The table summarises the data which are used in the thesis, and their sources.  
Data Origin 
Firm‟s fiscal data Thomson One Banker 
Real GDP OECD Factbook, 2007 




Stock price index World Federation of Exchanges, and Taiwanese Stock Market 
Taxes  
www.worldwide-tax.com, www.globalpropertyguide.com the Federation of 
International Trade Association (FITA), the Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Finance, KPMG in Canada, and OECD. 
 
3.3 Static and dynamic methods 
3.3.1 Static versus partial adjustment model 
As the static model assumes a single period, there is no assumption of a going 
concern and it presumes that there is no time-lag between regressors and regressand. 
This implies that the static model is more compliant with regard to theories that do 
not change debt ratios over time, such as the pecking order theory, the irrelevance 
theorem and the static trade-off theory. 
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However, if firms have optimal capital structures and adjust their debt ratios, then the 
static model suffers from mis-specification, because those variables relate to both 
optimal leverage levels and „capital structure adjustment costs‟ (Banerjee et al., 
1999). The dynamic approaches are more likely to comply with theories that suggest 
optimal debt levels or changing debt levels, based on a firm‟s internal and external 
conditions, such as the dynamic trade-off theory.  
 
Therefore, the theories need to be tested differently, based on their assumptions, and 
it is worthwhile using both methods in order to examine different capital structure 
theories. 
  
3.3.1.1 Static model 









kt,i,ti,ti, u+Xβ+α=Y ∑∑∑  
(3.1) 
 
where, Yi,t is the debt ratios of firm i at time t, Xi,k,t is a matrix for k variables of i 
firms at time t, and the vector residual ɛi,t. 
 
The static model shows a contemporaneous relationship between dependent and 
independent variables (Wooldridge, 2006). In this static model, all regressors are 
independently related to dependent variables. In other words, the regressors are 
exogenous, and the error term is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). If 
the regressand, yt, is simultaneously affected by one or more regressors, it would be 
endogenous. If this is the case, using instrumental variables may be a better 
methodology.  As this thesis uses panel data, it is more likely to be the case that there 
are endogeneity problems between variables (see Section 3.1 in the appendix 3, in 
which full details of statistical considerations, using panel data are described).  
 
3.3.1.2 Dynamic models. 
A dynamic model is defined by a dependent variable (yt) that depends upon a lagged 
dependent variable (yt-1), and that becomes an independent variable of yt. Davidson 
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and Mackinnon (2004, p.215) say that “…the lagged dependent variable, yt-1, appears 
among regression in the dynamic models.” Hence, a general dynamic regression model is 
formed by the formula;  
 
ttt XXyfy   ,...),,( 211 , ),0(~
2 IIDt  
(3.2) 
 
Most time series models and „dynamic panel data models‟ are dynamic models. 
“Panel data sets, consisting of cross sections observed at several points in time, may exhibit both 
characteristics” (Green, 2003, p.192). Thus, a dynamic panel data model is described 
by the following formula: 
 
tititi yfy ,1,, ,...)(   , ),0(~
2
,  IIDti  
(3.3) 
 
Therefore, by using dynamic panel data models, we can simultaneously analyse 
cross-sectional and time series data. Since the model of dynamic capital structure 
choice has been proposed by Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1984, 1985) and 
Goldstein et al. (2001), it has developed and has been widely used in optimal capital 
structure studies. 
 
3.3.1.3 Partial adjustment process in capital structure change 
As Kayhan and Titman (2007) show, there are optimal capital structures and firms 
move slowly towards them. We have to know what the target debt ratios are under 
the dynamic theory assumption.  
 
There are several ways to obtain target leverage levels. For example, there is the 
industry median leverage (Elliott et al., 2008), the historical mean of a firm‟s 
leverage levels (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), and the three-year moving average 
of a firm‟s gearing levels (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984), as well as estimated values by 
using Tobit regression (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Kayhan and Titman, 2007) or 
normal cross-sectional regression (Fama and French, 2002; Byoun, 2008). According 
to Kayhan and Titman (2007), the values of predicted target leverage are similar 
whether we follow either the Tobit model or the normal regression model. 
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3.3.1.3.1 Industry average 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Masulis (1983) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) suppose 
that firms move their debt level towards an industry average, while they search for 
the optimum debt levels. This implies that firms consider the industrial average 
leverage level as a target leverage ratio. Industry median leverages are also often 
used as a proxy for target debt ratio (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Faccio and Masulis, 
2005).  
 
The fact that firms consider industry-average-debt-ratio as their target leverage 
implies that firms in the same industry change their leverage levels in the same 
direction and that capital structures are affected by the same economic circumstances 
in the industry.  
 
3.3.1.3.2 Estimated optimum leverage 
The optimal debt ratio can be obtained by using the the Tobit regression model and 
the ordinal least square (OLS) model. Let us presume that 
*
tD  is an optimal leverage 
at time t; then the estimated target leverage is given by the following regression if the 






,   (3.4) 
 
where, firms are described by subscript i = 1, 2, …N, time by t=1, 2, … T, and 
capital structure determinants by k=1, 2, …K. The residual ti , is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with the mean zero and can be heteroskedastic (Ozkan, 2001). 
 
If the optimal leverages (
*
tD ) are reliable target debt ratios, then the expected 
deviations from target ratios are significantly positive or negative in the real 
regression analyses (in Formula 3.6). If they are not, then we could presume that the 
optimal leverages (
*
tD ) are poor target leverages, or that there are no target debt 
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ratios, and the coefficient of leverage deviation from Equation (3.6) will not be 
significant and will not be different from zero (Hovakimian et al., 2001).  
 
3.3.1.3.3 Partial adjustment process 
As a number of economic models suggest, current behaviour depends on past 
behaviour. Using panel data, we can estimate a dynamic model on an individual level 
(Verbeek, 2008).   
 
ttttt XyXy    ])[1( 110  (3.5) 
 
Formulation (3.5) is an example of the error-correction model, where, (1-λ) is the 
adjustment parameter, and the adjustment speed is measured by it. The independent 
variable Xt is randomly given and is uncorrelated with error term εt. More 
importantly, from Equations (3.1) and (3.5), Yt is decided by Xt and Xt-1 together. If 
Xt is simultaneously decided upon with Yt, then independent variable, Xt, and error 
term, εt, will be correlated, 0}{ ttXE  , and OLS would be not consistent. The 
special case of the error-correction model (3.5) is a partial adjustment model (3.6) in 













As the partial adjustment model uses 
*
tY , and as 
*
tY  differs from the actual value of 
Yt, the “adjustment to its optimal level corresponding to Xt (independent variables) is not 
immediate,” unlike in the static linear model (Verbeek, 2008, p.326). 
 
According to the details of our research survey, in the area of financial study, 
Kennan (1979) modified Gould‟s (1968) application to creat a partial adjustment 
model for analysing optimum stock price levels: ))1()(()(  tXtdNtX , is the 
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same as Equation (3.6), where )(td : desired level of stock price, X: actual stock 
price, and N: the adjustment coefficient. 
 
Appling Kennan‟s (1979) model, the „partial adjustment capital structure model‟ can 




,1,,   titititi DDDD   (3.7) 
 
where, tiD , : actual leverage at time t, 1, tiD : actual leverage at time t-1, 
*
,tiD  : 
optimal leverage at time t, and λ is the adjustment speed in every year.  
 
The value of λ is between one and zero (1 > λ > 0). In a frictionless world, λ should 
be one. In the real world, firms adjust their capital structure lumpily (Leary and 
Roberts, 2005) because of the existence of adjustment costs.  
 
 Formula (3.7) can be described as: 
*
,1,, )1( tititi DDD     (3.8) 
  
This can be described as follows, after considering Formula (3.4): 
  
k
titikktiti xDD ,,,1,, )1(   (3.9) 
 
Formula (3.9) can be written as (Ozkan, 2001; Byoun, 2008): 
  
k
titikktiti uxDD ,,,1,0,    (3.10) 
 
where, 0 = 1-λ, k =λβk, ui,t = λεi,t 
 
Since 0  is (1-λ), when λ is 1, then 0  is zero. This implies that actual leverage is 
the same as the target leverage, or that firms have changed their capital structure 
immediately. This is possible when there are no adjustment costs. In the imperfect 
real world, this cannot be realistic. On the other hand, when λ is 0, then 0  becomes 
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one. This implies that firms hardly change their capital structure, or that the change is 
infinitely slow.   
 
3.4 Firms’ characteristics 
It is possible that firms‟ debt ratios and their choices may be affected by their 
characteristics. Bankruptcy costs and new security issuing costs depend upon a 
firm‟s characteristics (see Chapter 2 in which a large number of previous studies 
were reviewed and where we examined the relationship between debt ratio choice 
and firms‟ characteristics). For example, „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ can be 
changed by a firm‟s circumstances, such as the size, the firm‟s age, financial 
condition and diversification of product lines (Driffield et al., 2005; Jalilvand and 
Harris, 1984). This thesis, therefore, analyses debt ratios using these various different 
characteristics. In this section, we describe the cluster analyses and data-snooping 
bias that can occur when data are classified by some criteria, e.g. by leverage level or 
profitability and so forth, and justify the grouping process, based on capital structure 
theories by introducing the criteria used in previous research. 
 
3.4.1 Cluster effect 
We use cluster analyses in Chapter 7. In other words, the data set is clustered and 
analysed based on various standards, such as tangibility, bankruptcy probability and 
others. Thus, it is highly likely that the data are correlated with a firm‟s 
characteristics. This is called a „cluster effect.‟ If there are „cluster effects‟ in the 
sample, either random effect or fixed effect can be used (see Appendix 3, Section 
3.1.1 in which the fixed and random effects are fully described). The cluster effect, 
however, allows us to find unobserved effects when we use a whole data set 
(Wooldridge, 2006). Namely, cluster analysis itself can be a purpose of the research 
(White, 2000), as we will discuss in the next section. Additionally, as cluster analysis 




3.4.1.1 Data-snooping bias 
A firm‟s characteristics are closely related to the grouping of the data set. In this 
thesis, an important analytical method is a comparison of how debt ratio 
determinants differently affect debt-equity choice based on a firm‟s characteristics. 
This grouping can be related to the data-snooping bias (Lo and Mackinlay, 1990). 
Sullivan et al. (1999) suggest that data-snooping bias is an important matter in 
finance and economics, and can occur in the modelling of financial theories, the 
identification of factors and in cross-sectional tests. Lo and MacKinlay (1990, p.433) 
explained the term of data-snooping by citing Aldous (1989, p.252):  
 
There is a huge area of “data-snooping statistics” where you have a family of 
test statistics T (a) whose null distribution is known for fixed a, but where you 
use the test T=T (a) for some a chosen using the data. 
 
This implies that data-snooping bias occurs when the data for other research are 
reused (Sullivan et al., 1999; White, 2000; Hsu and Kuan, 2005). In other words, the 
data-snooping bias can be caused by unconscious (or conscious) misuse of data (Hsu 
and Kuan, 2005) and by using secondary data. As most data used in financial 
research are secondary data, researchers are never free of data-snooping bias. In 
order to avoid this kind of bias, Hsu and Kuan (2005) suggest using comparable data 
sets rather than using the same data sets, and using sub-samples of a large data set. 
However, Sullivan et al. (1999) argue that selecting samples from the large 
population can also lead to selection bias. Similarly, Foster et al. (1997) suggest, by 
citing Lo and MacKinlay (1990), that grouping also brings about data-snooping bias. 
This implies that researchers could modify the results by selecting samples in their 
own way. Data-snooping is dangerous, but it is sometimes inevitable. For example, 
researchers can be interested in only one particular time period within the time-series 
data (White, 2000). This implies that without data-snooping bias, it is not possible to 
control specific research purposes. Therefore, data-snooping is nowadays called 
“data mining,” a term which has positive connotations because, this method brings “a 




The sample is collected from eleven countries and three different institutional 
environments. The eleven countries are Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, the UK, the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and the three different economies 
are Anglo-Saxon, European Continental, and the East Asia economies. The different 
economies and their characteristics are described below. 
 
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), there are several ways to categorise capitalism, 
such as the modernisation approach, neo-corporatism, and the social systems of the 
production approach which are related to: (1) liberal market economies and co-
ordinated market economies; (2) the role of institutions and organisations; and (3) the 
role of culture, informal rules, history, and others. The thesis follows Bradley et al. 
(2003) and Bergh (2006) when it comes to categorising the Western economies. 
They categorise Western industrialised countries into three different groups, i.e. 
Scandinavian, Central-European and Anglo-Saxon economies, although we use 
Anglo-Saxon and European-Continental economies in terms of the Western countries. 
This thesis also follows Schwartz (2010), Kim (2000) and Whitley (2000) to 
categorise the Eastern economy. These authors categorise the East Asian economy 
into Korea, Taiwan and Japan.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon and Continental economies are Western countries unlike Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. While the Anglo-Saxon model incorporates liberal [free-market] 
capitalism, the European model is considered to be a welfare model (Pontusson, 
1997; Coffey and Thornley, 2009). In other words, the policies in the Anglo-Saxon 
economy are more pro-capitalism and use the financial markets more than does the 
Continental economy, whose policy is more pro-labour and uses more financial 
intermediaries. As there is a close relationship between Germany and Austria, 
historically, legally, and culturally (Siems, 2004), the thesis includes Austria. 
Following Hall and Soskice‟s (2001) suggestion, the thesis excludes Spain, which is 
ambiguous in terms of its capitalism due to its history of economic development. 
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Whitley (2000) points out that Taiwan and Korea were subject to industrial 
influences during and after the Japanese occupation. East Asian economies share a 
Confucian culture and have developed under state leadership (Kim, 2000; Moon and 
Rhyu, 2000). China, Malaysia and Thailand have not been included in our data set 
because they have different economic circumstances compared with those three 
countries. For example, China is still a communist country and its industry is based 
on cheap labour (Schwartz, 2010); and as Malaysia and Thailand are second 
generations economies which are emerging in this region, they are still at different 
stages in their economic development compared with those three countries (Robison 
et al, 2000).  
 
Additionally, the Korean and Taiwanese economies are still developing compared 
with the other sample countries. However, according to Booths et al. (2001) and the 
World economy and Financial Surveys (2007) of the IMF, the industrialised levels of 
these two countries are already far more advanced than that of other developing 
countries. In the sample period, Korea and Taiwan have changed their industrial 
structure faster than the rest of the sample countries. This factor may bring a different 
capital structure to these two economies, compared with other developed countries. 
The country factor also implies that macro-economic indicators, such as Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, the growth of GDP and interest rates, are 
required to understand „capital structure adjustment modes.‟ 
 
3.4.3 Industry 
Jong et al. (2008) use the ICB industry group to classify industry levels. Lougharan 
and Ritter (2004) categorise firms into two groups; technology and Internet-related 
firms (SIC codes 2000-3999), and old-economy manufacturing firms. This thesis 
collects sample companies from 27 industries based on the ICB (sub-sector) industry 
code. We try to select firms as widely as possible, in order to investigate the 
difference in capital structure based on the different industries they are part of. Our 
criteria of selection of different industries are firms‟ asset tangibility, new and old 
industries, the different technology required and the level of impact of the business 
cycle. We excluded firms from utility and financial industries because they are 
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generally regulated across countries (Huang and Ritter, 2009). For example, banks‟ 
financial structures are affected by very different factors compared with firms from 
other industries. In addition, the details of ICB and ICB sub-sectors of samples are 
described in Section 1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 
3.4.4 A firm’s size 
The present thesis categorises firms into four groups (quartiles) based on their total 
assets. Bates et al. (2009) also divide firms into four groups by size, to assess the 
relationship between firm size and cash holding.   
 
Firm size is generally defined by three criteria; market capitalisation (market cap), 
total assets and total sales. Wald (1999) uses market capitalisation as a proxy of firm 
size. Market capitalisation reflects the market values of firms and often shows the 
future expectations of market participants (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Market 
capitalisation has two weak points, however. First, the great volatility of stock price 
changes (instability) makes for a very wide range of firm values, and there are no 
clear criteria for choosing the most representative price. Second, there is the matter 
of market efficiency. We often define bubble or abnormal market performances 
when we observe an unreasonable increase or decrease in prices: In fact, investors‟ 
irrationality and excess volatility have increased since the stock market crash of 
October 1987 (Stern and Chew Jr., 1992). Additionally, Walter (2003, p.5) mentions 
that “…the paradigm [of market efficiency] also refers to a probabilistic representation of the 
behaviour of stock market prices.” This means that stock price is just one possible aspect 
of intrinsic value. 
 
The second way to decide a firm‟s size is by the total assets on balance sheets. Under 
the assumption of „a going concern,‟ firms have been operating for several decades 
without asset revaluation. The book value, therefore, cannot reflect a firm‟s present 
value. Even though the criterion, based on book value, cannot represent the present 
value exactly, this is much more stable compared with the stock price decided by the 
financial markets, and this partially reflects a firm‟s value by including operating 
incomes and losses. Banerjee et al. (2008), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Leary and 
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Roberts (2005), Frank and Goyal (2009) and others use total assets as a variable with 
regard to the size of a firm. 
 
Total sales are also used to measure a firm‟s size. In fact, the amount of sales and the 
total assets of a firm are very closely correlated. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Ozkan 
(2001), Brounen et al. (2006) and others use sales as a variable with regard to a 
firm‟s size.  
 
3.4.5 A firm’s age 
Lougharan and Ritter (2004) differentiate between young firms (0 to 7 years) and old 
firms (8 years or more) based on the date of the IPO. Giannetti (2003) also classifies 
a firm‟s age using IPO date. Fama and French (2002) use the size of a firm as a 
proxy of the firm‟s age, because they assume that bigger firms were probably 
founded some time ago compared with smaller firms. In this study, based on the 
Thomson One Banker, we assume that the age is counted from the year in which 
firms are included in the dat-base, as it is not possible to obtain the year in which the 
firms were founded using our data-base. 
 
This thesis categorises the data by stating that old firms are defined as having at least 
18 years data across a twenty-year sample period, and that young firms are defined as 
having more than 8 years of data from the second decade sample period. In order to 
remove the effects caused by macro-economic factors that change over time, this 
thesis only uses data taken from the second time period for firms with a longer 
history, when they are compared to younger firms. Namely, with regard to both 
young and old firms, we only use data from the second period (from 1999 to 2008). 
Therefore, those two groups have operated under the same macro-economic 
conditions. 
 
 3.4.5.1 Survivorship and new listing bias  
As Sullivan et al. (1999) suggest, survivorship bias can lead to data-snooping bias 
(see Section 3.4.1.1 for details of data-snooping). This survivorship bias has been 
considered, especially in the study of mutual funds (Brown et al., 1992; Horst et al., 
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2001) and stock price performances (Brown et al., 1995; Lo and Mackinlay, 1990). 
Reasonably, there is a very high possibility of existing survivorship bias, though 
Brown et al. (1995) and Horst et al. (2001) fail to show significant survivorship bias 
in equity premiums. This survivorship bias can be presented as a look-ahead bias. 
This is because, as Brown et al. (1992, p.553) mentioned, “…past performance does not 
guarantee future performance.” New listing bias was considered by Lyon et al. (1999), 
who believed that new listing and rebalancing in portfolios affects the return of 
portfolios. This implies that the number of newly listed firms in the sample, or the 
number of old firms can bring a difference to the sample average. Dionysiou (2010) 
suggests two ways for dealing with this method; first, replace the data of firms with 
similarities such as size or industry; or second, delete data on newlly listed firms 
(namely, only use old data sets). 
 
Research using secondary data sets, also has the same problem. Fiscal reports used in 
this research were collected from firms that are listed or that have survived. 
Otherwise, the firms are delisted from the data-base. It is not possible to control this 
matter using second-hand data sets. A firm with great performance, size, or profits 
can survive longer. Having a reputation for long survival could affect debt ratios and 
this, as Brown et al. (1992) mention, might lead to a look-ahead bias. There could be 
a survivorship bias in our sample because, as we have seen in Chapter 2, firms with 
longer histories have different capital structures. The thesis has tested the existence 
of a survivorship bias in debt ratios by using the T test. If there is a survivorship bias, 
there are differences in averages between samples (see Section 7.3). Therefore, as 
White (2000) mentions, the potential for bias is inevitable. Furthermore, part of this 
research is to group our sample by firm characteristics and, of itself, this can lead to 
bias. 
 
3.4.6 Time period 
Since time trends are observed in the alteration of debt ratios, it can be presumed that 
capital structures change over time. This study attempts to show that capital structure 
is affected by time trends. To doing so, the present thesis uses a time dummy variable 
to observe how debt ratios have changed over a 20 year period. This study also 
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divides the sample into two groups of 10 years each, and observes how the two 
groups show different relationships between debt ratios and their determinants. There 
may be a difference in capital structure changing speeds or debt levels.  
 
3.4.7 Bankruptcy probability 
Since the Z-score model was made for US firms, the Z"-score model for non-US 
firms, and the EMS (Emerging Market Score) model for firms in emerging markets, 
this study uses different models in line with the origin of firms in countries when 
measuring bankruptcy probability. Korean firms, for example, use the EMS model, 
and non-US industrialised firms use the Z"-score model. For comparisons of 
accounting-based and market-based models in Chapter 7, the Expected Default 




In this chapter, we discuss the research methods, which we use in later chapters. We 
introduce the data sources from which we collected our data. In Section 3.3, we 
likewise indicate static and dynamic statistical methods, which we use in Chapters 5, 
6 and 7 for statistical analyses. In this section, we explain how the partial adjustment 
method is related to capital structure theories and how it is used to test them. Since 
we use cluster analyses to obtain more clear evidence of capital structure theories, we 
also indicate why firms‟ classification, based on firms‟ characteristics, is important in 
our research and how this is not related to the problem of data mining. In Section 3.4, 
we also explained the importance of firms‟ characteristics, and why the classification 
of firms, based on these characteristics, is pertinent in our research.   
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Chapter IV The differences in leverage level over time, 
between countries and between industries 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines Modigliani and Miller‟s irrelevance theory (1958) by testing 
whether there are systematic-capital-structure patterns grounded in firms’ industries 
and countries, and different time periods. If there are systematic patterns in leverage 
levels based on these three different criteria, it challenges the irrelevance theory 
because, as Stonehill and Stitzel (1969)
10
 suggest, the patterns in capital structure can 
prove that debt ratios are not randomly distributed. If this is the case, the systematic 
similarity in debt ratio can be seen as evidence for the existence of an optimal capital 
structure. This also implies that there are some factors that affect the choice of capital 
structure. Thus, this chapter is a starting point for the next three chapters, which test 
debt and equity choices and their important determinants based on three major 
capital structure theories. 
 
The idea provides us with three testable hypotheses which are as follows:   
 
H4.a: Capital structures are the same between countries. 
H4.b: Capital structures are the same between industries. 
H4.c: Capital structures are the same across time. 
 
The findings in this chapter are first, that there are some systematic similarities in 
capital structure based on industry and country, and second, leverage levels have 
generally reduced in the second period (1999-2008).  
 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 is about data 
and methodology. In this section, we discuss the measurement of debt ratios, and the 
                                               
10 Stonehill and Stitzel (1969, p.91) make the point that “…similarity of financial structures of firms in the 
same industry suggests that they act as if there is an optimal financial structure for an industry.” 
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method for dealing with outliers. Section 4.3 presents the differences in capital 
structures across industries, countries and time. The chapter ends with a conclusion 
and the contribution of the research in Section 4.4. 
 
4.2 Data and methodology 
4.2.1 Data 
The data consist of 4,598 listed firms taken from 27 industries, based on an „ICB 
(Industry Classification Benchmark) subsector‟ classification, in the three different 
economies (Anglo-Saxon, European Continental, and the East Asia economies ) over 
a twenty-year period (1989-2008) (see Section 1.1 in Appendix 1 for details). The 
financial statement data were collected from Thomson One Banker. There are two 
criteria for choosing economies (countries) and industries: (1) each economy has 
historical and cultural differences in terms of economic development; and (2) each 
industry has different characteristics (see Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.5, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
in which full details are described).  
 
4.2.2 Measures of debt ratios 
We cannot obtain a perfect debt ratio which represents a firm‟s exact leverage level, 
because there are some problems with having the right debt ratio: and the problems 
lead to a difficulty for researchers when it comes to choosing reliable debt ratios for 
study. Firstly, there are some „financial statement items‟ that are unclear as to 
whether they are debt or equity. For example, hybrid securities such as preference 
shares, redeemable preferred stocks, convertible bonds and bonds with warrants. 
Even though these hybrid securities have a huge impact on the value of firms and 
capital structures, it is still not clear where they belong.  
 
Secondly, there is no clear criterion between using market- and book-based debt 
ratios, although this chapter uses only a „book-based debt ratio‟ following Collins 
and Sekely (1983), Remmers et al. (1974), Wald (1999) and others. In capital 
structure studies, both market- and book-based debt ratios are generally used, and 
both of them have strong and weak points. 
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Wald (1999, p.166) suggests some of the weak points when using „book-based debt 
to asset ratios,‟ (1) countries have different accounting standards
11
, “…which 
potentially undercuts the comparability of cross-country results; (2) a linear specification may 
not be consistent with a particular theory of optimal capital structure; and (3) the variables 
chosen may be arbitrary or lack some essential determining factor.” Furthermore, book-based 
leverages reflect backward information, while market-based leverages reflect 
forward expectations (Barclay et al., 2006). In other words, book values are decided 
when stocks and bonds are issued; and these may be subsequently very different 
from their market value. Thus, book-value-based leverage levels are, in general, 
over-leveraged due to the conservative accounting principle (Hillegeist et al., 2004). 
Welch (2004) also suggests the problem of using book-value-based measures to be in 
that small firms‟ book values are particularly less correlated with market values.  
 
Therefore, some researchers use market-based debt ratios, because book value cannot 
represent the present value of firms (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, there 
are also two problems created by using market prices. Firstly, debt ratios change 
dramatically over time as stock prices change in the market. It is also difficult to 
decide the true firm value, or to decide which value to use due to this high volatility 
of stock prices. According to Titman and Wessels (1988), many firms use book-
value-based target ratios rather than market-value-based leverage levels. This 
argument implies that managements think that the financial market is generally over 
reacting or is less rational. Secondly, stock prices on the market are often much 
lower than the liquidation value when a firm is under financial stress. As a result, the 
market value may not represent the intrinsic value of a firm, either when it is in a 
good financial condition, or when it is under financial stress.  
 
4.2.3 Outliers 
The data show that some companies in the sample have suspiciously unusual 
leverage levels compared with other firms. For example, some firms have negative 
debt ratios. These outliers, or influential observations, will seriously misrepresent the 
                                               
11 For example, the definition of long-term debt is one over one year for most countries, but is one 
over four years in Germany (Wald, 1999). 
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population. Therefore, these outliers have been removed from the analysis to avoid 
distorting the results.   
 
As Grubbs (1950) and Cameron (2005) mention, there is no rule for removing 
outliers. In addition, there are no criteria for identifying an appropriate leverage level 
as we have discussed. However, a company‟s leverage level should not be negative; 
nor can it be excessively high compared to other company‟s gearing levels. Leverage 
level can be negative when a firm has lost all of its total assets so that its total asset 
value will be negative. This would not be normal in general circumstances. 
Furthermore, capital structures cannot be excessive because a high leverage level 
raises bankruptcy probability. 
 
For these reasons, a debt ratio that is too high or a negative value should be removed 
from the sample. Kayhan and Titman (2007) restrict the values of target debt ratio 
between 0.00 and 1; and Baker and Wurgler (2002) define that firms with debt levels 
greater than 10.0 are outliers. This thesis uses book- (and, in later chapters, market-) 
based debt ratios only between 0 and 2.0 (≈ 99 percentile). This is similar to 
Lemmon et al. (2008). 
 
4.2.4 Analysis of variance test 
This chapter uses the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test after removing outliers. 
The ANOVA test is used to decide whether a particular data classification is 
meaningful (statistically significant) (Kennedy, 2003). Thus, the ANOVA test will 
indicate the meaningful differences in leverage levels between different industries, 
countries and time periods. If there is no significant difference between classified 
groups, we could not argue the existence of systemic differences in leverage levels 


















  (4.1) 
 
where, n: total number of observation from sample, ni: number of observation from 
group i, k: number of groups, xi: a group i, xij: jth observation of variable i, ix : mean 
of group i, and x : mean of total sample. 
 
4.3 Capital structure differences between groups 
The most important objective in capital structure study is to find an optimal gearing 
level. If there is no optimal capital structure, then debt levels would be randomly 
distributed as a result of companies‟ business operations and managers would have 
no intention of changing them. This section investigates the differences and 
similarities between debt ratios, based on different time periods, industries and 
countries, and demonstrates the probability of the existence of optimal gearing levels. 
 
4.3.1 Capital structure and time period 
Fama and French (2002) and Leary and Roberts (2005) and others find that 
companies adjust (or change) their capital structures over time. Graham (2000, 
p.1935) insists that “…firms use debt more aggressively now (2000) then they did in the 1980s.” 
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008), however, show that French companies‟ debt ratios 
gradually decreased during the sample period (from 1997 to 2002). Kim et al. (2006) 
also argue that Korean companies show that „capital structure adjustment speed‟ and 
leverage levels have been affected by the Asian financial crisis. All these studies 
indicate that firms change their capital structures over time. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the difference in debt ratios between the periods (1989-1998 and 
1999-2008). The ANOVA test in Table 4.1 uses the whole sample of companies 
from eleven countries and shows that there are statistically significant differences in 
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debt levels between the two periods. This implies that companies have changed their 
debt ratios across the sample period. 
 
Table 4.1 ANOVA test between two different time periods 
This table compares the difference of means in debt levels between period one (1989-1998) and 
period two (1999-2008) using all companies. This table shows that there are significant differences 
between the two periods.  
Note, SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: mean square, F: F statistic, Prob:  p-value, *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level  
 SS DF MS F Prob > F 
Model 7.7288 1 7.7288 130.52*** 0.0000 
Residual 3104.0649 52418 .0592   
Total 3111.7937 52419 .0593   
 
Table 4.2 shows the differences in the average value of debt ratios over time between 
economies, and countries. Generally speaking, companies in all economies have 
changed their leverage levels across the two periods. The p-values of countries‟ 
comparison shows that they have all significantly changed in terms of leverage levels 
between the periods, with the exception of Austrian and Italian companies. The F 
statistic indicates that firms in the East-Asian economy have changed their debt 
ratios more than firms in the Anglo-Saxon economy or the Continental economy. 
The F statistic also shows the same results with the country level data. Overall, 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that there are significant differences in debt ratios between 
the two periods across economies and countries. Thus, we can conclude that firms 




Table 4.2 ANOVA test between two periods in terms of country and economy levels 
This table compares the difference of means between period one (1989-1998) and period two (1999-
2008) using the economy and country levels data.  
Note, F: F statistic, Prob: p-value, *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level.  
 F statistic Prob > F 
Anglo-Saxon economy 8.51** 0.0035 
Continental economy 12.03*** 0.0005 
East-Asian economy 628.18*** 0.0000 
Australia 18.25*** 0.0000 
Austria 1.31 0.2525 
Canada 22.70*** 0.0000 
Germany 8.51** 0.0036 
France 14.22*** 0.0002 
Great Britain 4.14** 0.0420 
Italy 3.55* 0.0600 




Taiwan 31.07*** 0.0000 
USA 33.25*** 0.0000 
 
4.3.2 Capital structure and country 
The country in which a firm has been founded, and in which it operates is an 
important matter in analysing the financial structure of a company, because all 
countries in the world have different tax policies, cultures, industrialisation levels, 
economic situations and histories. Previous studies show that capital structure is 
heavily affected by country factors (Sekely and Collins, 1988; Stonehill and Stitzel, 
1969), particularly by legal systems, such as bankruptcy law, stock market regulation 
(Bancel and Mitoo, 2004), and by culture (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Chui et al., 
2002).  
 
Capital structure differences can be explained by the location of the headquarter 
country (Stonehill and Stitzel, 1969; Errunza, 1979). Collins and Sekely (1983) state 
that capital structure differences are caused by differences in financial institutions, in 
national attitudes toward risk and in cultural differences. They particularly argue that 
capital structures are more influenced by „cultural characteristics‟ rather than 
„industrial factors.‟ For example, the sensitivity of default risk is different from 
country to country. Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Wald (1999), for instance, 
confirm that US firms are more sensitive to default risk than Japanese ones. 
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Generally speaking, the current research also finds that companies in Korea, Japan 
and Taiwan have higher debt ratios compared to those in the Western countries. (The 
differences between countries and economies are explained in Sections 2.3.1 and 
3.4.2).   
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that capital structure determinants function in the 
same way in different countries. Booth et al. (2001) discover, however, that capital 
structures have systemic differences due to country factors, such as GDP growth 
rates, inflation rates, and capital market development. In addition, Dore (2000) 
suggests that the different corporate governance environments of countries lead to 
differences in capital structures. They suggest that firms in Germany, Italy and 
France hold more debt. These countries have strong family ownership with regard to 
firms. (see Section 2.3.1 which describes the ownership in the European Continental 
economy) 
 
Table 4.3 ANOVA test results between three different economies  
F statistics and p-values indicate that there are differences in debt ratios between economies in both 
periods (1989-1998 and 1999-2008).  
Note, SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: mean square, F: F statistics, Prob:  p-value, 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level.  
  SS DF MS F Prob >F 
Period one 
(89-98) 
Model 25.1051 2 12.5525 274.43*** 0.0000 
Residual 588.3587 12863 .0457   
Total 613.4638 12865 .0476   
Period two 
(99-08) 
Model 3.6407 2 1.8203 28.95*** 0.0000 
Residual 2486.9602 39551 .0628   
Total 2490.601 39553 .0629   
 
Table 4.3 shows that there are clear differences in debt ratio between economies. In 
both periods one and two, the three economies have statistically different debt ratios. 
Table 4.4 shows the average debt ratio for each economy. The Asian economy shows 
the highest debt ratios, and firms in the European and Anglo-Saxon economies show 
similar debt ratios in the first period. In the second period, firms in the Anglo-Saxon 
economy are in the highest debt level position, but firms in the Asian economy are 
still high compared to European companies. It has also been noticed that the 
differences between debt ratios are smaller in the second period than in the first 
period. Table 4.4 with Tables 4.5 and 4.6, implies that the capital structures are 
 83 
becoming increasingly similar between countries, as well as between economies in 
the second period. One noticeable factor is that firms in the Anglo-Saxon economy 
have increased debt ratios while other economies decline.  
 
Table 4.4 Average debt ratios between economies.  
The table presents the average debt ratio for each economy. Average debt ratios are without square 
brackets, and the values of median debt ratios are in square brackets.  

















        
Table 4.5 illustrates the results of the ANOVA test between countries and shows that 
there are significant differences in terms of means of debt ratios between countries in 
both the first and second period. 
 
Table 4.5 ANOVA test between countries 
This table shows the average difference between countries across the first (1989-1998) and second 
periods (1999-2008). The F statistics indicate that there are significant differences in debt ratios 
between countries.  
Note, SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: mean square, F: F statistic, Prob: p-value, *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level.  
  SS DF MS F Prob 
Period one 
(89-98) 
Model 43.2371 10 4.3237 97.47*** 0.0000 
Residual 570.2267 12855 .0443   
Total 613.4638 12865 .0476   
Period two 
(99-08) 
Model 26.1571 10 2.6157 41.97*** 0.0000 
Residual 2464.4439 39543 .0623   
Total 2490.601 39553 .0629   
 
Table 4.6 shows the debt ratios in terms of the average and the median and their 
changes based on countries. The table also shows that average debt ratios have 
declined in the second period across countries, with the exception of Austria, Britain, 
Italy and the USA. The debt ratios of the three Eastern countries, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, are higher compared with the Western countries‟ debt ratios in the first 
period and show a high debt ratio reduction in the second period. The median debt 
ratio changes tell a similar story. With the exception of Italy, all the sample countries 
reduced debt ratios in median. The table also shows that across all the sample 
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countries, the standard deviation has increased, with the exception of Korea and 
Germany.  
 
Table 4.6 „Total debt to total asset ratio‟ in mean and median level changes based on 
countries 
The table shows that average debt ratios have generally declined in the second period, across countries. 
Note, SD: standard deviation. 
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99 ~ 08 .2189 .1500 .2509 
 
Table 4.7 shows the ranking of debt levels between countries. It shows that, in 
general, in terms of average values, the firms in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the 
Continental countries have similar debt ratios while the firms in the Eastern countries 
generally maintain higher debt ratios. The high debt ratio of Asian firms is persistent 
across the two decades. In terms of median values, Anglo-Saxon firms generally 




Table 4.7 Ranking in average and median of debt ratios between countries 
The table shows the ranking of debt levels between countries and indicates that firms in the Asian 
























































































































































4.3.3 Capital structure with different industries 
Traditionally, it is believed that capital structures are significantly affected by 
industry (Emery and Finnerty, 1998; Kester, 1986; Bowen et al., 1982). Schwartz 
and Aronson (1967), Scott (1972) and Scott and Martin (1975) also show that there 
are more differences between industries than within industries. In addition, Masulis 
(1983) argues that when a company‟s debt ratio is close to the average leverage level 
of the industry to which the firm belong, its value increases in the financial market.  
 
It is presumed that different industries have different assets and operating risks to 
support debt capability (Emery and Finnerty, 1998), whereas firms in the same 
industry have the same business risk (Remmers et al., 1974). Therefore, firms within 
the same industry have similar financial structures. Firms with large amounts of 
tangible assets generally have more debts than firms with intangible assets 
(Binsbergen et al., 2011; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Firms in the hotel industry, for 
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instance, have higher debt ratios than companies that are in the software industry. 
Table 4.8 shows that there are significant differences in the debt ratios of the twenty-
seven industries. 
 
Table 4.8 ANOVA test with different industries 
The table shows the F statistics that indicate significant differences in debt ratio between industries in 
both time periods.  
Note, SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: mean square, F: F statistic, Prob: p-value, *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level.  
 Source SS DF MS F Prob 
Period 1 
(89-98) 
Model 85.5553 26 3.2905 80.03*** 0.0000 
Residual 527.9085 12839 .0411   
Total 613.4638 12865 .0476   
Period 2 
(99-08) 
Model 191.0816 26 7.3492 126.33*** 0.0000 
Residual 2299.5193 39527 .05817   
Total 2490.601 39553 .0629   
 
Table 4.9 indicates that 17 industries decrease and 10 industries increase leverage 
levels in terms of average value. The table tells a similar story based on median 
values. As we discussed earlier, this implies that the decreasing debt ratio might have 
been the trend for the last 20 years. It also shows that while average debt ratios 
decrease, the overall standard deviations have increased. 
 
Table 4.10 arranges debt ratios in ascending order in respect of industry average 
leverage levels. We can observe that most industries are in a similar order in both of 
the sample periods. For example, in each of the periods, hotel, airlines, and fixed line 
telecommunication companies have high debt ratios, while companies in 
biotechnology, software, and computer services have low debt ratios. This result may 
have two implications. Companies have smaller debt ratios, (1) if they do not have 
sufficient tangible assets (Myers, 2003) or (2) if they have high operating earnings‟ 
volatility (Ozkan, 2001; Bongini et al., 2000).  
 87 
Table 4.9 Mean, median and SD of debt ratio with different industries 
The table shows the changes in mean, median and standard deviation of debt ratio between two 
different time periods. Note, SD: Standard Deviation 
















99 ~ 08 .3943 .3828 .2465 
Aluminium 






99 ~ 08 .3559 .366 .2205 
Automobiles 






99 ~ 08 .3259 .3183 .1918 
Biotechnology 






99 ~ 08 .1690 .0247 .2994 
Broad-line retailers 






99 ~ 08 .2762 .2736 .1822 
Brewers 






99 ~ 08 .2115 .1969 .2005 
Broadcasting and 
entertainment 






99 ~ 08 .3016 .2373 .3051 
Computer hardware 






99 ~ 08 .1750 .1291 .1874 
Computer services 






99 ~ 08 .1532 .0760 .2121 
Delivery services 






99 ~ 08 .2134 .1663 .1956 
Distillers and vintners 






99 ~ 08 .2988 .3029 .2054 
Drug retailers 






99 ~ 08 .2202 .1700 .2245 
Fixed line telecommunications 






99 ~ 08 .3580 .3002 .3368 
Food products 






99 ~ 08 .2489 .2129 .2252 
Gambling 






99 ~ 08 .3105 .2423 .3059 
Health care providers 






99 ~ 08 .2898 .2297 .2979 
Heavy construction 






99 ~ 08 .2007 .1598 .1832 
Home construction 






99 ~ 08 .2917 .2885 .2142 
Hotels 






99 ~ 08 .3507 .3419 .2574 
Internet 






99 ~ 08 .1631 .0352 .2684 
Marine transportation 






99 ~ 08 .3816 .3805 .2083 
Mobile telecommunications 






99 ~ 08 .2379 .1736 .2701 
Semiconductors 






99 ~ 08 .1573 .0924 .1856 
Soft drinks 






99 ~ 08 .2167 .1470 .2546 
Software 






99 ~ 08 .1461 .0237 .2641 
Steel 






99 ~ 08 .2851 .2745 .206 
Travel and tourism 






99 ~ 08 .3330 .3227 .2861 
Total 











 Table 4.10 Ranking (ascending order) in debt ratio in terms of mean, median and 
standard deviation 
The table shows debt ratios in ascending order. We can observe that most industries are in a similar 
order in both of the sample periods. Full industry names are described in Appendix 1. 
 Mean Debt Ratio Median Debt Ratio Standard Deviation 



































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.4 Capital structure within different industries and different countries 
Our results reveal three facts in this section. Firstly, over two decades and across 
eleven countries, most industries‟ leverage levels generally show stability, but also a 
gradual reduction. Secondly, firms related to new technologies have lower debt ratios 
compared to firms in traditional industries. For example, firms in biotechnology and 
computer service industries have low debt levels throughout the two decades and 
across countries (see Tables A.4.3 and A.4.4 in Appendix 4). Finally, an average debt 
ratio of an industry in a particular country is not the same as that in another country, 
but it is ranked in a similar place among different industries in each country. For 
example, the observed leverage levels of airlines and steel firms are very varied 
across countries, but most of the airlines companies‟ debt ratios are ranked higher 
than steel companies across countries. This implies that debt ratios are jointly related 
to industry and country factors (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10; and Tables A.4.3 and A.4.4 
in Appendix 4). 
 
4.3.4.1 Different leverage levels in terms of similarity and persistency 
Our results indicate that firms have different leverage levels in line with industries, 
time periods and countries. The results also show persistency in terms of leverage 
levels. Namely, firms with high debt levels in the first period retain their high 
gearing levels over time, whereas firms with low debt levels in the first period retain 
their low gearing levels over time. 
 
4.3.4.1.1 Similarities and differences in debt ratios 
There are similarities and differences in debt ratios across industries and countries. 
For example, most debt ratios are between 15% (AUT) and 28% (USA) in the food 
product industry, with the exception of some countries (see Table A.4.2 in Appendix 
4 for details). Firms in computer services, broadcasting and entertainment, drug 
retailing, automobiles and computer hardware industries also generally clearly show 
regular patterns in leverage levels. For instance, computer service firms generally 
have low debt levels across the two decades in most of the sample countries. In 
addition, health care providers, in general, have debt levels between 25% and 35% 
and heavy construction firms have between 15% and 25%, but there are many 
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exceptions to this. For example, semiconductor firms in Korea in the first term show 
46% while other firms are lower than 30%. 
 
Overall, there are some similarities in terms of debt ratios in industry averages across 
countries and wide diversities at the same time (see Tables A.4.3 and A.4.4 in 
Appendix 4). The phenomenon that leverage levels in terms of industrial averages 
are in a similar order across time and countries, implies the existence of important 
„capital-structure-decision determinants.‟ However, at the same time, the 
phenomenon that debt levels in terms of industrial averages are widely spread across 
countries, might imply the existence of country effects in leverage level decisions. 
 
4.3.4.1.2 Persistency in debt ratios  
The most noticeable observation is the persistency of leverage levels in terms of 
industry averages, over time. Across the twenty-year period, industry average 
leverage levels have changed but to a limited extent. Therefore, in terms of the order 
of debt ratios in industry averages between the two periods, they have not changed 
much (Table 4.10). In addition, aluminium companies, health care providers, travel 
and tourism companies, and broadcasting and entertainment companies show widely 
spread debt levels across countries. In particular, their debt ratios in terms of industry 
averages do not show a clear pattern across countries. However, their leverage levels 
show stable changes through the two periods of time in each country. This is strong 
evidence of capital structure persistency. This implies that these firms probably have 
reasons to maintain the same leverage level over time, without taking into accout 
their industry mean debt ratios. 
 
4.3.4.2 New industries 
High technology industries have only recently begun business when compared with 
traditional industries. Approximately 900 companies in our sample (about 25% of the 
total sample of firms) are newly listed in the second period within the high 
technology industries (ICB code 9000 series). Biotechnology firms have also 
doubled in number (an increase of 174 companies). Together, these two industries, 
comprising of about 1,074 companies show an increase in the number of firms in the 
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high technology industries. From Table 4.9, software, biotechnology, and computer 
hardware firms have increased their debt ratios in the second period based on the 
average value. Based on the median value, however, this has decreased during the 
same period. Only companies in traditional industries, e.g. airlines, aluminium and 
automobiles, have increased their in terms of both mean and median debt levels. 
 
Internet firms, for instance, had about a 25% debt level in the first period, though 
only four countries had Internet companies. In the second period, ten countries have 
Internet companies, with the exception of Austria, and most of their debt ratios are 
between 3% and 15%, with the exception of Germany, Canada and the USA. All 
computer hardware companies in the Anglo-Saxon economy have higher debt ratios 
than those in the Continental and the Far Eastern economies. Companies in high 
technology industries generally have a low debt level. Even though some of them 
increased their debt levels in the second period, it is still low; and the increase in the 
number of such companies in these industries in the second period, might lead to an 
overall decrease in leverage levels on average. This is consistent with Bates et al. 
(2009). 
 
4.4 Conclusion and contribution 
From earlier times, e.g. Donaldson (1961), Solomon (1963) and Stonehill and Stitzel 
(1969), it has been thought to be important to know the existence of optimal capital 
structure. If this is the case, why would it be so? The chapter has investigated only 
the debt ratio differences between industries and between countries by using time 
series data. The idea is simple. If there are target debt ratios, companies would try to 
achieve those targets, and if they were successful, then their debt ratios would be 
near the optimal capital structure: and we could then observe systematic patterns in 
leverage levels based particular industries.  
 
Our results show that both country and industry factors together affect debt levels. 
For example, our results show that the average debt level of each industry is different 
as between countries but the average debt ratios of industries are ranked in a similar 
order across countries (see Table 4.11; and Tables A.4.3 and A.4.4 in Appendix 4). 
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In other words, the average debt levels of some industries are always higher than that 
of others, across countries, whereas the average debt levels of the industries vary in 
different countries. There are some exceptions, of course. 
 
Our results also show that firms in Eastern countries have higher debt levels 
compared with Western countries, and there is a trend in terms of capital structure 
change. For example, debt levels have generally reduced in all the sample countries, 
over the two decades. The overall conclusion in this chapter implies that there are 
some common factors in capital structure decisions.  
 
4.4.1 Contribution 
Since Stonehill and Stitzel (1969), only a few papers have been published which 
compare debt ratios based on company characteristics. Our results indicate two 
aspects: first, that capital structures are not randomly distributed, unlike Modigliani 
and Miller‟s (1958) irrelevance theory implies; and second, the differences in capital 
structure based upon company characteristics (mainly, industry, country and time 
period in this chapter) imply that there may be a unique optimal debt ratio for each 
individual firm in respect of their different situations as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
suggest (see Section 2.2.4 in Appendix 2 for details). In other words, debt ratios can 
be affected by a firm‟s unique characteristics and situation, including different taxes, 
countries and industrial factors. 
 
4.4.2 Implication 
This is the most important chapter in this thesis. The results of this chapter underpin 
the rest of the thesis and require further study. This is because, in this chapter, we 
have observed that there is a high probability that firms have their optimal capital 
structure. If there is an optimal capital structure, then we need to know which is the 
optimal one, what are the important determinants to achieve the optimal gearing level, 
and how firms come close to their target. Since, we have observed the probability of 
the existence of an optimal capital structure, we are further motivated to undertake 
further research about firms‟ changing behaviours in terms of their capital structure.  
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In Chapter 4, we saw that there are various differences in leverage levels in industries 
and countries over a period of time. In this chapter, as each hypothesis in Chapter 2 
is related to a capital structure theory (or theories), we can investigate: (1) what the 
most appropriate capital structure theory is amongst them; and (2) what the most 
important debt ratio determinants are by testing our hypotheses.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, various researchers have attempted to suggest the 
important capital structure determinants, such as bankruptcy probability and tax 
shields for the static trade-off theory, and stock prices and asymmetric information 
for the pecking order and market timing theories (Myers, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). In this chapter, we will examine these theories by testing previously suggested 
research methods. For example, whether a „financial deficit‟ would be positively 
associated with debt issue in terms of the pecking order theory. This method is 
suggested by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and others. Our results indicate that no 
one theory dominates the others. Although all three major theories partially explain a 
firm‟s financial policy, the trade-off theory is the best amongst them. Our results 
show that cash holding, firm size, bankruptcy probability, asset tangibility, market-
to-book ratio, capital expenditure and stock return all play important roles in „capital 
structure decision making procedures‟. Our results also indicate that firms have 
reduced their leverage levels by issuing equity over the last twenty years, and that 
many firms in our sample have issued equity and debt at the same time. This may 
imply that asymmetric information is not as great as Myers (1984) thought.   
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 shows the predicted signs of 
different capital structure theories. Section 5.3 defines the variables that are used in 
this chapter. Section 5.4 describes different methodologies associated with different 
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capital structure theories. Section 5.5 presents the results from three static models. 
The chapter closes with a summary and conclusion of the results in Section 5.6.  
 
5.2 Predicted signs and capital structure theories 
The predicted sign table was originally provided in Chapter 2. For convenience, it is 
repeated here. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of predicted signs associated with capital structure theories 
The table shows the differences and similarities of predicted signs associated with different capital 
structure theories. In general, the predicted signs are similar between theories. As Myers (2001) 
mentions, this might be seen as evidence for the correlation between capital structure theories. 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) also conclude that the pecking order theory is a part of the trade-off 
theory, rather than a unique leverage determinant, because the variable „financial deficit‟ does not 

















Market-to-book - - - - - 
Financial slack      
Firm size +  +/- +  
Asset tangibility +  +/-   
Capital expenditure +/-  + -  
Tax rate +     
Earnings volatility - -  -  
R&D expense/ asset +/-  + -  
ROA(profitability) + - - -  
Bankruptcy 
probability 
- - - -  
 
5.3 The definition of variables 
In order to understand the relationship between capital structure and its determinants, 
this thesis has divided the independent variables into five categories: taxes, financial 
distress, the costs of capital, growth, and some nominal variables. This classification 
has already been used in many previous studies.  
 
5.3.1 Choice and definition of debt ratios 
There is no clear criterion for using debt ratio which represents a firm‟s correct 
capital structure in a capital structure study (see Section 4.2.2 where full details of 
debt ratio measures are provided).  
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In addition, Bowman (1980) argues that as there is a strong correlation between book 
value and market value, mis-specification owing to using book-value measures is 
very small. Frank and Goyal (2009) however, find that book-value-based debt ratio 
and market-value-based debt ratio do not show the same results. They confirm that 
industry median leverage, asset tangibility and profitability are statistically 
significant when market-based leverages are used; and that the variables of market-
to-book ratio, firm size and expected inflation lose their reliability. 
 
Therefore, much previous research has used both book- and market-based debt ratios 
together, such as Leary and Roberts (2005), Huizinga et al. (2008), and Antoniou et 
al. (2008). Chapters 6 and 7 also generally use market- and book-based debt ratios 
together, although book-based debt ratio takes a more important role. The definitions 
of the two variables used in this thesis are as follows: 
 
Book-based debt ratio=(short term debt and current portion of long-term debt+long-
term debt)/(book value debt+book value equity) 
Market-based debt ratio=(short term debt and current portion of long-term 
debt+long-term debt)/(book value debt-book value equity+market value equity). 
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the trends of book-based debt ratios over the twenty-year 
period. The figures show that debt ratios have decreased across all countries and 
economies. In particular, the debt ratios of Korean and Asian firms have shifted more 
than have been the case in other countries and economies. 
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 Figure 5.1 World debt ratio trends over a  20 year period  
 
 The figure shows that all the economies have decreased their debt ratios over the sample time period. The Asian firms have reduced their debt ratios most rapidly. 
Note, debt ratios are based on the book-based debt ratios as defined by Antoniou et al. (2008) and data are collected from Thomson One Banker. Book-based debt ratio 


















Figure 5.2 Debt ratio trends by countries over a 20 year period 
 
The figure shows the same story as revealed in Figure 5.1. All firms decrease debt ratios during the sample time period. The figure also shows that Asian firms, such as 
Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese firms have reduced their debt ratios more rapidly. Note, debt ratios are based on the book-based debt ratios as defined by Antoniou et 
al. (2008) and data are collected from Thomson One Banker. Book-based debt ratio = (short term debt and current portion of long-term debt+long-term debt)/(book 

















5.3.2 Choice and definitions of independent variables 
Full details of the theoretical backgrounds of each independent variable selection are 
provided in Section 1.2 in Appendix 1. 
 
5.3.2.1 Taxes 
In the static trade-off theory, debt increases a firm‟s value as a result of the 
associated tax shields. Therefore, tax should be positively associated with the debt 
ratio. However, there are some weaknesses when using tax rates because all 
countries have different tax rates (see Table A.1.4 in Appendix 1), and some 
industries have different tax rates on their revenue, e.g. charities pay less or no tax 
(Brealey et al., 2008). These differences would affect a firm‟s capital structure. 
Various authors use different tax rates as tax indicators. Desai et al. (2004), for 
example, follow Modigliani and Miller (1963) in that they use corporate income tax 
rates. Byoun (2008) uses a marginal tax rate that is equal to the statutory income tax 
rate. Huizinga (2008) uses a statutory tax rate on dividends as a proxy of tax rate.  
 
The definition of the tax rate used in this thesis is as follows: 
Tax rate = (income tax / pre-tax income)  
 
5.3.2.2 Financial distress 
Fama and French (2005) and Hovakimian et al. (2004) argue that the trade-off theory 
is more related to risk than to tax advantage. In addition, Brounen et al. (2006), using 
a questionnaire, find that financial stability is the most important matter of concern 
for CFOs; followed by credit ratings and earnings volatility. They also suggest that 
this conclusion is inconsistent with the pecking order theory, and corroborates the 
assertions of Graham and Harvey (2001) that financial flexibility (or financial 
stability) is generally considered to be consistent with the pecking order theory, but 
also relates to some non-pecking order problems, such as transaction costs (for 
capital structure adjustment), liquidity (for bankruptcy probability control) and new 
investment opportunities.  
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In this thesis, the variables, profitability, firm size, financial slack (net cash holding), 
asset tangibility and earnings volatility are considered as financial distress cost 
representatives. These variables are related to firms‟ financial stability (or flexibility), 
collateral value, and ability to control financial matters. We can presume that big 
firms, for example, have a better ability to manage financial matters. 
   
5.3.2.2.1 Profitability 
Profitable firms can have high tax shields as a result of using more debt. Cheng and 
Shiu (2007) and Huizinga et al. (2008) use „return on assets‟ and Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) use „operating income before depreciation‟ divided by assets, as a proxy of 
profitability. This thesis follows their lead by using (EBIT-tax)/Assett-1 as a proxy of 
profitability.  
 
ROA (return on asset): (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense 
on Debt-Interest Capitalized) × (1-Tax Rate))) / Last Year‟s Total Assets  
 
Note, ROA is defined by Cheng and Shiu (2007).  
 
5.3.2.2.2 Firm size 
There are many different types of measure for a firm‟s size, such as the „year end 
market cap‟ (Shumway, 2001), the „book value of debt plus the market value of 
equity‟ (Kurshev and Strevulaev, 2006), the „total sales‟ (Antoniou et al., 2008; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006), the „ln(real sales)‟ (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Graham, 
2000) and the „net assets (total asset-current liability)‟ (Frank and Goyal, 2003). This 
thesis uses the „logarithm of assets‟ as a proxy, following Brav (2009) and Byoun 
(2008).  
 




5.3.2.2.3 Financial slack (net cash ratio) 
This thesis follows Leary and Roberts‟ (2005) definition for a proxy of financial 
slack (net cash ratio). 
 
Financial Slack (net cash ratio) = (cash + marketable securities) / net assets 
where, net assets=total asset – „cash and marketable securities‟ 
 
5.3.2.2.4 Asset tangibility 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Antoniou et al. (2008) use the ratio of „net tangible 
asset to total asset.‟ 
 
Asset tangibility = Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets 
 
5.3.2.2.5 Earnings volatility 
Earnings volatility is defined as a five-year-moving-standard-deviation of the ratio of 
„operating income to total assets‟. We therefore have data for it from 1995. 
 
5.3.2.2.6 Bankruptcy probability 
Previous research uses returns on assets (Castanias, 1983), total assets (Welch, 2004) 
and current ratios (Zmijewski, 1984) as proxies of bankruptcy probability. Following 
Leary and Roberts (2005), Purnanandam (2008) and Binsbergen et al. (2010), we use 
the series of Z-score models such as Z-score, Z  -score and EMS. In other words, the 
thesis uses a „combined Z-score model‟ as a proxy of bankruptcy probability that 
uses different types of Z-score models based on a firm‟s characteristics. We named 
this „combined pb-area.‟ The Z‟-score model is used for US firms, the Z  -Score 
model for non-US firms, and the EMS model for firms in the emerging markets, 
following Altman‟s suggestion. Good, gray and bad areas indicate financial 
conditions based on this „bankruptcy decision model series.‟ EDF models are also 
used for the comparison of bankruptcy probability in Section 7.4 (see Section 1.2.2 
in Appendix 1 where full details of bankruptcy probability measures are provided). 
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Figure 5.3 World net cash ratio trends for a 20 year period  
The figure shows that net cash ratios have gradually increased across the world over the last 20 years. The figure indicates that firms increase their cash-holdings across 
the sample period of time. The Anglo-Saxon economy increases it most, followed by the European and Asian economies. Note that net cash ratios are defined by Leary 
and Roberts (2005) and data are collected from Thomson One Banker. Net cash ratio = (cash + marketable securities) / net assets, where, net assets=total asset – „cash 


















Figure 5.4 Net cash ratio trend by country for a 20 year period 
The figure shows „net cash ratio‟ changes based on country level data. The figure indicates that firms in the US have generally increased their cash ratio continuously. 
Note that net cash ratios are defined by Leary and Roberts (2005) and data are collected from Thomson One Banker. Net cash ratio = (cash + marketable securities) / 




















5.3.2.3 Financial costs 
5.3.2.3.1 Inflation     
Cheng and Shiu (2007) suggest the Ln_inflation.  
INF: GDP deflator 
 
5.3.2.3.2 Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio = ((total asset–book equity+market equity)/total asset) 
 
5.3.2.3.3 Stock return 
))(1ln( 11,1   ttttt PPPSR  
where, SRt-1,t: stock return at t, Pt: stock price at t. 
 
5.3.2.4 Growth and investment 
Goyal et al. (2002) suggest five variables as proxies of growth opportunities, 
including market-to-book ratio (as a proxy of Tobin‟s Q) (used by Cheng and Shiu, 
2007), annual growth rate of sales (Huizinga et al., 2008), advertising and R&D 
expenditure (Long and Malitz, 1983; Bradley et al., 1984). This thesis uses „capital 
expenditure‟ and „research and development expenses‟ together as proxies of new 
investment and growth opportunity. R&D expenses generally involve investment in 
intangible assets, whereas capital expenditure involves investment in tangible assets 
(Amir et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2006). 
 
5.3.2.4.1 Capital expenditure 
CAPEX: Capital expenditure = (capital expenditure/total asset)  
   
5.3.2.4.2 R&D expenses  
R&D expenses = research and development expenses/total asset 
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5.3.2.5 Nominal variables 
Our data also include various nominal variables such as time periods, industries, 
countries and economies. It includes a number of dummy variables. There is a 
potential problem with these in that an OLS equation will run out of degrees of 
freedom when it does not include sufficient number of observations. The use of time 
trend dummy variables can solve this problem (Cameron, 2005) because they can 
show debt ratio trends throughout the sample period without having dummy 
variables for each individual time period. The differences in terms of this time trend 
dummy variable compared with a traditional dummy variable are that: (1) the time 
trend dummies show the whole trend in terms of changes of dependent variables, 
while the traditional method shows changes for each individual year; and (2) the time 
trend dummy can be a proxy of unmeasured variables. Therefore, it can be a superior 
measurement (Cameron, 2005). This method also allows the use of other nominal 
variables, including countries and industries. 
 
This thesis has some nominal data, time trends, different countries and industries, 
and economies. The defined dummy variables are described in Appendix 1.1. 
 
5.3.2.6 Pure issuance 
In this thesis, we use new variables in the form of the pure issuance of equity and 
debt, and which clearly indicate the firms‟ real choice between debt and equity. The 
reason for the new variables is because, as Hovakimian et al. (2004) mention, about 
65% of firms issue equity and debt simultaneously. Therefore, the previous variables 
of net equity issue and net debt issue, cannot be good indicators for explaining firms‟ 
debt ratio change. In other words, in using the regression models, there is always a 
certain level of relationship between debt ratio change and „net equity issue, and net 
debt issue‟. Without considering which dependent and independent variables are 
used, the regressand is always associated with the regressor at a certain level. 
Therefore, debt ratio changes always show some level of association with the 
independent variables, net equity issue and net debt issue, at the same time, 
particularly when firms issue equity and debt together. This fact indicates that using 
the previous variables, net equity issue or net debt issue, we cannot clearly point out 
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whether firms choose equity or debt to change their gearing levels. Therefore, in 
order to address the weakness of the previous research involving these two previous 
variables, we use two new variables, pure equity issue and pure debt issue. These 
new variables clearly indicate the firms‟ real choice between equity and debt. In 
addition, since they show the firms‟ real choice between equity and debt, the positive 
value of „pure equity issue‟ indicates the negative value of „pure debt issue‟, (pure 
equity issue = -1×pure debt issue). The definitions of the variables are as follows: 
 
Net stock issuance=(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset 
Net long-term debt issuance = („long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset 
Pure equity issuance = ((net stock issue-net bond issue)/total asset) = ((sale stock-
repurchase stock) - („long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟))/total asset. 
Pure debt issuance = ((net bond issue-net stock issue)/total asset) = ((„long-term debt 
issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟) - (sale stock-repurchase stock))/total asset. 
 
where, sale stock refers to the sale or issue of common and preferred stock. This item, 
sale stock, indicates the cash flows received from issuing common and preferred 
stock. It includes the conversion of debentures or preferred stock into common stock, 
the sale of treasury shares, shares issued for acquisitions and proceeds from stock 
options. It does not include warrant issuance, share issuance costs and the stocks of 
subsidiary firms (see the definitions of Thomson One Banker and Compustat). 
Repurchase stock refers to redemptions, retirement or the conversion of common or 
preferred stock. It indicates cash flows which are used to buy outstanding common 
and prepared equity. This includes the purchase of treasury shares, the repurchase of 
stock, the exchange of common stock for preferred stock or debentures, and the 
retirement of preferred stock. It does not include warrant purchase, reductions in the 
stock of a subsidiary, and share purchase when reported separately (see the 
definitions of Thomson One Banker and Compustat). Long-term debt issue refers to 
the amount of money received by firms from the issuance of long-term debt, 
including convertible bonds, capitalised lease obligations and debt acquired from 
acquisitions. Long-term debt retirement refers to the amount of such borrowings 
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reduced by firms as a result of reducing long-term debt, including capitalised lease 





The detail of the data was described in Section 3.2. For convenience, some important 
figures are duplicated here. The data consist of 4,598 companies from 27 industries 
in 11 countries and from 3 different economies (see Appendix 1.1 for details). The 
industry classification is based on the „Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
sector and sub-sector.‟ Its sample period is between 1989 and 2008. Macro-economic 
variables (GDP deflator (inflation) and market capitalisation) have been collected 
from the International Monetary Fund, and the World Economic Outlook Database. 
GDP growth has been collected from the OECD Factbook, with the exception of the 
Taiwanese data as that is from the IMF.  
 
The data has been cleaned up by removing outliers to avoid potential errors as a 
result of using an inappropriate data set, and in order to minimise their influence. The 
thesis drops the values of debt ratio, both book- and market-based, if the values are 
greater than 2.00. This is about 99 percentile of the data set. The thesis also drops 
negative debt ratios as outliers. In the case of other variables, we likewise drop 
outliers if the values of variables are greater than three standard deviations from the 
variables‟ means. 
 
5.4.1.1 Missing values 
There are some missing values in the data set. The thesis uses generally accepted 
methods to replace these missing values with a minimal effect on the statistical 
outcomes.  
 
As the missing values of tax rates are correlated to net loss, the thesis replaces the 
missing values after comparing them with the data of net income. If firms have 
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negative net income, they do not report the tax rates. The thesis, therefore, replaces 
the missing data with zero tax rates if firms have negative net incomes.  
 
Both the data for „long-term debt reduction and repurchase,‟ and for „common equity 
and preferred stock repurchase and sales,‟ also have missing values. After comparing 
the behaviour of other sample companies, the thesis presumes that these companies 
did not issue or repurchase long-term debt or equity if there are no data.  
 
As for the rest of the data, if there are any missing values between time t0 and t2, (at 
t1), the value of t1, Vt1, is replaced by the mean value between time t0 and t2 
((Vt2+Vt0)/2); and, if the missing spaces are continued for more than two years, the 
spaces have been left as missing data. 
 
5.4.2 Panel data 
The models in this thesis are based on panel data that include three different elements, 
debt ratio determinants, company, and time. The model also includes some dummy 









kt,i,ti,ti, u+Xβ+α=Y ∑∑∑  (5.1) 
 
where, i: debt ratio determinants, k: company, t: year, ui,t: error term. 
 
Panel data often does not conform to the requirement that it is independent 
identically distributed (i.i.d) and the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE), because 
idiosyncratic error (time-varying error), heteroskedasticity and correlation over time 
can often occur in panel data. When these problems are present, OLS assumptions 
cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, it is arguable as to whether OLS is the most 
appropriate method when using panel data. Pooled OLS, GLS (with fixed effect and 
random effect), and Instrument Variables (IV) estimators (2SLS, 3SLS, or GMM) 
are used. If there is no heteroskedasticity problem in OLS regression, the GLS fixed, 
first and random effect models can be used, and Instrument Variable (IV or 2SLS) 
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and the GMM estimator suggest identical conclusions. If there is a heteroskedasticity 
problem, however, the GMM estimator leads to a better estimate (Baum et al., 2003). 
 
We also use the two-step GMM estimator that uses residuals produced by the first 
stage regression to make an „asymptotically optimal weighting matrix‟ (see 
Appendix 3.2 in which full details have been provided). Antoniou et al. (2006, p.175) 
mentioned that a two-step GMM is a superior estimator “…when the disturbances are 
expected to show heteroskedasticity in the large sample data with a relatively long time span. 
This can control the correlation of errors overtime, heteroskedasticity across firms, simultaneity 
and measurement errors due to the utilisation of the orthogonality conditions on the variance-
covariance matrix.” 
 
Verbeek (2008) compares statistical models to decide the best estimator by 
employing similar variables to those of Flanery and Rangan (2006). Verbeek models 
are of „partial capital structure adjustments‟ using OLS, OLS with „fixed effect and 
first-difference‟ and GMM estimators. He concludes that none of the models 
explains capital structure entirely convincingly. The differences in coefficients 
among the OLS, OLS with „fixed effect and first-difference‟ are substantial (Verbeek, 
2008). OLS, in general, overestimates the coefficients (particularly the speed of 
adjustment, λ) while fixed effect underestimates the coefficients. The coefficients of 
the first-difference model also substantially underestimate the true value, particularly 
when λ is large. The results from the GMM one-step and two-step estimators (using 
the methods of Anderson and Hasio, 1981; and Arellano and Bond, 1991) also 
indicate an unrealistically weak instrument problem. This implies that we may 
analyse a model with various methodologies before coming to a conclusion, and 
trying to find the finest instruments. 
 
In addition, much previous research such as that of Ozkan (2001) and Marsh (1982) 
suggests that capital structure is affected by many categorical variables, e.g. industry, 
country and economy. The thesis, therefore, analyses gearing ratios using several 




As Davidson and Mackinnon (2004) state, in general, there are endogeneity problems 
in the panel data when a variable is not orthogonal with the error term. A solution for 
the endogeneity problem is using first differences or fixed effects. These methods, 
however, raise a problem that they omit variables which are constant over time. This 
problem can be solved by using estimators such as IV or GMM which use 
instruments. Instruments are required to make sure that the error term is not 
correlated to endogenous independent variables; otherwise the OLS outcomes will be 
biased
12
.   
 
Theoretically, any variables can be instruments if they are highly correlated with 
independent variables and uncorrelated with the error term (see Sections 3.1.1 and 
3.2.3 in Appendix 3 which provide a full description of the endogeneity problem). 
However, it is difficult to find suitable instruments. Therefore, one- or two-period-
lagged independent variables are generally used as instruments. Lemmon and Zender 
(2008) and Ozkan (2001) use a one-period-lagged independent variable for all their 
analyses. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) use GMM models with two-period-lagged 
independent variables as instruments
13
. In Chapters 6 and 7, we also use one- or two-
period-lagged variables as instruments (Mackay and Phillips, 2005; see Section 3.1.2 
in Appendix 3 which provides full details of the instruments used).  
 
This thesis decides endogeneity in variables by using C-statistic (also called 
difference-in-Sargan C test (Roodman, 2006) or J-statistic). The C-statistic provides 
the orthogonality condition of (sub-instrumental) variables (Baum, 2006). Its null 
hypothesis is the exogeneity of variables. However, Roodman (2006) mentions by 
citing Sargan (1958) that the error in the Sargan test is proportionate as it increases 
                                               
12 Let us assume a regression model A, y1=α0+β1x+β2y2+µ, where y2 is an endogenous variable, µ is 
an error term. To solve this problem, z1 and z2 are used as instruments for y2, ŷ2=π0+π1z1+π2z2+π3x+ν, 
where, ν is an error term. Then Σŷ2(y1- 0β̂ - 21yβ̂ + xβ2
ˆ )=0. This equation is used to solve the regression 
model A. Since this method goes through two stages, it is called the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
method. 
13 Most researchers use from one to four-period lagged or differenced explanatory variables (Nishioka, 
2004; Benito, 2003). Flannery and Rangan (2006) use lagged market-based debt ratios for lagged 
book-based debt ratios as instruments.  
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the number of instruments and, by citing Ruud (2000), we do not know the 
reasonable number of instruments.  
 
5.4.3 Statistical descriptions 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics, and Table 5.3 presents a correlation matrix 
for the sample data. There are some high correlations with the size of the firm, profit, 
earnings volatility, research and development expenses in Table 5.3. Table 5.4 also 
presents the correlation matrix with differenced data and shows a high correlation 
with the size of the firm, research and development expenses and profit. Table 5.5 
shows the VIF (variance inflation factors) test and indicates that there is no multi-
collinearity between independent variables (see Section 3.2.1.2. in Appendix 3 in 
which full details of the VIF test are provided). Therefore, even though there are 
relatively high correlations between some variables as Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate, all 




Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the whole sample period between 1989 and 2008 
BDR: book value based debt ratio=book value debt/book value asset, MDR: market-based debt ratio=book value of debt/(book value of asset–book value of 
equity+market equity), NLTD: Net long term debt issuance=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, NE: Net stock issuance =(sale stock-
repurchase stock)/total asset, Netcash=cash and short-term investment/(total asset-cash and short-term investment), Lnasset=log(total asset), Tang (asset 
tangibility)=net property, plant and equipment/total asset, Tax=income taxes/pre-tax income, the thesis removes the negative value of taxes. Capex (Capital 
expenditure)=capital expenditure/total asset, the thesis removes the negative value of capital expenditure. R&D=research and development expenses/asset, the thesis 
removes the negative value of R&D. M/B (Market-to-book ratio)=(asset-book equity+market equity)/asset, this thesis removes the observations that are greater than 10 
and smaller than zero. Profit (Profitability)=operating income before tax/asset, Vol (earnings volatility)=5 year moving average standard deviation of the ratio of 
„operating income‟ to „total asset‟, DEF1=(dividend+investment+working capital change-cash-flow after interest and tax)/total asset, DEF2=(DEF1+long- term 
debt)/total asset. 
Stats BDR MDR ∆BDR ∆MDR NLTD NE DEF1 DEF2 Netcash Lnasset Tang Tax Capex R&D M/B Profit Vol 
Mean .226 .167 0 007 .01 .062 .163 .284 .673 4.95 .242 .329 .056 .076 1.84 -.036 .082 
Min 0.00 0.00 -1.842 -.722 -.6 -.866 -3.515 -3.516 0.00 -4.61 -.008 0 0 0 .043 -3 .000 
p25 .019 .01 -.029 -.021 -.013 0 -.021 .044 .068 3.44 .063 .025 .011 .002 .99 -.022 .016 
P50 .166 .111 0 0 0 0 .051 .186 .174 4.98 .183 .306 .031 .018 1.31 .040 .037 
p75 .354 .276 .025 .032 .014 .02 .217 .412 .466 6.54 .376 .431 .07 .09 2.1 .093 .093 
p99 1.1 .662 .459 .289 .387 .912 1.818 1.866 10.12 10.70 .826 2.16 .39 .74 8.13 .376 .574 
Max 1.91 .729 1.857 .709 .643 1.091 4.563 4.845 33.67 13.04 .913 13.25 .62 1.43 9.99 2.43 .673 
Sd .244 .176 .146 .088 .094 .186 .396 .411 2.03 2.50 .212 .564 .076 .142 1.47 .347 .115 
Skewness 1.84 1.02 -.326 .180 1.238 2.961 3.341 2.695 7.88 -.220 .91 10.60 3.05 4.00 2.58 -3.98 2.60 








Table 5.3 A correlation matrix for the whole sample period between 1989 and 2008 
Netcash=cash and short-term investment/(total asset-cash and short-term investment), Lnasset=log(total asset), Tang (asset tangibility)=net property, plant and 
equipment/total asset, Tax=income taxes/pre-tax income, Capex (Capital expenditure)=capital expenditure/total asset, R&D=research and development expenses/asset, 
M/B (Market-to-book ratio)=(asset-book equity+market equity)/asset, the thesis drops the observations that are greater than 10, Profit (Profitability)=operating income 
before tax/asset, Vol (earnings volatility)=5 year moving average standard deviation of the ration of „operating income‟ to „total asset,‟ BP=bankruptcy areas from Z-, 
Z‟- and EM- Score areas, 1=good, 2=gray, and 3=bad areas of the bankruptcy score. The table shows that lnasset has correlation relationships to R&D, profit, and vol, 
tang to capex, R&D to M/B, profit, Vol and lnasset, M/V to Vol, and profit to Vol, Lnasset and R&D. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level. 
 Netcash Lnasset Tang Tax Capex R&D M/B Profit Vol BP 
Netcash 1.00          
Lnasset -0.19*** 1.00         
Tang -0.24*** 0.28*** 1.00        
Tax -0.1*** 0.2*** 0.05*** 1.00       
Capex -0.06*** 0.09*** 0.36*** -0.01* 1.00      
R&D 0.25*** -0.33*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.03*** 1.00     
M/B 0.23*** -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.33*** 1.00    
Profit -0.20*** 0.42*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.06*** -0.50*** -0.22*** 1.00   
Vol 0.27*** -0.51*** -0.27*** -0.18*** -0.02*** 0.46*** 0.36*** -0.55*** 1.00  








Table 5.4 A correlation matrix for the whole sample period with differenced variables between 1989 and 2008 
DEF1=(dividend+investment+working capital change-cash-flow after interest and tax)/total asset, DEF2=(DEF1+long- term debt)/total asset. The table shows the 
correlation between variables. The table indicates that there is generally no significant correlation except between ∆R&D and ∆Lnasset, between ∆profit and ∆Ln asset, 
and between ∆profit and ∆R&D. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 ∆Netcash ∆Lnasset ∆Tang ∆Tax ∆Capex ∆R&D ∆M/B ∆Profit ∆Vol ∆BP DEF1 DEF2 
∆Netcash 1.00            
∆Lnasset 0.15*** 1.00           
∆Tang -0.19*** -0.14*** 1.00          
∆Tax 0.00 0.02*** -0.01** 1.00         
∆Capex 0.01* 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.01 1.00        
∆R&D -0.25*** -0.35*** 0.19*** -0.01 -0.05*** 1.00       
∆M/B 0.03*** -0.21*** -0.03*** -0.01* 0.01** 0.5*** 1.00      
∆Profit 0.14*** 0.35*** -0.16*** 0.02*** 0.06*** -0.45*** -0.04*** 1.00     
∆Vol -0.02*** -0.08*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.03*** -0.23*** 1.00    
∆BP 0.09*** -0.12*** 0.15*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.12*** -0.11*** -0.22*** 0.06*** 1.00   
DEF1 0.01 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.18*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.01* 0.02*** 1.00  




Table 5.5 VIF test results 
The table indicates that there is no multi-collinearity between independent variables. All variables are 
defined in Section 5.3. 











Mean VIF 1.46 
 
5.5 Testing static models 
To test the static models, we mainly use three dependent variables, leverage level, 
change in gearing level, and issuances of securities. The leverages are measured by 
book- and market-based equity values. Fama and French (2002) mention that the 
expected signs can be changed, based on book- or market-based asset valuing. In 
other words, the analysed results are changeable according to the dependent variables‟ 
definition.  
 
5.5.1 Composition in debt ratio change 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) decompose the change of debt ratio into three parts, net 
equity issue (-(e/A)), newly retained earnings (-(∆RE/A)), and the residual change in 
leverage (-(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1)) as shown in Equation (5.2). The residual change in 
leverage indicates the growth of assets, which includes equity and debt issues and 
























































































According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), capital structure changes are mostly related 
to equity issues. They conclude that the market-to-book ratio affects leverage 
alteration through net equity issues. In addition, retained earnings are „earning-
subtracts-dividend‟ (Gitman, 2006) and are related to financing costs. The cost of 
holding the retained earnings is, at least, the same as equity financing costs or less. If 
the equity financing cost is smaller than using retained earnings, then the firm 
dividends all retained earnings, and finances using equity issuance. In fact, the cost 
of retained earnings should be smaller than the cost of any external financing, 
including debt issuance in the pecking order theory. Thus, increasing retained 
earnings indicate that external financing is costly. Increased retained earnings are 
added to equity assets and are negatively associated with a leverage level. From this 
point of view, we can assume that retained earnings are closely related to the pecking 
order theory. 
 





























































Using Equations (5.2) and (5.3), we can find important factors in leverage level 
change as follows (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
 
From Table 5.6, both Baker and Wurgler‟s (2002) and Alti‟s (2006) models show 
similar results. Changes in debt ratio are more likely to be related to stock issue 
rather than to the retained earnings and the residual asset growth of firms. However, 
both models show that cash-flows generated by retained earnings and residual asset 
growth are not trivial in terms of debt ratio changes. This result implies that firms are 
performing more actively in the change capital structure by using the financial 
market, but that the importance of accumulating internal funds should also be 
considered as important. This result is consistent with the market timing theory and 
contradicts Welch‟s (2004) managerial inertia theory. Welch argues (2004) that firms 




Table 5.6 Debt ratio changes with regard to the Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti 
(2006) models 
The table shows that changes in debt ratio are more likely to be related to external financing rather 
than to the operating income of firms. Particularly, stock issue is the most important matter. A: total 
asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(∆RE/A): increased retained earnings, -
(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based 
debt ratio. ***: significance at 0.01 level, **: significance at 0.01 level, *: significance at 0.01 level.   
OLS Baker and Wurgler (2002) Alti (2006) 






















































































































Obs 31025 28939 26959 26449 
Adj-R2 0.1322 0.0291 0.0906 0.0542 
 
Table 5.7 shows the relationships between the „debt ratio change elements‟ defined 
by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006) and the important „capital structure 
determinants‟ that we will use in Chapters 6 and 7. From Table 5.7, equity issue is 
positively related to cash holdings, market-to-book ratio (M/B) and earnings 
volatility, and it is negatively related to profit and asset tangibility. This table shows 
the importance of profit. In particular, M/B indicates that a firm issues equities with 
high M/B. This is consistent with Banker and Wurgler (2002). This implies that 
equity issuances generally follow the trade-off and market timing theories together, 
and also the pecking order theory, in broad terms. The last column is inconsistent 
with Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006) who assert that firms issue stock 
when the market condition is good. Our results suggest that firms issue equity 
regardless of the market situation. The results also show the importance of 
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profitability and asset tangibility across all regressands. The table does not tell the 
same story as Baker and Wurgler (2002). They suggest that M/B is the most 
important factor. 
 
Table 5.7 Regressions between decomposed elements in debt ratio changes with full 
independent variables  
The table shows the relationships between the „debt ratio change elements‟ defined by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006) and the important „capital structure determinants‟ that we will use in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The negative signs of the first three dependent variables imply that firms increase 
their debt ratios (Alti, 2006). The last variable (( casht+ other assett)/At) indicates the growth in 
assets and decreases debt ratio by increasing equity and other assets. This implies that firms issue 
equity more than they need to if it shows a positive sign. A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: 
equity. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. ***: significance at 0.01% level, **: significance at 0.5% 
















































































































































Obs 12133 15219 15345 15302 
Adj-R2 0.2541 0.5365 0.1133 0.1622 
 
 
5.5.2 Trade-off theory 
Frank and Goyal (2003) mention that the static trade-off theory attempts to explain 
leverage levels, but that the pecking order theory tries to explain debt ratio changes. 
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The thesis, therefore, uses non-differenced variables for testing the trade-off theory 
and uses differenced variables for testing the pecking order theory. In this section, we 
test the trade-off theory by comparing our results with those of the predicted signs 
given in Table 5.1. Table 5.8 generally supports the static trade-off theory.  
 
Net cash holdings are negatively associated with debt ratios, consistent with Bates et 
al. (2009). They suggest that firms kept increasing their free cash-flows between 
1980 and 2006 as operating risks have been increasing in the market (see Figures 5.3 
and 5.4). They also imply that firms with stable cash-flows can have low cash levels. 
This idea is supported by Section 7.9 when we consider profitability. The results of 
this section suggest that firms with high profitability hold less cash. One more 
important matter to note with regard to cash-holding is that, as we can see from 
Figures 5.1 to 5.4, debt ratio and cash holding are negatively associated 
simultaneously. That is to say, firms decrease debt levels while increasing cash levels. 
The overall suggestion of this result is that firms which increase debt capability 
would not need to increase cash holding if they have stable profitability.  
 
Bankruptcy probability, BP, is positively associated with debt levels. This is 
consistent with previous research, such as that of Harris and Raviv (1991), John 
(1993), Sanz (2006) and others. This result implies that firms with a high debt ratio 
have high bankruptcy probability. We predict a negative sign because high 
bankruptcy probability leads to equity issuance. Therefore, although the predicted 
signs show an opposite direction in Table 5.8 compared with our prediction, it gives 





Table 5.8 Regression to test the static trade-off theory 





The table shows the results of analyses using the GMM estimator. The predicted signs indicate that 
debt ratios generally follow the static trade-off theory. BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-
based debt ratio. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. t statistics are in parenthesis; *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level; this analysis uses 
ICB level of criteria; L1, L2: one- and two-period-lagged variables; the null hypothesis of J statistic is 
that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels 
of J statistic (Hansen p-value); Instrumented variables in Column (1): logasset, asset tangibility, 
capital expenditure to asset, research and development, profitability, earnings volatility and 
bankruptcy probability; Instrumented variables in Column (2): netcash, capex, M/B and R&D; 
Instrumented variables in Column (3): profitability, MB, netcash and tax rate; Instrumented variables 
in Column (4): tax. 
  BDRt MDRt 














































































































































Observation  10719 11291 10592 11752 
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The negative signs of profitability indicate that firms accumulate profits. This 
supports the pecking order theory. However, judging by Section 7.9 on profitability, 
the situation is mixed with the pecking order and trade-off theories. From Table 7.39, 
as profitability increases, debt issue is more heavily associated with debt change. 
 
Asset tangibility and a firm‟s size indicate positive signs, as we expected. This might 
suggest the importance of bankruptcy probability. R&D expenses and capital 
expenditure show a negative relationship to debt ratio, in general. This indicates that 
companies use more equity and internal funds for new investments purposes. This is 
inconsistent with the pecking order theory. 
 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) is negatively related to market-based debt ratios while 
being positively related to book-based debt ratios. This implies that stock price 
affects the „market-value-based debt ratio‟ more directly. There will be two 
interpretations of the negative relationship between them with regard to the market-
based debt ratio. High stock prices encourage firms to issue equity in the market 
timing theory, and increase the size of total asset which decreases the debt ratio. The 
negative relationship between them can also be considered in terms of the trade-off 
and pecking order theories together, because a high M/B lowers the cost of equity 
capital. 
 
Overall, the results indicate that bankruptcy probability, asset tangibility, profits, 
firm size, cash holdings and market-to-book ratios are the most important factors in 
capital structure decision making. Interestingly, these five factors, with the exception 
of asset tangibility, are directly related to the elements of Altman‟s Z‟-score 
measurement. This indirectly implies the importance of bankruptcy probability rather 
than the matter of asymmetric information and tax shield. This result also suggests 
that market- and book-based debt ratios show some differences. Table 5.8 also 
indicates that capital structure is closely related to the factors of country, industry 
and time. Firms decrease debt ratios over time, and East-Asian countries and high-
technology industries decrease debt ratio more severely. 
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5.5.3 Pecking order theory 
As discussed before, pecking order theory tries to explain debt ratio changes by 
issuing equity or debt (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Thus, the change in (book-based) 
debt ratio is a better regressand for testing the pecking order theory (Kayhan and 
Titman, 2007). We use it as a major regressand in this section including the issuance 
of equity and debt. 
 
From the viewpoint of the (simple) pecking order theory, firms should issue debt 
when they need capital. The required capital for firms is evaluated by „financial 
deficit‟ as defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 





where, DEF1: „financial deficit‟ defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DEF2: 
„financial deficit‟ defined by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), DIV: dividend, I: 
investment (capital expenditure), WC: net working capital (=total current assets-total 
current liabilities=operating working capital+cash and cash equivalents+current debt), 
C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation), LTDR: long-term debt ratio, D: net debt issue, E: net equity 
issue. All items are scaled by „total asset.‟ 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) add long-term debt ratios (LTDR) for defining 
„financial deficit‟ in Equation (5.6) because their pecking order prediction is related 
to „long-term debt issuance.‟ However, according to Frank and Goyal (2003), their 
unreported results show that the long-term debt ratio is not important with regard to 
their regression in the definition of „financial deficit.‟ They, therefore, use the 
„financial deficit‟ without a long-term debt ratio. 
 
Positive „financial deficit‟ indicates that firms invest cash more than their internally 
generated capital. On the other hand, a negative „financial deficit‟ indicates less 
investment than internally generated funds and increased „internal cash-flows‟ in 
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firms (Kayham and Titman, 2007). Frank and Goyal (2003) show that „financial 
deficit‟ leads to debt financing for large firms. This is consistent with the pecking 
order theory. They state, however, that debt financing does not dominate equity 
financing.  
 
As the „financial deficit‟ is composed by these four (or five) items, it is possible to 
investigate the most influential item among them with regard to debt ratio change. 
The item of utmost importance can be found by using the equations below, which are 





where,△DRt: debt ratio change.  
 
From DEF1 and DEF2 in Equations (5.5) and (5.6), the next analyses are also 
executed. 
 
Net D or Net E=αt+DIVt+It+△WCt-Ct+εt (5.9) 
Net D or Net E=αt+DIVt+It+△WCt-Ct+LTDRt+εt (5.10) 
 
where, net D: net long-term debt issue, net E: net equity issue 
 
Based on predicted signs, Panels A and B in Table 5.9, generally follow the pecking 
order theory. The pecking order theory predicts a positive sign with regard to both 
investment and „working capital‟ (Frank and Goyal, 2003). The positive relationship 
between „debt ratio change‟ and investment indicates that firms use debt for new 
investment, consistent with both the pecking order and the trade-off theories. As 
investment (capital expenditure/asset) is generally about tangible investment, 
investing in tangible assets increases collateral and future debt capacity (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003). The table also indicates that a change in „net working capital‟ is 
negatively associated with a leverage level. This implies that firms supply „working 
capital‟ with equity issue or operating incomes. Similarly, „internal cash-flow‟ 
(C=net income+depreciation) suggests a pro-pecking order theory, with negative 
signs, which indicates that firms accumulate cash for future investment. The 
 123 
dividends also show a positive association with debt level change but, as Frank and 
Goyal suggest, trade-off theory also expects a positive relationship between them. As 
we discussed earlier, although our results in Panels A and B generally follow the 
predicted signs, since the pecking order and trade-off theories have similar 
predictions, it is not clear whether our results are consistent with the pecking order 
theory. 
 
In Panels C and D, net long-term debt issuance is positively related to dividend, but 
dividend is negatively related to equity issuance. This result is more consistent with 
the static trade-off theory, rather than with the pecking order theory, because this 
implies that firms try to change their leverage levels. The results also tell us that, 
when firms consider using external financing sources, both debt and equity issuances 
are affected by similar factors. In other words, with the exceptation of dividends, all 
variables have the same relationship with debt and equity issue. In terms of 
„explanatory powers (R
2
)‟, equity issuance shows higher „explanatory powers‟ in 
Panel D than bond issuance in Panel C. Frank and Goyal (2003) also show that 
equity financing has a better „explanatory power‟ and debt financing does not 
dominate equity financing.  
  






Equations (5.11) and (5.12) are the simplest way of testing the pecking order theory. 
These equations are too simple without any restrictions (control variables), but the 
method has one advantage. Researchers do not lose observations that occur when 
increasing control variables (Frank and Goyal, 2003). As firms issue debt when they 
require capital, if the capital structure follows the pecking order theory without 
considering control variables, then the coefficient of „DEF‟ will be unity (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999). This is because, in the pecking order model, firms only 
issue safer security when they need new capital. This is consistent with our argument 
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that firms issue equity when managers are less optimistic or when the issuing costs 
are low.  
 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 indicate that debt ratio is generally negatively related to 
„financial deficits‟ and that the values of „coefficient‟ and „explanatory power‟ are 
very low. From Panel B in both tables, it is clear that „financial deficits‟ relate more 
to equity issue. The tables also show that „financial deficits‟ (DEF) are similarly 
related (the same coefficient signs) to equity and debt issuance. This result suggests 
that the pecking order theory may not play an important role in increasing finance, or 
that asymmetric information costs may not be as great as Myers (1984) previously 




Table 5.9 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits 
Based on predicted signs, Panels A and B in this table generally follow the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory predicts a positive sign in both investment 
and „working capital‟ (Frank and Goyal, 2003). In Panels C and D, net long-term debt issuance is positively related to dividend, but dividend is negatively related to 
equity issuance. This result is more consistent with the static trade-off theory, rather than with the pecking order theory, because this implies that firms try to change 
their leverage levels. DEF1=αt+DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF2=αt+DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct+LTDRt, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, 
DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal, DEF2: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also define financial deficits (DEF2), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation), LTDR: long-term debt ratio. All 
items are scaled by total asset. t statistics are in parenthesis; *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
  Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 
 Predicted 
signs 
DEF1t DEF2t DEF1t DEF2t 








































































































Obs  38129 38129 37878 37878 34712 34712 34450 34450 







Table 5.9 Continued 
 
 Panel C: net long-term debt issue/assett Panel D: net equity issue/assett 
 DEF1 DEF2 DEF1 DEF2 
































































































Obs 30097 30097 29809 29809 29852 29852 29525 29525 




Table 5.10 Debt ratio change and financial deficit with Frank and Goyal‟s (2003) model 
This table use Frank and Goyal‟s (2003) model from Equation (5.11), ∆(D/A)t=αt+DEFt+εt. The table shows that debt ratio change has a stronger relationship with 
equity issue rather than debt issue. DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF2=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct+LTDRt, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio 
change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal, DEF2: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also define financial deficits (DEF2), DIV: dividend, I: 
investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation), LTDR: long-term debt 
ratio. All items are scaled by total asset. t statistics are in parenthesis; *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 
 
 Panel A 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 











































Ajd R-squared 0.0012 0.0001 0.0000 0.0037 0.0012 0.0002 0.0000 0.0037 
Observation 38129 37878 34712 34450 38129 37878 34712 34450 
 Panel B 
 Net Long-term debt issue/assett Net equity issue/assett Net Long-term debt issue/assett Net equity issue/assett 











































Ajd R-squared 0.0108 0.0334 0.2475 0.1661 0.0108 0.0335 0.2427 0.1661 






Table 5.11 Debt ratio change and financial deficit with Shyam-Sunder and Myers‟ (1999) model  
The table shows that debt ratio change has a stronger relationship with equity issue rather than debt issue. This table uses Shyam-Sunder and Myers‟ (1999) model, 
Equation (5.12): ∆(D/A)t=α+∆DEFt+εt. DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF2=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct+LTDRt, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal, DEF2: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also define financial deficits (DEF2), DIV: dividend, I: 
investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation), LTDR: long-term debt 




 Panel A Panel B 











































Ajd R-squared 0.0004 0.0153 0.0004 0.0071 0.0021 0.0257 0.0144 0.0085 
Observation 32543 32238 30758 30456 26264 25935 26134 25778 
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Frank and Goyal (2003) suggest that during the 1980s and 1990s, American firms 
used more equity than debt for external financing. Our findings also come to the 
same conclusion. This is inconsistent with the pecking order theory and consistent 
with Figures 5.1 and 5.2 and Tables 5.9 to 5.11. Column (1) in Table 5.12 shows that 
the number of observations (each firm has a maximum of 20 observations during the 
sample period) which „issue more net equity than net debt issuance‟ is twice greater 
than the observations that „issue more net debt than net equity issuance‟. The average 
of increasing equity (14%) in terms of „pure issuance of equity‟ („equity issue‟-
„equity repurchase‟-„debt issue‟-„debt retirement‟) is also greater than increasing 
„pure issuance of debt‟ (8%) („debt issue‟-„debt retirement‟-„equity issue‟-„equity 
repurchase‟). This table is also inconsistent with the inertia theory. Only 2,635 
sample observations out of 35,311 did nothing. That is just under 7.5% of the total 
sample. This implies that most firms actively issue equity or debt in order to change 
their leverage levels. 
 
Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics of number of observations who issue equity or debt  
Note, net equity issue: equity issue-equity repurchase, net debt issue: debt issue-debt retirement (debt 
recall), Column (1) indicates that net equity issue minus net debt issue is positive. Column (2) 
indicates that net equity issue minus net debt issue is negative. Column (3) indicates that net equity 
issue minus net debt issue is zero. Obs: observation numbers, Mean: (net equity issue-net debt 
issue)/total asset in Column (1), (net equity issue-net debt issue)/total asset in Column (2), and other 
values are described in the same way. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Net equity issue > net 
debt issue 
Net equity issue < net 
debt issue 
Net equity issue = net 
debt issue 
Obs 20,289 12,387 2,635 
Mean .1396 .0832 0 
Min 2.85e-06 2.03e-06 0 
p25 .0116 .0164 0 
P50 .0383 .0466 0 
p75 .1505 .1084 0 
p99 .9999 .5067 0 
Max 1.4751 .9773 0 
Sd .2243 .1044 0 
Skewness 2.2845 2.5578 - 
Kurtosis 7.8651 11.81161 - 
 
Table 5.13 is a summary of the number of observations that issue equity and debt. 
Panel A (net long-term debt issue) shows that more firms (observation: 16,141) 
reduced debt during the sample period, and that more firms (observation: 18,057) 
increased equity in Panel B (net equity issue). Panel C (pure debt issuance) indicates 
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that, during the sample period, more firms (observation: 20,289) decreased their debt 
ratio then increased debt (observation: 12,387). This means that almost twice as 
many firms reduced their debt ratios. Tables 5.12 and 5.13 are seriously inconsistent 
with the pecking order theory. 
 
Table 5.13 Number of observations who issue equity or debt 
The table is a summary of the number of observations which issue equity and debt.  
Note, Panel A: Net long-term debt issuance/total asset, panel B: Net equity issuance/total asset, and 
panel C: „pure issuance of debt,‟ (Net long-term debt issuance/total asset)-(Net equity issuance/total 
asset). Mean and median: mean and median value of pure debt increase. 
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Finally, applying Frank and Goyal (2003), the thesis analyses the pecking order 
theory by testing „financial deficit‟ (DEF) with control variables.  
 
△DRt=αt+β1·DEFt+β2△·Netcasht+β3△·Lnassett+β4△·tangt +β5△·Taxt  
+β6△·Capext+β7△·Rndt+β8△·M/Bt+β9△·Profitt+β10△·Volt+β11△·BPt + εt (5.13) 
 
where, DEFt : DEF1t, DEF2t. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 
The „financial deficits‟ are considered with control variables in Table 5.14. The 
results show that the pecking order theory works, as debt increasing is associated 
with positive „financial deficits‟ (DEF1, DEF2) and with negative profitability. Our 
results imply a similar meaning with those of Frank and Goyal (2003) model. Their 
model indicates that the change of debt ratio shows negative signs with M/B, profits 
and previous debt ratios, and positive signs with asset tangibility and sales.  
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Table 5.14 Test the pecking order theory with full control variables 
The table tests Equation (5.13) which includes all control variables. The results show that the pecking 
order theory works as debt increasing is associated with positive financial deficits (DEF1, DEF2) and 
with negative profitability.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF2=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct+LTDRt, DEF1: „financial deficit‟ defined 
by Frank and Goyal, DEF2: „financial deficit‟ defined by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), DIV: 
dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: net working capital (=total current assets-total 
current liabilities=operating working capital+cash and cash equivalents+current debt), C: cash-flow 
after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation), LTDR: long-term debt ratio. 
Tang: net tangible asset/total asset, M/B: ((total asset-book equity+market equity)/total asset), profit: 
ROA (return on asset)=((Net Income before Preferred Dividends+((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest 
Capitalized)×(1-Tax Rate)))/Last Year‟s Total Assets), netcash: (Cash+Marketable Securities)/Total 
Assets, Lnasset: log(total asset), Tax: income taxes/pre-tax income, Capex: capital expenditure/total 
asset, R&D: research and development expense/total asset, Vol: five-year moving standard deviation 
of the ratio of operating income to total asset, BP: bankruptcy probability, mixed Z-score models, 
BDR: Book-based debt ratio=(short term debt & current portion of long-term debt+long-term 
debt)/(book value debt+book value equity), MDR: market-based debt ratio=(short term debt & current 
portion of long-term debt+long-term debt)/(book value debt-book value equity+market value equity), t 
statistics are in parenthesis, *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance 
at 0.1 level. The null hypothesis of J statistic (Hansen p-value) is that over-identifying restrictions are 
valid; The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); L1: 
one-period-lagged variable; Instruments in Column (1): tax, capex and M/B; Instruments in Column 
(2): tax, M/B and Vol; Instruments in Column (3): Vol and M/B; Instruments in Column (4): tax. 
 



























































































































































































Observation  6572 6379 8043 7640 
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One interesting fact in this table is that the effects on the debt ratio change from 
control variables are greater than the effect from the financial deficits. This indicates 
that the „financial deficit‟ is significantly associated with debt ratios, but that the 
strength of the effect is much weaker than conventional variables such as bankruptcy 
probability, market-to-book ratios, or profitability.  
 
These results are mostly consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003) who also show that 
„financial deficit‟ is more closely related to „net equity issuances,‟ rather than „debt 
issuances‟, and that „financing deficit‟ is less important to explain debt issuances 
over time. This conclusion goes against the results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999). They show that „debt issuance‟ dominates external funding. 
  
5.5.4 Market timing 
The idea of a relationship between stock price and equity issuance is not new. Myer 
(1984) already considers stock price as relating to issuance costs; and Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) show equity issuance as having a high market-to-book ratio period. 
According to Alti‟s (2006) research, firms‟ investments and equity issuance in a hot-
market are not very relevant. He presumes that firms may issue equity for investment 
purposes because firms‟ growth expectance is higher for hot-market but their results 
indicate that the investment rate is lower in the hot-market. This implies that firms 
issue equity only after overvalued stock-prices. This phenomenon also supports the 
pecking order theory, in terms of issuing costs and increasing debt capacity (see 
Section 2.2.5 in which the relationship between the pecking order theory and market 
timing theory is fully described). However, Welch (2004) suggests in his „inertia 
theory‟ that market-based debt ratio is mainly decided by stock prices rather than by 
new overvalued equity issuance. Therefore, firms do not put an effort into changing 
their capital structure. Namely, debt ratio becomes low with high stock prices and 
high with low stock prices. Welch (2004) also shows that there is no evidence of 
targeting.  
 
Both Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) use the „share 
price effect‟ (SPE), which is obtained by subtracting the „actual debt ratio‟ (ADR) 
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from an „Implied Debt Ratio‟ (IDR). The IDR is defined by Welch (2004). Since 
market timing is related to stock price, Welch (2004) uses the IDR as a proxy of the 
market situation in his inertia theory.  
 
Welch (2004) suggests the extent to which stock prices affect the market-based debt 
ratio. The next equation can easily explain the suggestion. If a firm‟s gearing ratio at 
time t+1 is perfectly associated only with stock returns between time t and t+1, 
issuing neither equity nor debt
14
, then the „market based debt ratio‟ (MDRt+1) at t+1 













  )returnstock 1( 1,1
) (5.14) 
 
where, IDR: implied debt ratio, D: total debt, E: total market valued equity, stock 
returnt,t+1=((Pt+1-Pt)/Pt): stock return, Pt: stock price at t. 
 
Using a dynamic adjustment method, he hypothesises the next equation. If a firm 
adjusts its debt ratio perfectly, α2 =1, α3 =0; and, if it never adjusts its leverage level, 
then α2=0, α3 =1. 
 
MDRt=α1 + α2·MDRt-1 + α3·IDRt-1,t +εt    (5.15) 
 
Equation (5.15) implies that market-based debt ratio at time t equals the sum of the 
previous year debt ratio and stock price effects. The α2 implies „capital structure 
adjustment speed.‟ The unity of α3, therefore, indicates that the debt ratio is decided 
only by stock price changes.  
 
If Equation (5.15) changes with a restriction that the coefficients of variables add up 
to one, as follows: MDRt=α1+λ1·IDRt-1,t+(1-λ1)MDRt-1+εt, then it will be MDRt-
MDRt-1=α1+λ1·(IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1), where IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1 is SPE (Stock Price Effect) 
(Welch, 2004). Since Equation 5.15 is based on the „dynamic adjustment method‟ 
                                               
14 Welch (2004) ignores dividends because they are not seen as a great problem in capital structure. 
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and SPE, which is obtained by subtracting MDR from IDR, the SPE term has a 
similar effect to adjustment speeds if firms issue neither equity nor debt, as follows: 
  
MDRt- MDRt-1 = λ·SPEt-1,t              (5.16) 
 
If equity is fully affected by the stock price, then IDRt-1,t and MDRt will be the same, 
and the coefficient of SPEt-1,t, λ, becomes unity.  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) adjust Welch‟s regression in the next regression. 
 
∆MDRt, t-1=λ1(target MDRt-MDRt-1)+(1- λ2)SPEt-1,t + εt (5.17) 
 
where, λ1: adjustment speed, 1-λ2: stock price effect. 
 
This equation expresses the view that a change in debt ratio equals the sum of „partial 
debt ratio adjustment‟ plus „stock price effect.‟ The coefficient (1-λ2) of SPE can be 
interpreted as debt ratio changes affected by the share price (Flannery and Rangan, 
2006).  
 
This thesis also uses the variable of stock returns, SR=log(1+annual stock return), to 
test the association between stock returns and debt ratio changes and stock issuances, 
following Kayhan and Titman (2007). Following the suggestion of Alti (2006), the 
thesis does not use the „weighted market-to-book ratio.‟  
 
From Table 5.15, in Welch‟s (2004) model, using his interpretation, In column (1), 
the implied debt ratio (IDRt-1,t) indicates that about 23% of the debt ratio (MDRt) is 
affected by the stock price only, but MDRt-1 is close to 41% (1-0.59) of the current 
debt ratio (MDRt or target). This indicates that a big proportion of the debt ratio 
change is decided by financing and internal capital increases. Column (1) shows that 
MDRt-1 is a more important factor than IDR. This result is inconsistent with Welch 
(ibid.). Column (2) shows that the „stock price effect‟ and the „partial adjustment 




Table 5.15 Debt ratio change and the stock price effect 
The table shows that there is a strong stock price effect on debt ratio change.  
Note, MDRt-1: market-based debt ratio at time t-1, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance 
=(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-
1,t)+Dt-1), SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-
MDRt-1, target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated by OLS. In Column (5), the thesis splits 
the stock return into quartiles and uses only the 3rd and 4th quartiles‟ data (1st quart:-.427, 2nd quart: 
-.046, 3rd quart: .254). *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 
0.1 level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





























   







Adj-R2 0.7883 0.1723 0.1287 0.0123 0.0145 
Obs 42337 15121 42293 43026 8717 
 
Columns (3) and (4), using stock return (SR), indicate that the debt ratio is negatively 
associated with stock return. This raises three possible conclusions: (1) that firms 
issue equity, or (2) that the stock price itself decreases debt ratios, or (3) both (1) and 
(2) together. Column (5) shows that stock price is positively associated with net 
equity issuances. In Column (5), stock return (SRt-1,t) with „net stock issue to asset‟ is 
regressed with the 3rd and 4th quartile data of stock earnings. When the first and 
second quartile data are included, it shows a negative sign with regard to equity 
issuance. This indicates that firms start to issue equity when the stock price is 
significantly overvalued or highly priced. This also indicates that firms issue equity 
with low stock prices, because low stock prices probably indicate a high probability 
of bankruptcy with an unusual loss of a firm‟s value or that judging by the given 
trend during the sample period, firms‟ general behaviour is to increase equity. The 
overall conclusion is that stock prices affect capital structure decisions, but the 
importance is not as great as market timing and inertia theories suggest. Therefore, it 
 136 
is still not clear as to its critical importance. This result also indicates that equity 
issues could be associated with high stock prices and high bankruptcy probabilities.  
 
In Table 5.15, the thesis tests the stock price effect on debt ratio in a simple way. 
Table 5.16 includes control variables that are considered as key debt ratio 
determinants in major capital structure theories. Applying Welch‟s variables (2004), 
and the method of Flannery ansd Rangan (2006), Table 5.16 shows the market timing 










where, X: control variables that are defined in Section 5.3. 
 
Equations (5.18) and (5.19) use the idea of „dynamic capital structure adjustment.‟ 
The coefficient of MDRt-1 would be zero when firms adjust their debt ratios perfectly 
in respect to stock price changes and other control variables. Equation (5.18) 
assumes that the leverage level is decided upon by the „capital structure adjustment,‟ 
the „stock price effect‟ (SPE) and other control variables. Since SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-
MDRt-1, Equation (5.18) can be rewritten as Equation (5.19), which indicates the 
effect on debt ratios from stock returns. Similar to the partial adjustment 
interpretation with MDRt-1 in Equation (5.18), the coefficient of IDRt-1,t will be zero 
if the debt ratio is fully decided only by the „partial capital structure determinants‟ in 
Equation (5.19). The λ1 (= 1-coefficient) of IDR indicates the stock price effect in 
Equation (5.19). Equation (5.19) is derived from Equation (5.15), MDRt=MDRt-
1+IDRt,t+1+εt, where MDRt-1 is decided by the capital structure decision factors. The 
variables, Xt-1 indicate the debt ratio determinants
15
 (As described in Section 6.3).  
  
                                               
15 This section assumes that all ten major variables are associated with capital structure decisions, 
since this section is more focussed on the market timing test rather than „dynamic capital structure.‟ 
However, the next section is consistent with previous research and chooses seven variables as the 
most important capital structure determinants. 
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Table 5.16 Market timing and capital structure with control variables 
The table presents the strong market timing effect on leverage level change by showing significant relationships between debt ratio and variables that are related to the 
market timing effect, such as SPE, IDR, and SR. Control variables in Equations (5.19) and (5.20)  are one period lagged (Columns (2) and (3)) and first differenced 
(Columns (4), (5) and (6)) respectively. Fixed effect is not used for Equation (5.20) (Columns (4), (5) and (6)) because they use first differenced data, which have 
similar results to fixed effects. Column (6) only uses the 4th quartile in stock return (SR).  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-
1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, SR: stock return, SRt,t+1=ln(1+(pt+1-pt)/pt), p: stock price. All 
variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The null hypothesis of J statistic (Hansen p-
value) is that over-identifying restrictions are valid; The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); MDRt-2 and MDRt-3 are 
instrumented for the xtabond2 command, using options of robust, small and two-step, sub-options of eq(level), lag(1 2) and collapse for gmm style and of eq(level) for 
iv-style for Column (1); Columns (2) and (6) use ivreg2 command. R&D, vol, tax and are instrumented for Column (2); R&D and profit are for Column (3); Vol for 
Column (4); tax for Columns (5) and (6). 
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AR(1)  -12.52***       
AR(2)  0.47       
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Observation  13277 11312 11104 Observation 9320 8467 1515 
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Column (1) describes Equation (5.18) and is tested by System GMM because this 
model includes a lagged dependent variable (MDRt-1) as an independent variable. In 
other words, Column (1) has a dynamic model form (see Section 6.3.2.1 and Section 
3.1.2.1.3 in Appendix 3 which describe the System GMM in detail). In Column (1), 
the coefficient of MDRt-1 and SPE indicates that partial adjustment (0.2552=1-.7748) 
and stock price effect (0.7114=1-.2886) play a major role in debt ratio decisions. 
Columns (2) and (3) describe Equation (5.19) and show that the coefficient for 
IDRt,t+1 is (1-0.5456 or 1-0.4513). This indicates that the current debt ratio is 45.4% 
or 54.87% affected by the stock price, depending on the model. This implies that the 
stock price has a significant effect on the debt ratio. Columns (4) and (5) show that 
annual stock returns (SR) are negatively associated with debt ratios. The market-
based debt ratio is more strongly associated with stock returns than the book-based 
debt ratio. The last column indicates that stock returns (SR) and M/B are positively 
associated with equity issuances although SR is not significant.  
 
Overall, according to the results, the variables of stock return, SPE, IDR and SR, are 
significantly important in terms of the market-based debt ratio change, although 
Column (6) indicates that SR is not seriously associated with equity issuance. 
 
5.6 Summary and conclusions  
Our results show that debt ratios are mainly affected by the previous year‟s debt ratio, 
cash holdings, firm size, bankruptcy probability, asset tangibility, market-to-book 
ratio (including stock return) and macro-economic environmental factors. Table 5.17 
shows that no theory clearly dominates the others, and that the key variables of each 




Table 5.17 Summary of results 
Note, PS: predicted signs, RE: results. If there are differences in results based on different methods, 
we report the most representative signs regarding significant levels. The sign of „+/-‟ indicates that it 




Simple pecking order 
theory 
Market timing theory 
 PS RE PS RE PS RE 
Stock price effect     + + 
Implied debt ratio     + + 
Annual stock return     - - 
DRt-1       
Speed       
Financial deficit   + +   
Market-to-book - +/- - +/- - - 
Financial slack  -  -  +/- 
Firm size + + +/- +  + 
Asset tangibility + + +/- +  + 
Capital expenditure +/- - + +/-  +/- 
Tax rate + +/-  -  + 
Earnings volatility - -  -  +/- 
R&D expense +/- - + +/-  +/- 
ROA(profitability) + - - -  - 
Bankruptcy 
probability 
- + - +  + 
 
5.6.1 The most appropriate capital structure determinants 
5.6.1.1 Tax 
Brounen et al. (2006) argue that tax is the fourth most important factor after financial 
flexibility, credit ratings and earnings volatility. However, our results show that tax 
rate is a less important factor in debt ratio choice decisions. This is inconsistent with 
Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963) and consistent with a number of previous studies 
such as those of Myers (2001), Bebczuk (2003) and Shefrin (2007). 
 
5.6.1.2 Financial distress costs  
In our results, we find that the variables, bankruptcy probability, which measure the 
degree of financial distress indicate that financially secure firms, not subject to 





5.6.1.2.1 Cash holdings 
Net cash holding shows a significantly negative relationship with debt levels across 
the analyses. This implies that firms which are financially less secure, hold more 
cash and less debt ratio, consistent with Opler et al. (1999) and John (1993) who 
assert that small firms and firms engaged in more risky activities, hold more cash. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) and Brounen et al. (2006) also argue that financial 
stability, particularly cash-holding, is more likely to be related to the static trade-off 
theory, rather than the pecking order theory.  
 
In line with Opler et al.‟s (1999) research, cash-holdings have gradually reduced 
between 1950 and 1994. Bates et al. (2009) and Duchin (2010) indicate, as in Figures 
5.3 and 5.4, that cash-holdings started to increase from the mid-1990s. This implies 
that cash-holdings are affected by macro-economic factors such as a shift in the 
prosperity of various industries or due to the technological revolution. Judging by 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in which debt ratios continuously decrease, it is possible to 
assume that the debt ratio has also gradually changed due to the same factors. 
Therefore, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show a strong relationship between debt ratios and 
cash-holdings. 
 
5.6.1.2.2 Firm size 
Our results show that firm size is positively associated with leverage levels. This 
result is consistent with that of Ozkan (2001), and Mackay and Phillips (2005). This 
supports both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, because large 
firms spend less on transaction costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988) in terms of the 
trade-off theory, and they have low asymmetric information costs in terms of the 
pecking order theory. Firm size can also be considered as a bankruptcy probability 
indicator, because large firms are assumed to have less earnings volatility and better 
„financial managing ability.‟ As Kurshev and Strevulaev (2006) suggest, our results 




5.6.1.2.3 Profitability  
From the results, profitability (ROA, return on asset) is negatively associated with 
debt ratio. This result is consistent with the finding of Mitton (2007) and Antoniou et 
al. (2008). They argue that profitable firms borrow less because they have 
accumulated sufficient internal funds to meet their needs. This implies that profitable 
firms decrease their debt ratio. Fama and French (2002) explain that this is evidence 
of how capital structure follows the (complex) pecking order theory. 
 
However, based on both trade-off and the pecking order theories (with low 
asymmetric information), firms should issue debt, particularly profitable firms. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), debt is a risk-free asset for a profitable firm. 
This implies that profitable firms use more debt to obtain more tax benefits in terms 
of trade-off theory; and this expectation has been confirmed by a large body of 
previous research, such as that of Frank and Goyal (2003) and Ross (1977). 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) also find that firms with „high returns on assets‟ are more 
likely to issue debt because profits reduce leverage levels which distance their debt 
ratios from their leverage targets. Our results in Section 7.9 also show that firms with 
high profitability are more likely to issue debt. Our results therefore imply that debt 
ratio in respect of profitability is jointly connected to the pecking order theory and 
the trade-off theory.  
 
5.6.1.2.4 Asset tangibility 
Our results indicate that asset tangibility is positively related to debt ratio, consistent 
with Braun and Larranin (2005), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Brav (2009). This is 
because tangible assets have collateral value (Frank and Goyal, 2003) although 
liquidity costs depend on an alternative use of the tangible assets rather than asset 
tangibility itself (Lee et al., 2000; Alderson and Betker, 1995). Frank and Goyal 
(2003) suggest that as high asset tangibility reduces firms‟ asymmetric information 
costs, firms can issue more debt. After all, asset tangibility can be related to both the 





The results show that, in general, growth opportunities (R&D expenses and capital 
expenditure) do not generally give a clear indication of the relationship between debt 
ratios and investment factors across analyses. However, capital expenditure shows a 
more positive association with debt ratios and R&D expenses show a more negative 
association. It would be closer to trade-off theory because capital expenditure has 
higher asset tangibility which allows firms to increase their debt levels.  
 
5.6.2 The most appropriate capital structure 
Our results cannot suggest a dominant capital structure theory that can explain all 
„firms‟ leverage level changing behaviours,‟ over others. However, trade-off theory 
might be the best among them, because our results indicate that firm size, asset 
tangibility, profits, cash holding, market-to-book ratio and bankruptcy probability are 
the most important leverage level determinants, and that all these variables are 
generally closely related to trade-off theory. All of these determinants, excluding 
asset tangibility and firm size, are directly related to the Z‟-score model which, of 
course, is an indicator of bankruptcy likelihood.   
 
Our results indicate that firms issued equity and reduced debt ratios during the 
sample period of time. They also occasionally issued equity and debt simultaneously. 
This is consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2004). They find that about 61.5% of firms 
issue stocks and bonds together. Flannery and Rangan (2006) and others suggest that 
„financial deficit‟ will be positively associated with debt issue in terms of the pecking 
order theory. Our results (Table 5.11) show that the „financial deficit‟ is more 
associated with equity issue rather than with debt issue. This implies that the pecking 










In Chapter 5, we investigated three important capital structure theories by using static 
models and predicted signs (Table 5.1) which are related to these capital structure 
theories. In this chapter we focus on dynamic models. This means this chapter tests 
both the trade-off and the complex pecking order theories. In terms of the trade-off 
theory, we test whether firms change their capital structure over time. The trade-off 
theory argues that firms will change their debt ratios in order to move to their optimal 
(or target) capital structure.  
 
As Myers (1984), and Fama and French (2002) mentioned, the complex pecking 
order theory implies that firms reduce their debt ratios when firms have net profits as 
there are adverse selection costs which increase firms‟ issuing costs. In other words, 
firms accumulate their profits in order to increase their debt capacity for their future 
need for cash (e.g. new positive NPV projects). This implies that firms change their 
gearing levels while they accumulate cash in terms of the notion of the pecking order 
theory. This likewise implies that debt ratios are negatively associated with firms‟ 
profits. Furthermore, as there is a high level of adverse selection costs due to high 
asymmetric information, firms cannot issue equity at fair value. This also implies 
that, as the market timing theory asserts, firms will issue equity when stock prices are 
above their fair value. Therefore, we can test the complex pecking order theory by 
observing whether or not firms change their capital structure or whether their profits 
are negatively associated with debt ratios. 
  
In order to compare different optimal capital structures, in this chapter we estimated 
the optimal capital structure using both the Tobit model and normal OLS models 
after carefully studying previous research. Our results indicate that there is no 
significant difference in estimated target debt ratios between the Tobit model-based 
method and the OLS model-based method. Results from descriptive statistics and 
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capital structure adjustment speeds show that both methods suggest similar 
conclusions, in terms of the average target debt ratio and the speed of the adjustment 
in the debt ratio. 
 
Our results show that: (1) firms adjust their capital structures in a fashion consistent 
with the views of Leary and Robert (2005) and Hovakimian et al. (2004); (2) stock 
prices are negatively associated with the debt ratio, which implies that firms issue 
equity when stock is overpriced. This is consistent with the views of Fama and 
French (2002) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). Our results likewise indicate negative 
associations between debt ratios and firms‟ profits. This is consistent with Myers 
(1984) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002). This implies that firms accumulate their 
operating income. According to the complex pecking order theory, this can be 
interpreted as firms accumulating cash in order to increase their debt capacity for 
financing future projects. This is a cheaper way for firms to increase their cash in the 
world with high asymmetric information costs. In this chapter, therefore we can 
observe that debt ratio adjustment can be explained by both the trade-off and 
complex pecking order theories. Both theories assume that firms have their own 
target debt ratios. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes methods. In this section, 
we describe how the target capital structure for each firm is decided upon, and how 
we observe whether firms adjust their debt ratio. Section 6.3 tests dynamic models in 
terms of both the trade-off and the complex pecking order theories. Section 6.4 
closes the chapter by offering conclusions and identifying the limitations of the 
research.    
 
6.2 Method 
In this chapter, we use the same variables that were used in Chapter 5. The 
differences in this chapter are that we use dynamic models and test dynamic versions 
of the trade-off and pecking order theories. We also explain in Section 6.3.1 how we 
can estimate optimal capital structures for each firm. In this section, we show how 
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we decided on the important capital structure determinants in order to obtain target 
debt ratios, by presenting the details of previous research and their determinants.  
 
We also briefly introduce the dynamic trade-off theory and complex pecking order 
theory, and how they are connected to our methods in Section 6.3. In Section 6.3.2.1, 
Difference- and System-GMM are explained as we use panel data. It is necessary to 
understand how and why a dynamic model involving panel data causes serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in error terms. Finally, we mention that this 
chapter applies Flannery and Rangan‟s (2006) method. In other words, while we test 
the dynamic models, we also test asymmetric information based on capital structure 
theories by using the variables which are closely related to market timing and stock 
prices. Of course, in this chapter, we continuously use the viewpoints of dynamic 
models when we interpret our statistical results in order to bring out the main 
purposes of this chapter. 
 
6.3 Testing dynamic models 
The dynamic models attempt to test the existence of a target debt ratio that is 
changed over time in respect of the market (or economic) situation. Frank and Goyal 
(2003), for example, conclude that leverage levels move differently, and that 
financing patterns change over time. Fama and French (2002) show that the 
adjustment speed toward targets is slow; and Graham and Harvey (2001) mention 
that achieving targets might not be a primary aim of firms, even though they all have 
their targets. These phenomena may lead to less meaningful statistical results for 
leverage level rebalance tests. For example, firms may issue equity in a bull market 
in order to obtain extra cash, although they may have a low debt ratio than their 
target (see Section 6.3.3 for more examples).  
 
6.3.1 Dynamic trade-off model and partial adjustment model 
If there is an optimal debt ratio, firms attempt to stay at the optimal leverage level, or 
to change their debt ratios towards the optimal level; and, if they do, it will prove the 
trade-off theory. From the formula of „partial adjustment process,‟ Yt-Yt-1=λ(
*
tY -Yt-
1), λ will be 1 if firms change their debt ratios immediately; and λ will be 0 if firms 
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do not change their gearing ratios or the changing speed is extremely (infinitely) 
slow (see Section 3.3.1.3.3, which describes the partial adjustment in full detail). 
Unless λ is 0, we assume that firms change their debt ratios toward their targets, and 
that the values of λ are generally between zero and unity. Namely, firms partially 
change their debt ratios. We generally believe that firms change their capital 
structures slowly because there are transaction costs (or adjustment costs) that 
interrupt immediate capital structure adjustment. This implies that λ would be close 
to unity in an efficient capital market. Therefore, many firms change their capital 
structure in a „lumpy‟ way (Fischer et al. 1989; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Leary and 
Roberts, 2005).  
 
This partial adjustment method can be used to test the trade-off theory as well as the 
simple pecking order theory. In the simple pecking order theory, as it does not have 
target debt levels, λ will be 0 and will be insignificant (Fama and French, 2002).  
 
6.3.1.1 Target leverage level 
Since target leverage levels are invisible, we need to calculate them. Several ways 
have been developed in order to obtain target debt ratios. In the current thesis, we use 
the partial adjustment method in two different ways, Tobit and regression models 
(see Sections 3.3.1.3.1 and 3.3.1.3.2 which describe the target debt ratios in detail).  
 
The target leverage levels for the „partial adjustment approach‟ have to be measured 
with „year-by-year cross-sectional regression.‟ This is because firms may change 
their target debt ratios every year, based on a firm‟s and the macro-economic 




Table 6.1 Previous research into target leverage ratio estimation 
Note, earnings and ROA: earnings to asset, plant: capital expenditure, R&D: research and 
development expenses, PPE, FIXTA: asset tangibility, SE: selling expense, Dp: depreciation, TP: 
target payout, STD: standard deviation, Ln(A): log(total asset); all variables are scaled by total asset. 
Authors Variables method 
Shyam-Sunder 





and Myers (1999) 
ΔDRt=α0+ Δplantt+ ΔR&Dt+ Δtaxt+ Δeaningt+εt
 
regression 
Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) 
DRt=α0+R&D/salest + selling-expensivet/salet 
+ tangible asset ratiot +firm sizet t  
Tobit 
















To obtain target leverage ratios, after considering the previous research, we have 
chosen seven determinants which mostly affect capital structure. When we decide on 
the „standard time‟ for target leverage ratios and adjustment speeds, we followed 
French and Fama‟s approach. That is that the last-year-fiscal-situation creates the 
present debt ratio. As there are not many empirical studies using differenced data 
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), the thesis also uses only indifferenced data. 
 
DRt= α0+β1·Netcasht-1+β2·Lnassett-1+β3·tangt-1+β4·Capext-1+β5·Rndt-1  
+β6·M/Bt-1+β7·Profitt-1+εt (6.1) 
 
where, All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 
Using Equation (6.1), we calculated target debt ratios for each firm. We undertook 
three stages in order to obtain the target capital structures.  
 
Firstly, We chose these variables as important capital structure determinants after 
carefully studying previous research as shown in Table 6.1. These seven variables 
are considered important in most capital structure research and relate to the three 
major capital structure theories. Furthermore, as we can see from Table 6.1, with the 
exception of the dummy variables, we include more determinants in our estimating 
model than previous research. In addition, our variables do not overlap in capital 
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structure determinants, such as R&D expenses and R&D dummy. We believe this 
fact leads us to be better able to estimate firms‟ target debt ratios than those from 
previous studies. 
 
In the second stage, as can be seen from Table 6.2, we regressed Equation (6.1) in 
order to obtain associations (coefficients) between dependent variables and 
covariates. For example, the coefficients in Table 6.2 are computed with regard to 
the entire sample period. However, we have regressed the model (Equation 6.1) year 
by year, using annual data. This method allows us to obtain new target debt ratios for 
each year. In other words, every year there are different coefficients. It is necessary 
to calculate the coefficients every year because firms face different business 
environments each year. As their business environment changes, firms‟ target debt 
ratios will also need to change year-on-year. For instance, if a firm suffers a big loss 
or faces an economic recession in a particular year, it might reduce its debt ratio in 
the coming year otherwise its default risk might be unacceptably increased.  
 
Table 6.2 Coefficients for target debt ratios using OLS and Tobit regressions  
The table shows four different target decision models using Tobit and OLS regression models, and 
using book- and market-based debt ratios and observations in all years. Note, the thesis, generally, 
uses OLS based target rather than Tobit based target. MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-
based debt ratio. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 By OLS regression By Tobit regression 









































































R square 0.1542 0.2588   




Thirdly, and finally, we obtained each firm‟s target debt ratio by multiplying the 
values of the determinants by the coefficients which we gained from the second stage. 
In other words, using Equation (6.1), we can estimate the coefficients of important 
capital structure determinants, and then multiply them by the value of each 
independent variable for each year. The sum of multiplying the estimated 
coefficients by a firm‟s actual capital structure determinants‟ values becomes a target 
debt ratio for each firm in a specific year. As we mentioned earlier, since we have 
estimated coefficients every year, we can obtain new target debt ratios every year for 
each individual firm. 
 
Following previous research as shown in Table 6.1, we calculated target debt ratios 
using both normal regression and the Tobit model. We find that there is not much 
difference between the methods in terms of descriptive statistics as shown in Table 
6.3 and the capital structure adjusting speeds as shown in Table 6.4. Although we 
calculate target debt ratios in two different ways, there is no significant difference 
between them. Therefore, we only used the target debt ratios, calculated by using the 
normal regression model rather than using the Tobit model for our analyses. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics of target and actual debt ratios 
The values are removed from the estimated target debt ratios if they are negative or greater than 1, and 
from the actual debt ratios if they are negative or greater than 2.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio 
 Target by regression Target by Tobit Actual debt ratio 
Stats BDR MDR BDR MDR BDR MDR 
Mean .1382 .0936 .1713 .1149 .2258 .1671 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p25 .0759 .0408 .0939 .0537 .0191 .0096 
P50 .1265 .0835 .1593 .1043 .166 .1109 
P75 .188 .1353 .2343 .1648 .3539 .2755 
P99 .3616 .2684 .4411 .3172 1.1 .6615 
Max .8577 .3756 .8696 .4717 1.9144 .729 
sd .0825 .0644 .1017 .0758 .2436 .176 
Skewness .8885 .7127 .7739 .6592 1.8421 1.0186 
Kurtosis 4.668 3.0533 4.1149 3.042 8.8937 3.1664 
obs 19051 15675 18618 15423 52420 48182 
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 compare two different methods to estimate target debt ratios: the 
Tobit model and the simple OLS. Following Hovakimian et al. (2001), we measured 
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target debt ratios by using book- and market-based debt ratios because there is 
always ambiguity when using book- and market-based values (Fama and French, 
2002). To prevent the distortion of the analysed results, we removed outliers, 
including negative debt ratios, from both real debt ratios and target debt ratios.   
 
6.3.2 The dynamic trade-off theory 
The simplest model for investigating „capital structure adjustment speed‟ toward 






where, λ: adjustment speed toward target, △DR: debt ratio change and target: target 
debt ratio. 
 
The positive λ indicates that debt ratio moves toward the targets; and, if λ > 1, this 
implies that there is no adjustment costs (Antoniou et al., 2008). Namely, a higher λ 
indicates a fast adjustment speed. 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest that DRt-1 can also be a tool to measure 
adjustment speed when the model includes full capital structure determinants (see 
Section 3.3.1.3 and Flannery and Rangan, 2006).  
 
DRi,t= α+(1- λ)DRi,t-1+ λ
j
∑ βj Xj,i,t-1+εi,t+ i  (6.3) 
 
In this equation, when λ is zero, the coefficient of DRt-1 will be unity when there is 
no capital structure adjustment. This implies that a smaller coefficient and a greater λ, 
implies a higher speed of adjustment. In Equation (6.3), the „one-period-lagged 
dependent variable,‟ DRt-1, as a regressor, is endogenous to error terms (Ozkan, 
2001). Arellano and Bond (1991) indicate that the endogeneity can be removed by 
using instrument variables with GMM estimations. We therefore use the instruments 




6.3.2.1 Difference GMM and System GMM 
Using dynamic (auto-regressive) panel data, the assumption of serial uncorrelation 
and homoskedasity in error terms (ui,t) can be easily violated. If this is the case, the 
individual effect is related to error terms; and the fixed effect or random effect 
estimator cannot solve this problem in the regression with dynamic panel data, 
because the correlation remains between the lagged regressors and disturbances 
(error terms) (Wawro, 2002). Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that regressors with 
a predetermined (E(ut|Xt)=0 rather than E(u|X)=0), use „lagged values‟ as 
instruments in „first differences‟ in dynamic models. This „Difference GMM‟ 
becomes less informative with two conditions (Blundell and Bond, 1998). First, the 
variables are close to a random walk (Roodman, 2009); namely, λ in Equation (6.3) 
is close to 1 (weak correlation); and second, the „unobservable fixed effects‟ ( i ) 
increases. If this is the case, the instrument yi1 is weakly correlated with the 
regressand (∆yi2). This weak instrument problem leads to a „downward bias‟ (Wawro, 
2002). If data consist of a highly persistent time series however, we can solve this 
problem (Wawro, 2002; Eicher and Schreiber, 2010). In the System GMM, Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) use the first differenced values as 
well as lagged values as instruments (see Appendix 3.1.2.1 for details) in order to 
solve this problem.  
 
There are two different estimators to calculate coefficients in Difference- and System 
GMM based on the moment conditions, to minimise the quadratic distance that is the 
„average covariance matrix‟ of i
'





 and the 





 (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The one-step estimator is more reliable with small samples. If the 
disturbances of residuals are heteroskedastic, however, then the two-step estimator is 
more reliable (Wawro, 2002; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In 
this dynamic analysis, we use the System GMM with the two-step estimator to solve 
this correlation problem owing to using an autoregressive panel data model. We use 
the „xtabond2‟ command for estimating System GMM; and following Roodman‟s 
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(2009) suggestion, we report all options used for the estimation and number of 
instruments.  
 
Table 6.4 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different measures 
The table shows firms‟ debt ratio changes across time.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, speed1=target1t-BDRt-1, 
speed2=target2t-MDRt-1, speed3=target3t-BDRt-1, and speed4=target4t-MDRt-1. Target1: book-based 
target debt ratios calculated by OLS, target2: market-based target debt ratios calculated by OLS, 
target3: book-based target debt ratios calculated by Tobit regression, and target4: market-based target 
debt ratios calculated by Tobit regression. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment 
speed). The coefficient values of Blundell and Bond‟s (1998) method are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment 
speed λ is (1-coefficient). The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic 
(Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. For System GMM with BDR and 
MDR, we use only BDRt-2 (for regressand BDR) MDRt-2 and R&D assett-2 (for regressand MDR) as 
endogenous variables and use options (or suboptions) of equation(level) laglimits(1 2) collapse for 
gmm-style  and of equation(level) for iv-style and of small two-step and robust for the „xtabond2‟ 
command itself. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999): Pooled OLS 
Blundell and Bond (1998): 
System GMM 





















    
Speed3t   
.1504 
(34.86)*** 
   








MDRt-1      
.7583 
(29.24)*** 
Adj-R2 0.0616 0.0639 0.0616 0.0661   
AR(1)     -9.30*** -15.52*** 
AR(2)     1.34 1.63 
Hansen 
[p-value] 





inst     L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No     10 19 
obs 18912 15443 18482 15189 20541 20429 
   
From Table 6.4, the „Blundell and Bond method‟ includes the „target capital structure 
determinants‟ that we used for estimating the „target debt ratio,‟ although we do not 
report them here because the purpose of this equation is to test the „capital structure 
adjustment speed‟ rather than to investigate their effect. By using different targets, 
Table 6.4 indicates that it is clear that firms move their debt levels towards optimal 
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leverage ratios. One noticeable matter is that the values of λ are similar across the 
coefficients that are estimated by using different target debt ratios and regression 
methods. 
 
Finally, applying Flannery and Rangan (2006) and including other control variables, 






where, λ: adjustment speed toward target, X: variables used to obtain target debt 
ratios, Z: extra control variables include tax, earnings volatility and bankruptcy 
probability, speedt = targett debt ratio-DRt-1, ∑Xt-1: M/Bt-1, profitabilityt-1, net casht-1, 
sizet-1, asset tangibilityt-1, capext-1 and R&Dt-1.     
 
Table 6.5 also suggests the existence of a target debt ratio. These results support the 
trade-off theory rather than the pecking order theory. The „capital structure 
adjustment speeds‟ are still highly significant when including all other capital 
structure determinants. Furthermore, „stock returns‟ indicate a negatively significant 
association with debt ratio, but „financial deficits‟ do not show the significance with 
the regressand, although it generally indicates a positive relationship to it. This 
indicates that market timing theory is more acceptable than pecking order theory in 
our results. This of course is related to the phenomenon of equity issuing during the 
period of time under consideration.   
 
While we interpret the target debt ratios and the speeds of capital structure 
adjustment, it is important to remember the argument put forward by Graham and 
Harvey (2001). They find that firms generally have a target debt ratio, but achieving 
this target is not the most important factor in operating firms. It is therefore not 
difficult to imagine that there are various ranges in the speed of adjustment. 
Therefore, we analyse the speed of capital structure adjustment based on firms‟ 
characteristics in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.5 Dynamic capital structure models with control variables 
Applying Flannery and Rangan (2006) and including other control variables, we test Equation 6.4. The table shows that firms change their leverage levels toward 
targets.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels 
of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
Instruments are DR, BP and vol in Columns (1), and (2); DR, SR and R&D in Columns (3), and (4); DR, BP and R&D in Columns (5), and (6); DR, BP, R&D and 
capital expenditure in Columns (7), and (8). Options for xtabond2 syntax are small, twostep and robust; and the suboptions for gmm-style are equation(level), 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








































































































































































































































AR(1)  -6.17*** -11.49*** -7.55*** -12.46*** -7.09*** -11.09*** -7.06*** -11.27*** 




















Inst  L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No  15 15 16 16 16 16 18 18 







6.3.3 Complex pecking order model 
In the conclusion to his article, Myers (1984) suggests a new idea of capital structure 
that jointly considers the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory (see 
Section 2.2.4.1, which describes details of the complex pecking order theory). He 
suggests that a low stock price prevents investment in a positive NPV project; and 
thus that firms attempt to remain within safe debt levels (it might be short-term 
targets), e.g. near a default-risk-free zone, in order to (1) reduce financial distress 
costs and (2) prepare the firm‟s borrowing power for future debt issue, namely, for 
future debt capability.  
 
Since firms have [short-term] target debt ratios for increasing debt capacity, there 
would be a negative relationship between debt levels and investment opportunities 
(capital expenditure) in the complex pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002). 
However, from Table 6.5, coefficient signs of capital expenditure and R&D expenses 
show positive relations that are more likely to follow the simple pecking order and 
trade-off theories.  
 
Firm size and the volatility of cash-flows (or earnings) are positively and negatively 
associated with debt ratio respectively in the complex pecking order theory and 
trade-off theory, because large firm size and low volatility increase debt capability in 
the complex pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002) and reduce the 
bankruptcy risk in the trade-off theory. Our results are consistent with their 
predictions. In addition, firms like to accumulate cash for future projects when the 
adverse selection cost is low (Bessler et al., 2011). Our results indicate that debt 
ratios are negatively associated with market-to-book ratios. Overall, the coefficient 
signs in Table 6.5 generally support the complex pecking order theory (see Table 5.1, 
which shows the full details of the predicted signs). 
 
6.4 Conclusions and limitations 
Table 6.6 shows that firms adjust their capital structure across time as the adjustment 
speeds are greater than zero. The predicted signs of complex pecking order theory 
also indicate that our results are consistent with this theory. One important point we 
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can make is that our results support both the trade-off theory and the complex 
pecking order theory. 
 
Table 6.6 Summary of results 
Note, PS: predicted signs, RE: results. If there are differences in results based on different methods, 
we report the most representative signs regarding significant levels. The sign of „+/-‟ indicates that it 
is difficult to decide on representative signs. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 Dynamic trade-off theory Complex pecking order theory 
 PS RE PS RE 
Stock price effect     
DRt-1 + +   
Speed + +   
Financial deficit     
Market-to-book - - - - 
Financial slack  -  - 
Firm size  + + + 
Asset tangibility  +  + 
Capital expenditure  + - + 
Tax rate  +  + 
Earnings volatility - - - - 
R&D expense  +/- - +/- 
ROA(profitability) - - - - 
Bankruptcy 
probability 
- - - - 
 
6.4.1 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we tested capital structure theories using dynamic methods. The 
dynamic models indicate that firms change their capital structures in order to achieve 
their targets. We estimated each individual firm‟s target debt ratio by using Tobit and 
OLS models. Our results show that both methods suggest similar target debt ratios 
and capital structure adjustment speeds.  
 
Our results show that firms adjust their capital structures, which indicates that firms 
aim to achieve their target debt ratios in order to maximise their value. This, of 
course, supports the trade-off theory. In terms of the complex pecking order theory, 
firms‟ capital structure adjustment can be interpreted as firms changing their capital 
structures in order to increase their debt capacity for future positive NPV projects. As 
the complex pecking order theory suggests, firms have short-term target debt ratios 
rather than long-term optimal capital structures.  
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Our results also indicate that stock prices and market-to-book ratios are negatively 
associated with debt ratios. This supports both the pecking order and the market 
timing theories. Debt ratios which are negatively associated with volatility of 
earnings, and which are positively associated with firm size, similarly support both 
the trade-off theory and the asymmetric information based theories.   
 
Similar to what has been demonstrated in Chapter 5, using dynamic methods still 
does not clearly indicate the most appropriate capital structure theory which we can 
use to explain firms‟ general gearing ratio adjusting behaviours. This chapter 
therefore also indicates the probability that both the trade-off theory and asymmetric 
information-based theories can partially explain firms‟ capital structure adjustment 
behaviour.   
 
6.4.2 Limitation 
There are some limitations with regard to this chapter. These limitations are related 
to the dynamic model. We used Tobit and normal OLS models to estimate firms‟ 
optimal capital structures. There are, however, many other ways to obtain optimal 
capital structures. This implies that there is no one correct way to estimate true target 
debt ratios which accurately indicate firms‟ targets. For example, Emery and 
Finnerty (1997) consider an industry‟s average as a target gearing level. Furthermore, 
as we can see from Table 6.1, there are no clear determinants for estimating target 
debt ratios since different researchers use different variables for their research. This 
implies that likewise we cannot assert that our method is the best one, although we 
consider that this is the best method compared to others. That is because, as was 
mentioned earlier, (1) we use more capital structure determinants, (2) there is no 
duplication in determinants and (3) we renew the target debt ratio every year, as 
firms‟ business environments change. In addition, we estimate target debt ratios 
using a normal OLS based model. This is because there is a censorship associated 
with using a Tobit model, and therefore we will lose some information because of 
this censoring. Since there is no lost data, as with a Tobit model, our OLS model 





In Chapters 5 and 6, we investigate the most important capital structure determinants 
and the appropriate theory. Our results indicate that all capital structure theories 
partially explain firms‟ debt ratio changes and that there is no dominant one, 
although our results imply that the trade-off theory is the most appropriate. Our 
results in this chapter likewise imply that capital structure determinants, which are 
related to bankruptcy probability, are continuously important.  
 
In Chapter 7, we use cluster analysis for the same purpose as in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The advantage of this is that we can more clearly observe the most important capital 
structure changing factors and theories. In other words, using only regression models 
as in Chapters 5 and 6, we observe only the overall association between the 
dependent and independent variables. However, if we use cluster analysis, we can 
discover how the association changes as the segments of firms‟ characteristics 
change. In Chapter 7, therefore, we observe different and clearer evidence in terms of 
firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours in line with the segments of firms‟ 




Chapter VII Debt ratio and a firm’s characteristics  
 
7.1 Introduction and motivation 
In this chapter, we test three major important capital structure theories, the trade-off 
theory, the market timing theory, and the pecking order theory, by using cluster 
analysis. The purpose of this chapter is the same as Chapters 5 and 6, which 
investigate the most appropriate capital structure theory and search for important 
leverage level determinants. In other words, this chapter is an extension of Chapters 
5 and 6. The methods we use in this chapter are also the same methods which we 
used in Chapters 5 and 6. The difference is that we use these methods based on 
different segments of firms‟ characteristics (e.g. the first quartile of firms‟ size, old 
aged firms, and so on).   
 
An important motivation for using cluster analyses is that this method can show 
clearer evidence of firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours than the methods in 
Chapters 5 and 6. This clearer evidence of course helps us to investigate important 
capital structure determinants and theories. In other words, by using the methods 
introduced in Chapters 5 and 6, we can simply observe the overall association 
between independent variable and covariates. However, if we use cluster analysis, 
we can observe how the associations between them change, as the segments of firms‟ 
characteristics change. That is, for example, firms in the first quartile segment in 
terms of firm size would have different behaviours compared to firms in the other 
segments when they adjust their capital structures, because firms in different 
segments face different financial and market conditions. Therefore, we can obtain 
different and clearer evidence in terms of firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours in 
line with the different segments of firms‟ characteristics.   
 
For example, as we mentioned earlier, the methods in Chapters 5 and 6 simply 
indicate a positive association between firms‟ size and debt ratios. However, cluster 
analysis indicates that there is a positive association between firms‟ size and debt 
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ratios in the third and fourth quartile segments of firms‟ size and that there is a 
negative association between them in the first and second quartiles. Furthermore, 
issuing equity is more likely for small firms than for large firms, a difference that 
was not observed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In addition, in Chapter 6, we only observe the phenomenon that firms adjust their 
capital structures. This is, of course, evidence of the trade-off theory. However, in 
this chapter, we can observe firms‟ different capital structure adjustment speeds 
based on the segments of firms‟ characteristics. From Table 7.40, for example, firms 
in the first and fourth quartiles with regard to firms‟ profits, have high capital 
structure adjustment speeds, while in the second and third quartiles, they have low 
adjustment speeds. This phenomenon supports both the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. This is because firms in the first quartile (in a net loss area) 
need to issue equity rapidly to improve their financial stability. On the other hand, 
firms in the fourth quartile have high stock prices due to high profits, such as having 
extra cash by issuing over-priced stocks. This example implies that, compared to the 
previous method, cluster analysis can support the other capital structure theory, or 
suggest a better explanation in respect of the segments of firms‟ characteristics, 
because we can observe in more detail firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours 
compared to Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
In this chapter, firms have been divided into quartiles (four segments) in terms of 
certain characteristics, including firm size and asset tangibility, and they have also 
been divided by country, industry and other aspects. Eleven different characteristics 
are tested in this chapter. Classifying data in terms of certain specific characteristics 
can lead to data snooping bias. However, as White (2000) argues, studying the bias 
itself can be a reason for research (see Section 3.4 in which the cluster effect and bias 
are fully described). In this chapter, we can observe the different debt and equity 
choices of firms, and the different „capital structure adjusting speeds‟ in line with the 
different segments of firms‟ characteristics. Since we have analysed many different 
characteristics using different methods, we do not report all the results as this would 
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be tedious. Therefore, we use some of the important results to better support our 
argument. However, we report the full results in Appendix 5.  
 
There are four hypotheses considered in this chapter: 
H7.a: A firm‟s specific characteristics segment affects its capital structure. 
H7.b: A firm‟s specific characteristics segment affects its equity and debt issue 
choice. 
H7.c: There are differences in capital structure adjusting speed in respect of the firms‟ 
characteristics segment. 
H7.d: Macroeconomic factors affect both a firm‟s leverage level and its debt and 
equity choices. 
 
Our important findings in this chapter are that firms behave differently in order to 
adjust their debt ratios, and that the different behaviours are explained by different 
capital structure theories in line with the different segments associated with firms’ 
characteristics. In other words, firms in financially less secure segments in respect of 
their characteristics, operate in accordance with the trade-off theory. For example, 
firms within the segments associated with small size, net loss, low tangible asset, 
high earnings volatility, extremely high debt ratio, and low tangible asset, issue 
equity. This behaviour follows the trade-off theory. On the other hand, firms with 
high profits and stock returns operate in accordance with both the market timing 
theory and the pecking order theory. That is, firms within the segments associated 
with high profits or high stock returns, issue more equity. However, our results 
likewise deny the pecking order theory because we observe that firms with high 
asymmetric information costs, issue equity. For example, small, young or high-
technology firms mainly issue equity, although they have high levels of asymmetric 
information.  In addition, firms associated with financially less secure segment areas 
(e.g. high bankruptcy, short histories, and over-leveraged firms) have faster „capital 
structure adjustment speeds.‟ The results of this chapter indicate stronger evidence of 
the trade-off theory than those of Chapters 5 and 6.  
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As we expected earlier, we find that cluster analyses show more details of firms‟ debt 
ratio changing behaviours. Our results also provide clearer evidence that capital 
structure is significantly affected by the segments of a firm‟s characteristics. 
Furthermore, our results similarly show that firms generally follow the trade-off 
theory and try to use opportunities to issue debt or equity when asymmetric 
information costs are low. Finally, and importantly, our results indicate that macro-
economic factors such as inflation, time, industry and country, all relate to a firm‟s 
leverage debt-and-equity choice modes and speed of adjustment. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. From Section 7.2 to Section 7.12, data are 
divided and analysed based on the firm‟s characteristics. A firm‟s characteristics are 
its size (Section 7.2), age (Section 7.3), bankruptcy probability (Section 7.4), 
leveraged level (Section 7.5), period of time under consideration (Section 7.6), stock 
return (Section 7.7), growth (Section 7.8), profitability (Section 7.9), asset tangibility 
(Section 7.10), country (Section 7.11) and industry (Section 7.12). The chapter closes 




7.2 Firms’ Size 
Table 7.1 shows that bigger firms have higher debt levels. This implies that smaller 
firms issue more equity and larger firms are more likely to follow the pecking order 
theory, which is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003) and Helwege and Liang 
(1996). The table also indicates that big firms hold less cash, have more tangible 
assets, make higher profits, pay more taxes, have smaller research and development 
expenses; and are less volatile in terms of income than small firms. Table 7.1 
indicates that, in general, large firms are more secure financially than small ones in 
terms of earnings volatility, asset tangibility and profitability. Judging from the R&D 
expenses, they might be more likely to relate to old and traditional industries.  
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive characteristics, based on firms‟ size  
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics based on their 
size between 1989 and 2008; median values are in square brackets.  
Note, -4.6052< 1st quartile < 3.4366, 3.4366 ≤ 2nd quartile < 4.9822, 4.9822 ≤ 3rd quartile < 6.5403 
and 6.54 ≤4th quartile <13.044 in Log(total asset). All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 









































































Obs 13326 13321 13327 13324 
  
Adverse selection problems cause small firms to issue more debt according to the 
pecking order theory (Frank and Goyal, 2003), as they have greater asymmetric 
information problems. Frank and Goyal (2009) also extend this argument, in a 
manner similar to that for market timing theory, that firms can issue equity if there 
are fewer less asymmetric costs. Since a larger firm has less asymmetric information 
compared with a smaller one, it can issue more equity than the smaller firm. Table 
7.2, however, shows that firms in the first quartile rely relatively more on equity 
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issue than firms in the second quartile. It likewise indicates that firms in the third and 
fourth quartiles issue more equity compared with the firms in the first and second 
quartiles. Higher equity issue in the first quartile than the second quartile can be 
explained by the trade-off theory because such firms have higher bankruptcy 
probability than the others. Therefore, they need to issue equity. Firms using more 
equity in the third and fourth quartile can be explained by the pecking order theory 
(c.f. Frank and Goyal, 2009). However, according to traditional pecking order theory, 
although there is low asymmetric information for larger firms, they should issue debt 
because equity issue is still costly. The results in Table 7.2 are consistent with both 
the pecking order theory (in terms of Frank and Goyal‟s argument) and the trade-off 
theory. The market timing theory might explain this because there are more chances 
of the over-valuation of stock prices for larger firms. Furthermore, if the traditional 
pecking order theory is correct, small firms should issue debt because equity issue is 
too expensive for them.  
 
Table 7.2 Debt ratio changes based on firms‟ size, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002) 
The table shows that small firms relatively use more equity, whereas large firms use more external 
financing, and all firms generally rely more on equity across quartiles.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, A: total asset, e: equity, RE: retained earnings, -(e/A): equity issue, 
-(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 ∆BDR 










































































Obs 6210 6606 8031 10178 
Adj-R2 0.1246 0.1058 0.2420 0.1813 
 
Panel A in Table 7.3 shows the different associations between debt ratio change and 
financial deficit elements, based on firms‟ sizes. Firms in the 4th quartile use more 
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debt for dividends and new investment (capital expenditure) and less for „working 
capital change‟ than small ones. This might be because smaller firms are financially 
more vulnerable. In Panel A, „internal cash and net income‟ (C) has a great negative 
effect on the debt ratio of larger firms. This might imply that large firms have higher 
profitability. Panels B and C also show that large firms use more debt for new 
investments, while small firms use more equity; and working capital also relates less 
positively to equity issue for large firms. This table also shows that investment is the 




Table 7.3 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on firms‟ size  
The table shows the different associations between debt ratio change and financial deficit elements, 
based on firm size and shows that large firms use more debt for new investments, while small firms 
use more equity.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net stock issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after 
interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 














































Obs 8104 9899 9819 10310 
Adj-R2 0.1023 0.0806 0.0645 0.06 
 Panel B:  Net long-term debt issue / assett 














































Obs 6144 6600 7775 9578 
Adj-R2 0.0314 0.0388 0.0536 0.0846 
 Panel C: Net equity issue / assett 














































Obs 5954 6569 7771 9558 
Adj-R2 0.2680 0.3360 0.2371 0.1146 
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Frank and Goyal (2003) show that „financial deficit‟ is related less to debt issuance, 
which implies that the pecking order theory does not explain capital structure change. 
They do, however, show that larger firms are more likely to follow pecking order 
behaviours than smaller firms. Table 7.4 is generally consistent with Frank and 
Goyal‟s suggestions (2003). Large firms rely more upon debt for their financial 
deficit (DEF1), although the explanatory power and coefficients are not great. In 
particular, firms in the 4th quartile issue much greater debt than firms in the 1st 
quartile. The same conclusion is shown by Panels B and C. This shows more debt 
issue on the part of large firms, and strong equity issue on the part of small firms. 
One more important result from Panel C is that the observed explanatory powers of 
regressions and the coefficients of „financial deficit‟ are much greater than is 





Table 7.4 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on firms‟ size  
The table shows that large firms use more upon debt for their financial deficit (DEF1), although the 
explanatory power and coefficients are not great.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1: 
financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0018 0.0025 0.0001 0.0015 
Obs 8104 9899 9819 10307 
 Panel B: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0138 0.0094 0.0269 0.05 
Obs 6144 6600 7775 9578 
 Panel C: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2348 0.1586 0.1745 0.1142 
Obs 5954 6569 7771 9558 
 
In Table 7.5, larger firms‟ „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ are slower than those 
of smaller firms. This result is consistent with Antoniou et al. (2008) who suggest 
that smaller firms change leverage levels more rapidly. This might imply that „capital 
structure adjustment speed‟ depends on internal cash-flow as well as financing, 
because if firms‟ capital structure adjustment relies entirely on external financing, 
then large firms would change gearing levels quickly with low transaction costs 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Therefore, our result is inconsistent with the financing 
cost hypothesis. This can be explained better by financial security. As smaller firms 
are financially in less secure positions than large ones, it is a more important matter 
for smaller firms to stay out of an unsecured (high) debt level. Panel B uses System 
GMM, and we have not reported the capital structure determinants, since the purpose 
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of this regression is to test the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ rather than to 
investigate the effects from them. 
 
Table 7.5 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different measures, 
based on the size of firms 
The table shows that „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ are increased for smaller firms. Panel B 
uses System GMM. We do not report the capital structure determinants since the purpose of this 
regression is to test the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ rather than to investigate their effects.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio is 
calculated by OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panel A. The 
coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panel B are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment 
speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panel B, we use all 7 capital structure determinants although 
we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 is instrumented and the 7 variables are assumed 
exogenous in Panel B used by the System GMM. The values in the square brackets are the significant 
levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. Options for 
xtabond2 syntax are small, twostep, and robust; and the sub-options for gmm-style are equation(level), 
laglimits(1 2), collapse and for iv-style is equation(level). *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
OLS 
Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0877 0.0672 0.0438 0.0592 
Obs 3176 4527 5217 5992 
Sys-GMM Panel B: BDRt 



















AR(1) -3.91*** -7.52*** -4.18*** -6.75*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 3730 5145 5557 6109 
 
7.2.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ size 
In Chapters 5 and 6, we observe that firms‟ size is positively related to debt ratios. 
This is consistent with both the trade-off and the pecking order theories, because 
large firms have low bankruptcy probability and asymmetric information costs. In 
this section, Table 7.3 similarly shows that small firms use more equity and less debt 
in their new investments. In addition, Table 7.4 indicates a strong positive 
association between debt ratio and financial deficits as the size of firm increases. 
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Finally, capital structure adjustment speeds decrease as firms‟ size increases. The 
overall conclusion is that firms‟ capital structure adjustment behaviours based on 
firms‟ size, in general, follows the trade-off theory and particularly, small firms‟ 
behaviours can be explained only by the trade-off theory (see, Tables 7.3 and 7.4). It 
is not possible to explain this under the pecking order theory because small firms 




7.3 A firm’s age 
In Sections 2.3.4 (firm history) and 3.4.5 (firm age), we have already discussed the 
probability that a firm‟s age can affect its debt ratio changing behaviour. In this 
section, we investigate whether firms‟ age can affect their gearing ratio adjusting 
patterns in line with their different ages by using cluster analysis.  
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we divide our sample into two groups based on firm 
age. The literature survey indicates that various studies use different methods in 
order to decide the proxies for firms‟ ages, as it is difficult to know for sure when 
firms were actually founded. For example, Lougharan and Ritter (2004) and 
Giannetti (2003) use the date of IPOs of their sample firms. Furthermore, Fama and 
French (2002) use the size of the firms. As we can see from these examples, there is 
no clear criterion. This is because most databases, including Thomson One Banker, 
do not provide the year when the firms in their database were founded.  
 
In this thesis, we estimate the firms‟ age based on when our sample firms first appear 
in our database (Thomson One Banker). For example if a firm‟s fiscal data was first 
shown in the year 1989, we presume that the firm was founded in 1989 or before, 
because our sample started in 1989. Furthermore, if a firm‟s data first appeared in the 
year 1990, we then presume that the firm was founded in 1990. This implies that old 
firms are firms which are shown as having a longer period on the database. For 
example, we assume that firms which do not have data in the first ten-year period 
(from 1989 to 1998), and have more than 8 years of data in the second ten-year-
period (from 1999 to 2008) are short history (young) firms, and those which have 
more than 18 years of data in the total twenty-year period as being long history (old) 
firms. We use only the second ten-year period data from both old and young firms 
for analysis, because we take account of macro-economic changes between the two 
different time periods, which might have affected the firms‟ capital structures. In 
other words, we compare the two different age groups under the same macro-
economic conditions (see Section 3.4.5 in which more details with regard to 
decisions about a firm‟s age are described).  
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Table 7.6 shows a T test result. There is a significant difference in terms of book-
based debt ratios between the groups. This may suggest the existence of a 
survivorship bias between the two groups. However, it also shows that there is a 
significant difference in debt ratio between an old age group and a young age group. 
Furthermore, as White (2000) mentions, the purpose of this classification is to 
investigate the differences in firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours between the two 
groups. 
 
Table 7.6 T test between long and short history firms in terms of book-based debt 
ratios 
The t statistic indicates the significant differences in book-based debt ratio between two groups. *** 
significance at 0.01 level 
 Obs Mean Std. Error Std. Deviation 
Long history 8806 .2494 .0023 .2117 
Short history 25294 .2096 .0016 .2556 
Difference 34100 .0398 .0013 .2456 
 t statistic= 13.12, ***,  probability =0.000 
 
Hall et al. (2004) presume that older firms have more chance of accumulating funds 
than younger ones, and consequently they have less need to borrow. However, 
younger firms have fewer opportunities to accumulate funds, and therefore have to 
borrow. They did, however, find the opposite result. Giannetti (2003) also shows the 
positive relationship between debt levels and a firm‟s age. From Table 7.7, firms 
with a long history have higher debt levels, are of a greater size, and tend to hold 
more tangible assets as well as less cash. The table also shows that earnings volatility 
is lower for older firms. This implies that older firms are better placed when using 
external financial resources, and have a better business performance, in general. One 
particularly noticeable point is that there is a significant difference in cash holding 
between old and young firms, and older firms hold high debt, as well as, lower cash. 




Table 7.7 Descriptive characteristics by firms‟ age 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of a firm‟s characteristics based on its age 
between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 









































Obs 8810 25722 
 
Table 7.8 shows the number of observations of firms which increase their debt, in 
terms of „pure debt issue‟ ((Net long-term debt issuance/total asset)-(Net equity 
issuance/total asset)). Generally, firms with both young and old histories issue equity 
more than debt. In terms of old firms‟ observations, 45% issue more debt, while 31% 
of young firms issue more debt. Overall, 60% of firms are observed to issue more 
equity during the last ten year period. This implies that between 1999 and 2008, 
firms with a long history used more debt than those with a short history. 
 
Table 7.8 Number of observations that indicate an increased debt ratio, based on the 
firms‟ age 
The table shows that in general both young and old firms issue equity more than debt.  
Note, number of observations of pure debt increase is (Net long-term debt issuance/total asset)-(Net 
equity issuance/total asset). Mean and median: mean and median value of pure debt increase 












































Table 7.9 indicates that old firms are more associated with equity issue than are 
younger ones. This implies that firms with a long history have less asymmetric 
information costs in terms of the pecking order theory. 
 
Table 7.9 Debt ratio changes based on the age of firms, using the Baker and Wurgler 
models model (2002)  
The table shows that old companies are associated more with external financing rather than young 
companies.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, long: long history firms, short: short history firms, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 







































































Table 7.10 shows that a financial deficit (DEF1) is a negatively related debt ratio for 
both groups in Panel A. This implies that companies with both long and short 
histories use more equity, and this is inconsistent with the pecking order theory. As 
we have seen from Figure 5.1, there is a time serial trend in terms of debt ratio. 
Namely, debt ratio has been reducing continuously over the last twenty years. 
However, Panels B and C in the table indicate that companies with a long history are 
more associated with long-term debt issuance and less associated with equity issue, 
than firms with a short history. In addition, Table 7.11 indicates that firms with a 
short history adjust their debt ratios more quickly. Together, Tables 7.10 and 7.11 
imply that young firms consider their financial security to a greater extent and 




 Table 7.10 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1) based on the firms‟ age 
The table implies that companies with both long and short histories use more equity but old firms use 
relatively less equity and more debt than young ones.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit as defined by Frank and 
Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow 
after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total 




Panel B: Net long-term debt 
issue/ assett 
Panel C: Net equity issue/ 
assett 



























Adj-R2 0.00 0.0002 0.0095 0.0094 0.2065 0.2383 





Table 7.11 Comparison of „capital structure adjustment speed,‟ based on the firms‟ 
age 
The table indicates that old firms adjust their debt ratios slowly.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio. The coefficient values of Panels C 
and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjusting speed λ is (1-coefficient) in Panels A and B. In calculating Panels 
C and D, we use all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not report these coefficients here. 
BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are used as instruments in Panels C and D respectively. The values in the square 
brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous 
variables. For the syntax of xtabond2, eq(level) lag(1 2) and collapse options are used for gmm-style 
and eq(level) option is used for iv-style. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 
0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 





















Adj-R2 0.0521 0.0675 0.0673 0.0791 
Obs 4708 10506 4329 8127 
 Panel C: BDRt Panel D: MDRt 





















AR(1) -6.37*** -7.39*** -9.19*** -12.08*** 











Inst L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4787 11201 4754 11167 
 
7.3.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and with firms’ age 
This section strongly supports the trade-off theory because our results show that 
firms with a short history use more equity and have lower debt ratio. Table 7.11 also 
indicates that firms with a short history show high capital structure adjustment 
speeds. This implies that, as firms with a short history tend to be in financially 
unstable situations, they issue equity to increase their financial stability. The high 
capital structure adjustment speeds of short history firms also indicate that they need 
to change their debt ratios as soon as possible in order to escape from a situation of 
instability. This section likewise indicates that firms with a long history also issue 
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more equity than debt, just as in the case of short history firms. Compared with other 
chapters and sections of our analyses, this is a situation for all firms in our sample 
data. That is, firms, irrespective of the length of their histories, use more equity. This 
is thoroughly against the pecking order theory, and implies that there is a big shift in 
debt ratio change across our entire sample, for the time under consideration. This 
phenomenon is consistent with Bates et al. (2009) who suggest that the increasing 
amount of intangible assets held by firms creates costly financial distress and hence 




7.4 Bankruptcy Probability 
This thesis uses the „combined pb-area.‟ That is, we use a series of the Z‟-score 
models as a proxy of financial distress (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of 
Z-score models are described). In Section 7.4.1, we compare our proxy of 
bankruptcy probability, combined bp-area, to Z-score and EDF models to test its 
reliability (see Section 1.2.2 in Appendix 1 in which full details of bankruptcy 
probability measures are described).  
 
7.4.1 The comparison between market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy 
prediction models  
According to Hillegeist et al. (2004), „accounting-based credit scoring models‟ (Z- or 
O-scores) could not properly represent bankruptcy probability because Z- and O-
score models can be biased, caused by the sample selection process. For example, 
there are a limited number of firms who go bankrupt. Since 1% of firms generally go 
bankrupt in the US, 5% of bankruptcy probability cannot be tested with this low 
bankruptcy level. In other words, while a relatively small number of firms become 
bankrupt, the majority of firms survive. As there is a problem due to small sample 
size, there can be a bias in bankruptcy estimation. To solve this problem, Shumway 
(2001) asserts that a hazard model (probability model) is more accurate and 
relatively unbiased for forecasting bankruptcy.  
 
Since „accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models,‟ such as Z- and O-score 
models are formed as a prediction score based on a „multiple discriminate analysis‟ 
(MDA) and „market-based bankruptcy prediction models‟ are formed as a probability, 
it is difficult to make a comparison between them. Thus, they have to be transformed 
into the same formation to make comparisons possible. In other words, Z-score 
transforms into probability like the Black-Sholes-Metron (BSM) model, and vice 
versa. We can transform them by using the „discrete hazard model‟ (Ohlshon, 1980; 
Shumway, 2001; Hillegeist et al., 2004). 
 
 181 
For example, we can transform the probabilistic results from market-based models, 
such as the EDF model, can be turned into a score to allow comparison with 
accounting-based models. Hillegeist et al. (2004) suggest the following method:  
 
 )1(ln bppbscore   (7.1) 
where, pb: actual probability of bankruptcy 
 
In the same way, the „scoring models‟ can also be turned into „logistic functional 
models‟ to compare the probability model by reversing the previous formula, using 









where, pbi,t: actual probability of bankruptcy,  : constant, x : a vector of 
explanatory variables,  : coefficient vector. Since Z- score models do not report the 
constant, we presume that the constant is zero in order to calculate the probability of 
bankruptcy. O-score models, however, report the contents. 
 
As this is a „log transformation function‟ from Equation (7.1), the score tends to 
infinity when the pb is one or zero. The pb value should be winsorised because the 
value of infinity could distort results. By following Hillegeist et al. (2004), we 
restrict the value of the pb to between 0.00001 (minimum) and 0.99999 (maximum), 
then the score will be between -11.51292 and +11.51292: to make a comparison, the 
scores of accounting-based models should be winsorised between -11.51292 and 
+11.51292. 
 
Hillegist et al. (2004) conclude that the market-based BSM model contains more 
information, and thus the BSM model is a better proxy of bankruptcy probability 
than accounting-based models. Agawal and Taffler (2008) however, conclude that 
there is no significant difference between market-based and accounting-based models 
in terms of a failure prediction. Shumway (2001) also suggests using both methods 
for more accuracy. 
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Table 7.12 shows the relationship between debt ratios and bankruptcy probabilities at 
time t. The low value of Z- and the BP-area and the high value of Z-bp (Z-score 
model based bankruptcy probability) and EDF indicate financial stability (see 
Section 1.2.2 in Appendix 1). This table tells us the same story that bankruptcy 
probability and debt ratios are positively associated. Specificially, firms with high 
debt ratios expose a high level of bankruptcy probability. In terms of the explanatory 
power, Z-area, Z-bp and Bp-area are the most reliable indicators of bankruptcy 
probability. The coefficients of the probability model such as EDF and Z-bp also 
have high and statistically significant values. As they show similar results, it is 




Table 7.12 Comparison between book-based and market-based bankruptcy prediction models 
The table shows that there is clear correlation between market- and book-based bankruptcy prediction models.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. Z-score and EDF-score are winsorised between -11.51292 and 11.51292, and Z-bp and EDF are winsorised between 0.00001 and 
0.99999. Z-area and bp-area are defined 1= good area, 2=gray area, 3=bad area, where a good area indicates a high score in terms of z-score values and a bad area 
indicates a low score. Since, a high EDF probability indicates a long distance to default, a high value indicates a secure financial state. *** significance at 0.01 level, 






















    
Zscoret   
-.0386 
(-115.42)*** 
   








EDFt      
-.2969 
(-12.70)*** 
Adj-R2 0.4030 0.2759 0.3184 0.0198 0.2640 0.0041 







Table 7.12 Continued 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio. The Z-score and the EDF-score are winsorised between -11.51292 and 11.51292, and Z-bp and EDF are winsorised between 
0.00001 and 0.99999. Z-area and bp-area are defined 1= good area, 2=gray area, 3=bad area, where the good area indicates a high score in terms of the z-score value 
and the bad area indicates a low score. Since a high EDF probability indicates a long distance to default, a high value indicates a secure financial state. *** significance 






















    
Zscoret   
-.0298 
(-115.35)*** 
   








EDFt      
-.3782 
(-21.96)*** 
Adj-R2 0.4873 0.2575 0.3205 0.0198 0.1441 0.0122 
Obs 37547 41368 28203 38981 28203 39013 
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7.4.2 Debt ratio and bankruptcy probability 
Table 7.13 shows that the bankruptcy probability is mostly related to debt ratio, cash 
holdings and profit, and increases as debt ratios increase, while firms with a low 
bankruptcy probability hold high net cash. An important fact is that firms in bad 
areas show deep negative profits. The combined-bp area and Z‟-score areas show the 
same result.  
 
Table 7.13 Descriptive characteristics, based on bp-area 
A univariate comparison of the means and medians of measures of firm characteristics are based on 
the bankruptcy probability between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The combined pb-area is defined by a series of z‟-score 
based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of Z-score models are described). All 
variables are defined in Section 5.3.  
Variables Combined bp area Z‟ score area 





















































Obs 23137 8049 13189 21358 6456 10114 
 
We regress the Z‟-score decision factors with debt ratios to investigate the effect on 




where WC: Working Capital, TA: Total Asset, RE: Retained Earnings, ME: Market 
Value Equity, EBIT: Earnings before Interest and Taxes, BD: Book Value of Total 
Debt, SALE: sale. 
 
From Table 7.14, most factors from the Z‟-score model are negatively related to debt 
ratios. This implies that high debt ratios increase the probability of bankruptcy. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that all variables in the Z-score model are considered as 
important factors when analysing capital structure theories from previous research. 
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„Working capital to asset‟ is the most important factor, followed by profit related 
items (EBIT, retained earnings and sales).  
 
Table 7.14 Debt ratio and the component of the Z‟-score model   
The table shows that most factors from the Z‟-score model are negatively related to debt ratios. This 
implies that high debt ratios increase the probability of bankruptcy. BDR: book-based debt ratio, 
MDR: market-based debt ratio, *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 




















































































Adj-R2 0.3798 0.5028 Adj-R2 0.2828 0.3103 
No of Obs 29163 28847 No of Obs 24383 23984 
 
Table 7.15 indicates that firms with a high level of bankruptcy probability (in a bad 
area) at time t-1, increase their equity issue to reduce the debt ratio at time t. This is 
strong evidence for supporting the static trade-off theory. The differences are more 









Table 7.15 Debt ratio changes based on the bp-area, using the Baker and Wurgler 
models (2002)  
The table indicates that firms with a high level of bankruptcy probability (in a bad area) at time t-1 
increase equity issue to reduce debt ratio at time t.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, the combined pb-area is defined by a series of z‟-score 
based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of Z-score models are described). A: total 
asset, e: equity, RE: retained earnings, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-
1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 
level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A: ∆BDRt 
 Combined pb-area Z‟-score area 
BP condition at t-1 
Good  
areat-1 































































































Adj-R2 0.1630 0.2845 0.1362 0.1598 0.2654 0.1821 
Obs 14460 4653 7381 14242 3657 5822 
 
From Table 7.16, Panels A and B show that the „financial deficit‟ is negatively 
associated with debt increasing when firms are in a bad area at t-1. This implies that 
they use equity for „financial deficits‟ when they are in financially unstable 
conditions. This is consistent with Fitzpatrick and Ogden‟s findings (2011) that 55% 
of firms experiencing financial distress issue equity. They imply that the asymmetric 
information cost is not as great as the pecking order theory argues, or that the 








Table 7.16 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on the bp-area 
The table shows that firms use equity for financial deficits when they are in financially unstable 
conditions.  
Note, the combined pb-area is defined by a series of z‟-score based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in 
which the details of Z-score models are described). DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based 
debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-
repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term 
debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: 
dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and 
taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. This table 
is based by combined bankruptcy probability rather than z‟-score area. *** significance at 0.01 level, 
** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 



























Adj-R2 0.0028 0.0016 0.0091 0.0021 0.0026 0.0002 
Obs 17361 5680 9096 16363 5292 8282 
 Panel  C: Net long-term debt issuet/assett Panel  D: Net equity issuet/assett 



























Adj-R2 0.0159 0.0244 0.0139 0.2491 0.1216 0.2549 
Obs 13278 4185 7129 13294 4156 6976 
 
From Table 7.17, capital structure adjustment speeds generally reduce as bankruptcy 
probability declines. This implies that firms in a bad area need more financial 





Table 7.17 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on the bp-area 
The table shows that „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ generally reduce as bankruptcy probability 
declines.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio. The combined pb-area is defined 
by a series of z‟-score based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of Z-score models are 
described). The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The 
coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ in Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the 
adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 capital structure 
determinants, although we do not report on these coefficients here. BDR and capital expenditure is 
instrumented in Panel C. MDR and capital expenditure are used as instruments in Panel D. The values 
in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests 
the endogenous variables. xtabond2 uses eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style, and eq(level) for 
iv-style. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. This table is based by combined bankruptcy 
probability rather than z‟-score area. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 





















   







Adj-R2 0.0363 0.0619 0.0741 0.0268 0.0629 0.0820 
Obs 9503 2698 3924 7724 2579 3315 
 Panel  C: BDRt Panel  D: MDRt 





















   







AR(1) -8.99*** -1.97** -4.63*** -7.00*** -5.34*** -7.43*** 















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Obs 10456 2725 4037 10450 2703 3967 
 
Table 7.18 shows the number of observations of „pure debt issue‟ in respect of the 
financial conditions at time t-1. The table indicates that by not regarding bankruptcy 
probability areas, firms generally decrease the debt ratio by issuing more equity. The 
table further shows that as bankruptcy probability increase, firms issue more equity, 
from 54% of the total security issue in good areas to 63% in bad areas.  
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Table 7.18 Number of observations that increase debt, based on the bp-area  
The table indicates that by not regarding bankruptcy probability areas, firms generally decrease the 
debt ratio by issuing more equity. However, it also shows that firms issue more equity as the 
bankruptcy probability increases.  
Note, number of observations of „pure debt increase,‟ (Net long-term debt issuance/total asset)-(Net 
equity issuance/total asset). Mean and median: mean and median value of pure debt increase. This 
table is based by combined bankruptcy probability rather than z‟-score area. The combined pb-area is 
defined by a series of z‟-score based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of Z-score 
models are described). 











































The results in this section indicate that financially distressed firms reorganise debt 
ratios more actively than those in a good area. This indication is not consistent with 
Gilson (1997), who asserts that as financial costs are too severe for financially 
distressed firms, they cannot issue new securities. The results in this section also 
imply that bankruptcy costs are greater than transaction costs.   
 
7.4.3 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ bankruptcy probability 
Tables 7.15 and 7.16 show that firms issue more equity and less debt when they are 
in a bad area in terms of Z-score model at time t-1. This shows that firms issue equity 
when their financial security is unstable at time t-1. This is strong evidence that firms 
(particularly firms in bad areas at time t-1) adjust their capital structure structures. 
Table 7.17 also indicates that firms in a bad area at time t-1 adjust their capital 
structures more rapidly than those firms in the other areas. Furthermore, from Table 
7.18 we also observe that without considering firms‟ financial states at time t-1, more 
firms from the entire range of financial states issue more equity, and firms in bad 
areas issue relatively more equity than those in the other areas. The results from 
Tables 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17 support the trade-off theory. As we have seen in Section 
7.3.1, we can also observe a trend in Table 7.18. That is, the trend of increasing 
equity without regarding firms‟ financial states also indicates that there is a big shift 
in terms of firms‟ capital structure change. This can be explained only by the trade-
off theory, because it is difficult to believe that all firms are over-priced or that 
asymmetric information is reduced across time if we accept the market timing theory 
or the pecking order theory respectively as explanations of this phenomenon. 
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7.5 Over-leveraged and under-leveraged firms 
If capital structure follows the trade-off theory, over-leveraged (under-leveraged) 
firms attempt to reduce (increase) leverage levels. In particular, over-leveraged firms 
have to reduce debt in both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory because 
they face great credit problems. However, Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Lemmon 
and Zender (2008) argue that both theories suggest opposite solutions for under-
leveraged firms. The trade-off theory expects that under-leveraged firms issue debt 
or repurchase equity, while the pecking order theory expects firms to reduce their 
debt ratios to increase their debt capability by retiring outstanding debt.  
 
In order to decide whether firms‟ leverage levels are over- or under-leveraged, we 
compare them to target debt ratios, (TDRt-DRt, where, TDR is target debt ratio and 
DR is actual debt ratio). If the actual debt ratio is higher than the target debt ratio, 
then it is over-leveraged and vice versa. Using these over- or under-leveraged debt 
ratios, we expect to observe different „firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours‟. Firms 
would like to change their debt ratios towards moderate levels if there is a target debt 
ratio. 
 




When classifying leverage levels into two groups (those of over-leveraged and 
under-leveraged firms), we compare debt ratios with four different target leverage 
levels (book- and market based and tobit- and regression based target debt ratios; see 
Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). The four different target debt ratios lead to similar 
results. To reach a clearer conclusion of the effect of over- and under-leveraged debt 
ratios, we use firms which are only extremely over- and under-leveraged, similar to 
those considered by Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) (the fourth or first quartile for 
under- and over-leveraged firms, respectively). For example, if the value (of TDRt-
DRt) is greater than 0.113, or smaller than -0.275, for under- and over-leveraged 
firms, respectively (see Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5); we use the target debt ratios 
computed by regression with book-based debt ratios. 
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The basic statistic in Table 7.19 indicates that the statistical values are similar 
between OLS regressed target debt ratios and the Tobit regressed target debt ratio. 
This implies that it matters little whether we are using OLS- or Tobit-based target 
debt ratios. The table shows that there are significant differences in cash holding, 
asset tangibility, and bankruptcy probability between the two groups. Namely, under-
leveraged firms hold more cash and tangible assets and have a low bankruptcy 
probability in general.  
 
Table 7.19 Descriptive characteristics, based on leverage levels 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics, based on leverage 
levels between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. OLS Regressed target: target debt ratio is computed by 
OLS. Tobit regressed target: target debt ratio is computed using the Tobit model. BDR-target: book 
based target debt ratio, MDR-target: market based target debt ratio. All variables are defined in 
Section 5.3. Extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile 
among the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively. 
For example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and smaller than -
0.275 with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). 
 OLS regressed target Tobit regressed target 












































































































Table 7.20 Debt ratio changes based on leverage levels, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
The table supports the trade-off theory by showing, that extremely over-leverage firms at time t-1 
issue equity more.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change. Extremely over- 
and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among the under-leveraged 
firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively. For example, the value (of 
target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and smaller than -0.275 with book-based debt 
ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). Independent variables with ∆MDR are based on market-
based target debt ratios for the decision of level of debt ratio criteria, and the independent variables 
with ∆BDR are based on book based target debt ratio. A: total asset, e: equity, RE: retained earnings, -
(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in 
leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.2181 0.0623 0.0873 0.0464 
Obs 1742 1356 1415 919 
 
Table 7.20 clearly shows that extremely over-leveraged firms at time t-1, issue more 
equity in the next term than under-leveraged firms. This supports the trade-off theory.  
 
As was discussed earlier, Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest that the pecking order 
theory and the trade-off theory expect different behaviours on the part of firms when 
they are under-leveraged. They show, in general, that firms follow the trade-off 
theory rather than the pecking order theory. Following their idea, we test it with 





Table 7.21 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1) using Flannery and 
Rangan‟s (2006) model, based on leverage levels  
The table implies that extremely over-leveraged firms at time t-1 use equity at time t, while extremely 
under-leveraged firms use debt for new investment.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change. Extremely over- 
and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among the under-leveraged 
firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively (see, Table A.5.20 in 
Appendix 5). DEF1t=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based 
debt ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: 
investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal 
cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. DEF1 levels indicate the 
levels of financial deficit for only firms who are extremely over-leveraged or under-leveraged at time 
t-1. The regression with ∆BDR uses book based OLS regressed-target debt ratio and with ∆MDR uses 
market-based OLS regressed-target debt ratio. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 
level, * significance at 0.1 level 
Leverage level Panel A : Extremely over-leveraged at time t-1 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0293 0.002 0.0256 0.0367 
Obs 1214 732 1031 645 
Leverage level Panel B : Extremely under-leveraged at time t-1 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0422 0.0105 0.005 0.0224 
Obs 1078 464 719 359 
 
From Panels A and B in Table 7.21, the extremely over- and under-leveraged firms 
at time t-1 decrease or increase debt at time t, respectively, when „financial deficit‟ is 
greater than zero (DEF1 > 0). This implies that over-leveraged firms use equity and 
under-leveraged firms use debt for new investment. On the other hand, over- and 
under-leveraged firms are positively and negatively associated with „financial deficit 
(DEF1),‟ respectively, when DEF1 < 0. This implies that accumulated earnings 
reduce the debt ratio for firms which are extremely over-leveraged; and debt levels 
increase while retained earnings is increased for extremely under-leveraged firms. 




Table 7.22 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on leverage levels 
The table implies from Panels A and B, that firms generally follow the trade-off theory.  
Noter, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among 
the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively (see, 
Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio 
change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-
Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. The leverage level is based on time t-1. All 
regressions in this table are based on book based target ratio except the models with the independent 
variable of ∆MDR. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 
level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 





















 0.01 0.0467 0.0048 0.0054 
Obs 1946 1543 1676 1078 
 
Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / 
assett 
Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0623 0.0316 0.20 0.4702 
Obs 1686 1323 1701 1321 
 
Table 7.22 shows that extremely over- or under-leveraged firms‟ debt ratios at time t-
1 are negatively and positively associated with „financial deficits‟ at time t. Namely, 
an extremely over-leveraged firm uses equity for a financial deficit, and vice versa. 
Panels A and B support the static trade-off theory. Panels C and D do not tell the 
same story and it might show a behavioural persistency. Extremely over-leveraged 
firms are more associated with debt issuance while extremely under-leveraged firms 
are more associated with equity issuance. These behaviours do not belong to any 




Table 7.23 A comparison of „capital structure adjustment speeds‟, based on leverage 
levels 
The table indicates that extremely over-leveraged firms change their debt ratios first, followed by 
extremely under-leveraged firms.  
Note, overt-1 and undert-1 indicate that over- and under-leveraged firms at time t-1 and ex-un and ex-ov 
are extremely under-leveraged and over-leveraged. Extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are 
defined as firms which are in the fourth quartile among the under-leveraged firms, and in the first 
quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). BDR: book-
based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, Speed1= target1t – BDRt-1, speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, 
target1: book based target debt ratio calculated by OLS, target2: market-based target debt ratio 
calculated by OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. 
The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the 
adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). Independent variables with (∆)MDR are based on market-based 
target debt ratios for the decision of level of debt ratio criteria, and the independent variables with 
(∆)BDR are based on book based target debt ratio. BDRt-1 is instrumental for Panel C, MDRt-1 and 
profitability are instrumental for Panel D. Panels C and D use System GMM with options for small 
robust and twostep, with sub-options of eq(level) and lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style, and of 
eq(level) for iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen 
p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 

















































    



















 0.0541 0.0109 0.0764 0.0311 0.0702 0.0089 0.0537 0.0063 
Obs 8311 6959 2022 1606 7725 4337 1842 1132 
 Panel C: BDRt Panel D: MDRt 









































    



























































Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 39 12 73 73 71 
Obs 8483 7179 2059 1621 8030 4794 1872 1155 
 
Table 7.23 shows the „different capital adjustment speeds‟ based on debt levels at 
time t-1. The table generally shows that over-leveraged firms change their debt ratios 
faster than do under-leveraged firms; and extremely over- or under-leveraged firms 
also change their gearing levels faster than the less extremely leveraged firms. This 
implies that bankruptcy costs are greater than „capital structure adjustment costs‟ for 
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(extremely) over-leveraged firms. This is consistent with Korteweg (2010), who 
finds that over-leveraged firms are more likely rebalance their leverage levels. This 
table might also support the hypothesis of „capital structure adjustment costs‟ by 
showing that extremely under-leveraged firms‟ „capital structure adjustment speed‟ is 
faster than that of others, because their adjustment costs might be lower due to a low 
bankruptcy probability.  
 
Table 7.24 Number of observations of „pure debt issue‟ with book-based leverage 
level at t-1 
The table shows that firms generally decrease debt ratios, regardless of debt levels. It shows arguable 
evidence however that (extremely) over-leveraged firms issue equity more than do others.  
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among 
the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms, respectively (see, 
Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). Number of observations of „pure debt increase,‟ (Net long-term debt 
issuance/total asset)-(Net equity issuance/total asset). Mean and median: mean and median values of 
pure debt increase. This tabe is based on book-based debt ratio. 





















































































Table 7.24 shows that firms generally decrease debt ratios regardless of debt levels. 
It shows arguable evidence however that (extremely) over-leveraged firms issue 
more equity than the others. One other noticeable point is that there are fewer over-
leveraged firms who do nothing (neither issue equity nor debt) compared to under-
leveraged firms. In other words, firms behave more actively when they are over-
leveraged. 
 
7.5.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ leverage levels 
This section tests the trade-off theory because we investigate firms‟ capital structure 
adjusting behaviours in line with firms‟ leverage levels. In other words, the trade-off 
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theory argues the existence of optimal capital structure. This argument implies that 
firms try to increase and reduce their debt ratios if they have too low or too high debt 
ratios respectively in order to approach the optimal capital structure. Table 7.20 
indicates that extremely over-leveraged firms issue more equity than extremely 
under-leveraged firms. Furthermore, Table 7.22 also shows a negative association 
between debt ratio change and financial deficits for extremely over-leveraged firms 
and shows a positive association between them for extremely under-leveraged firms. 
Table 7.23 shows that extremely over- and under-leveraged firms adjust their capital 
structure faster than other groups of firms. All our results, particularly, for the 




7.6 Different time periods 
This section is similar to Chapter 4 in that firms in different time periods have 
different debt ratios. Figure 5.1 indicates that firms use less debt than they did before, 
consistent with Graham (2000). He asserts that firms used debt more aggressively in 
the 1980s. Table 7.25 shows that firms used less debt in the second period. It also 
shows that a firm‟s size, tangible assets and capital expenditure decrease and 
earnings volatility increases. This might imply that the firm‟s capital structure is 
affected by macro-economic factors. In fact, during these two recent decades, many 
high technology and internet firms have been founded. This section might also be 
related to the firm‟s age as indicated in Section 7.3. Namely, most old firms were at 
the first period in our sample but this was not the case for many young firms.  
 
Table 7.25 Descriptive characteristics between two periods 
The table shows that firms use less debt in the second period, and a firm‟s size, tangible assets and 
capital expenditure decrease and earnings volatility increases. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
1995 is the first year in this table because the variable of „Vol‟ is a 5 year standard deviation of 
earnings. 
 1995-2001 2002-2008 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
BDR .23 .18 .22 .15 
MDR .18 .12 .16 .10 
Netcash .69 .16 .71 .19 
Lnasset 5.05 5.11 4.69 4.69 
Tang .26 .21 .22 .15 
Tax .35 .34 .30 .26 
Capex .07 .04 .05 .02 
Vol .07 .03 .09 .04 







Table 7.26 Debt ratio changes between two periods, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 










































































Obs 9236 19499 8371 18398 
Adj-R2 0.1772 0.1178 0.0427 0.0259 
 
Table 7.26 shows that although firms rely slightly more upon equity issuance for 
debt ratio change in the first period, there is no significant difference between them 
in their equity issuing behaviours.  
 
From Table 7.27, „capital structure adjustment speed‟ is greater in the second period. 
Panel A, particularly, using the System GMM, shows that the „capital structure 
adjustment speed‟ has greatly increased in the second period. The results using 




Table 7.27 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between two periods 
The table indicates that „capital structure adjustment speed‟ is increased in the second period although 
it is arguable with OLS.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, speed1= 
target1t-BDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are 
λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panel B. The coefficient values of Panel A are (1-λ). Thus, 
the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). Panel A uses System GMM and BDRt-1 is instrumented. The 
command xtabond2 uses options of robust small and twosteps, and eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed as sub-
options for gmm-style and eq(level) for iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant 
levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are 
defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 
0.1 level 
 Panel A: BDRt  Panel B: ∆BDRt 





















AR(1) -4.50*** -9.08*** Adj-R2 0.0623 0.0625 







   
Inst L1, L2 L1, L2    
Inst No 10 10    
Obs 4536 14692    
 
7.6.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and different time periods 
As we have seen from previous sections, firms gradually decrease their debt ratios by 
issuing equity without regard to their size, age, or bankruptcy probability. In this 
section, we have also observed that firms‟ average debt ratios reduce in the second 
period compared to the first period, but this is trivial. We cannot find any big 
difference in this section. Both the results from Chapter 4 and from this section 
indicate a decrease in debt ratios, but we cannot find any significant differences from 




7.7 Stock returns 
Firms can reduce debt levels when stock returns are high by issuing high priced 
equity or increasing the asset value if market timing and the pecking order theory are 
correct. In addition, the stock price effect (increasing (or decreasing) asset value as 
stock price increases (or decreases)) would be high in terms of debt ratio change, 
without actually issuing equity or debt if the inertia theory is correct. 
 
From Table 7.28, a basic statistical descriptive table, there is a negative relationship 
between stock return and debt ratio, even though the differences in debt ratio 
between groups are not great. This table also indicates that profitability increases, 
and cash holding and earnings volatility decrease as stock returns increase. This table 
also shows one particular factor that cash holdings decrease with the exception of the 
4th quartile as debt ratios decrease. This is inconsistent with a general trend between 
debt ratio and cash holding in our sample. The exception of the 4th quartile might 
imply the market timing effect by equity issuing with high stock price.  
 
Table 7.28 Descriptive characteristics by stock return 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics is based on stock 
returns between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets. We segregate data based on 
log(stock return), 1Q<-.43, -.43≤2Q<-.046, -.046≤3Q <.25 and .25≤ 4Q. All variables are defined in 
Section 5.3. 























































Obs 10877 11355 12158 11502 
  
Table 7.29 shows that there is no clear evidence that stock returns trigger equity issue, 
although there is a steady increase in equity issue from the second quartile. Firms in 
the first quartile issue equity moderately more than firms in the second quartile, 
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because they are financially less secure with low stock prices and low profits. Table 
7.28 reveals the severe loss in net income for firms in the first quartile. It is therefore 
necessary to issue equity to increase their financial stability. In the 4th quartile, we 
can see more clear evidence of increasing equity issue. 
 
Table 7.29 Debt ratio changes based on stock returns, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
The table shows little evidence of that stock returns trigger equity issue.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): 
equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.1198 0.1313 0.1081 0.1847 
Obs 6687 6863 7199 8053 
 
Table 7.30 indicates the positive relationship between both net debt and equity 
issuance, and financial deficit. This might be related to issuance costs as we 
discussed already (Bolton and Freixas, 2000). Panel B in Table 7.30 shows a 
noticeable increase in equity issue in the 4th quartile. This might be related to the 
overvalued stock price effect. (see Table A.5.36 in Appendix 5 for more details about 





Table 7.30 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on stock returns 
The table indicates the positive relationship between both „net debt and equity issuance‟ and financial 
deficit. Panel B in the table shows a noticeable increase in equity issue in the 4th quartile.  
Note, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-
Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0110 0.0115 0.02 0.0113 
Obs 6459 6487 6918 7929 
 Panel B: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2191 0.2673 0.2669 0.3137 
Obs 6383 6435 6883 7879 
 
Table 7.31 Net equity issue and stock return 
The table shows that firms which are extremely over-valued (in the 4th quartile) are likely to issue 
equity. SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 
level 
OLS 
Net equity issuet / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0119 0.0007 0.0001 0.0147 
Obs 7795 7503 7787 8797 
 
Table 7.31 shows clear evidence that firms which are extremely over-valued (in the 
4th quartile) are likely to issue equity. The full description in Appendix 5 (Table 
A.5.38), however, indicates little supporting evidence of the relationship between 




Table 7.32 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison based on stock return 
The table shows that a firm‟s „capital structure adjustment speed‟ increases as stock returns increase.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio. The coefficient values of „capital 
structure adjustment speeds‟ in Panels A and B are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-
coefficient). In calculating Panels A and B, we use all 7 capital structure determinants, though we do 
not report these coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are used as instruments for Panels A and B, 
respectively. Panels A and B use System GMM and use options of small, robust and twosteps for 
options of xtabond2, the suboptions of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for 
iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C 
test value suggests the endogenous variables. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 
level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: BDRt 



















AR(1) -3.03*** -5.92*** -4.40*** -3.06*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4868 4917 4856 5447 
 Panel B: MDRt 



















AR(1) -3.85*** -6.38*** -6.26*** -4.83*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4819 4898 4850 5419 
 
Table 7.32 shows that in general, a firm‟s „capital structure adjustment speed‟ 
increases as stock returns increase. The speed increases more noticeably with 
„market-based debt ratios.‟ This implies that the market timing theory is related to 
„financing (transaction) costs‟: or stock price changes itself mainly affect the market 




7.7.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ stock returns 
This section is closely related to the theories that are based on asymmetric 
information, such as the pecking order and the market timing theories. Tables 7.29 
and 7.30 indicate that firms issue more equity as well as more debt as stock prices 
increase. This is consistent with Bolton and Freixas (2000) who assert that firms can 
issue debt if they can issue equity because asymmetric information costs on debt are 
lower than those on equity. The capital structure adjustment speed increases with 
increasing stock returns as is shown in Table 7.32. This section offers clear evidence 
that the stock price is closely related to equity issue, and hence the pecking order and 
the market timing theories. 




7.8 Growth opportunities 
Several measures are used for a firm‟s growing capability, such as stock prices, 
Tobin‟s‟ Q, market-to-book ratio, growth of assets (see Section 1.2.3 in Appendix 1 
in which full details of growth measures are described). In this section, we use 
capital expenditure and Research and Development (R&D) expenses.  
 
According to Frank and Goyal (2003), a high growth level can lead to adverse 
selection problems, because high growing firms have high asymmetric information; 
and they should issue debt as in the pecking order theory. The results in this thesis do 
not show clear evidence of this. From the statistical description in Table 7.33, we can 
observe that the debt ratio gradually increases as capital expenditure increases, but 
decreases as R&D expenses increase. Asset tangibility (Tang) shows a significant 
relationship between capital expenditure and R&D expenses in the table. Asset 
tangibility increases as capital expenditure increases, while it decreases as R&D 
expenses increase. This might be because, capital expenditures are based on physical 
investments which are tangible assets, but R&D expenses are based on intangible 
assets (see Section 5.7.1.2.4 in which asset tangibility is mentioned). Therefore, 
R&D expenses and capital expenditure are related, not only to growth, but to asset 
tangibility and probably to collateral values, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric 
information cost.  
 
In Table 7.33, firm size and profitability have positive relationships with capital 
expenditure, but not R&D expenses; and earnings volatility (Vol) has a negative 
relationship with capital expenditure, but a positive relationship with R&D expenses. 
Both capital and R&D expenditure are positively related to a firm‟s market value 
(M/B). The cash holding figure is consistent with Opler et al. (1999), in that R&D 
expense (capital expenditure) is positively (negatively) associated with increasing 
cash holding. This reminds us that in the complex pecking order theory, firms 
increase debt capability for future investments. Low debt levels and high cash 
holdings with high investment opportunities, support the complex pecking order 
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theory. Therefore, Table 7.33 indicates that R&D expenditure follows the pecking 
order theory, but capital expenditure is more closely linked to trade-off theory.  
 
Table 7.33 Descriptive characteristics with growth opportunities 
The univariate comparison of the means and medians of measures of a firm‟s characteristics is based 
on capital expenditure and R&D expenses between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The criteria of capital expenditure and R&D expenses are 
as follows: 1Q<0.011, 0.011≤ 2Q<0.031, 0.031≤3Q<0.07, 0.07≤4Q in capital expenditure to asset; 
1Q<0.0017, 0.0017≤2Q<0.018, 0.018≤3Q<0.092, 0.092≤4Q in R&D to asset. All variables are 
defined in Section 5.3. 
 Capital expenditure/assett R&D/assett 











































































































































































Obs 11285 11384 11294 11329 7004 7097 7028 7035 
 
Table 7.34 shows that equity issue increases as capital expenditure increases and 
decreases as R&D expenses increase. Panel A indicates that capital expenditure 
increases with increasing newly retained earnings and increasing residual leverage, 
which includes the growth resulting from combining equity, debt and retained 
earnings together. This implies that while capital expenditure increases, firms use 
more external financing sources. Panel B, which examines R&D expenses, reveals 
the opposite phenomenon, that firms use fewer external financing sources while 




Table 7.34 Debt ratio changes based on growth opportunities, using the Baker and 
Wurgler model (2002)  
The table shows that equity issue increases as capital expenditure increases and decreases as R&D 
expense increases.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): 
equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 ∆BDRt 
 Panel A: Capital expenditure / asset 










































































Obs 6634 7986 8128 7837 
Adj-R2 0.0972 0.1232 0.1418 0.1981 
 Panel B: R&D / asset 









































































Obs 4737 4060 4700 5269 
Adj-R2 0.1276 0.1673 0.1571 0.1189 
 
This indicates the clear differences between capital expenditure and R&D expenses, 
whilst both variables are used as a firm‟s future growth indicators. This table also 
implies that these phenomena might be related to both bankruptcy probability and 




Table 7.35 shows that the stock price effect on debt ratio increases as capital 
expenditure and R&D expense increase. This implies that stock prices increase with 
capital expenditure and R&D expense increases.  
 
Table 7.35 Debt ratio changes and stock price effects with the growth factors of firms  
The table indicates that „stock prices effect (IDRt,t+1)‟ on debt ratios increase as capital expenditure 
and R&D expense increases. MDR: market-based debt ratio, IDR: implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-
1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), D: total debt, E: total equity. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance 
at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
MDRt 
Panel A: Capital expenditure /asset 




























Adj-R2 0.7401 0.8269 0.8295 0.7741 
Obs 9942 10117 9955 9132 
 Panel B: R&D expense / asset 




























Adj-R2 0.7602 0.8007 0.76 0.64 
Obs 5696 6246 5782 5694 
 
Table 7.36 indicates that „book-based debt ratios‟ capital structure adjustment speeds‟ 
increase with increasing capital expenditure, whereas there is no significant 
difference with R&D expenses changes. 
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Table 7.36 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison with firm growth factors 
The table indicates that „book-based debt ratio‟s capital structure adjustment speeds‟ increase with 
increasing capital expenditure, whereas there is no significant difference with the R&D expense 
changes.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. The coefficient values are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is 
(1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 capital structure determinants, though we 
do not report these coefficients here. BDRt-1 is instrumented for Panels A and B. The values in the 
square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the 
endogenous variables. The options for xtabond2 are twosteps small robust and suboptions for gmm-
style are eq(level) lag(1 2) and collapsed and for iv-style is eq(level) for Panels C and D. All variables 
are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance 
at 0.1 level 
System GMM 
BDRt 
Panel A: Capital Expenditure/ Asset 







































Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4814 5790 5419 4429 
 Panel B: R&D expense/ Asset 



















AR(1) -4.95*** -6.83*** -5.55*** -5.66*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4608 5169 5219 4949 
 
7.8.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ growth opportunities 
Our results show that capital expenditure is positively and R&D expense is 
negatively associated with debt ratios. Although we consider that both capital 
expenditure and R&D expense are proxies of a firm‟s growth opportunities, these 
two parameters indicate opposite associations with the debt ratio as they increase. 
We observe that these two proxies of a firm‟s growth opportunity are positively 
associated with stock prices as firms‟ growth opportunities increase. These two 
proxies of growth opportunity are related to both the trade-off theory and the pecking 
order theory. For example, capital expenditure is the amount of money spent on 
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tangible assets. Therefore, firms‟ expenses with regard to capital expenditure have 
less asymmetric information problems and greater liquidation value when they go 
bankrupt. On the other hand, R&D expense has more asymmetric information 
problems and less liquidation value. This implies that the characteristics of these two 
proxies are related to both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory and our 
results in these two growth opportunity situations support both theories. This is 
because, in terms of debt ratio with growth opportunity, both proxies relate to the 
trade-off theory. However, at the same time, both proxies are positively associated 





The results from the previous chapter show that debt ratios indicate a negative 
relationship with profitability. As we discussed earlier, this is important evidence 
which supports the (complex) pecking order theory (French and Fama, 2002).  
 
In Table 7.37, profitability is positively associated with a firm‟s size, stock return 
(SR) and asset tangibility, and is negatively associated with debt ratio, bankruptcy 
probability, cash holding and earnings volatility. This mainly implies that 
profitability is closely related to financial stability. It also implies that profitability 
and stock returns might be closely associated
16
. In fact, 28% of observations which 
are in the 4th quartile of profitability are in the 4th quartile of stock return at the 
same time. This might be explained as being that highly profitable firms issue equity 
at extremely overvalued prices, or that together, the high profits and stock prices 
reduce the leverage level.  
  
                                               
16  The number of observation, based on total assets, which are in both the fourth quartile of 
profitability and the fourth quartile of stock return is 3,639 that is about 28% of observations in the 
fourth quartile of profit and 32% of observation in the fourth quartile of stock return. The sum of two 
variables in the fourth quartile is 29,090.   
 214 
 
Table 7.37 Descriptive characteristics with profitability 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics is based on 
profitability between 1989 and 2008. The median values are in square brackets.  
Note, the criterion of segregation of profitability into quartiles is as follows: 1st Q <= -0.022, -0.022 < 
2nd Q <= 0.04, 0.04 < 3rd Q <= 0.093, and 4th Q > 0.093. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 Profit / asset 


















































































































Table 7.38 shows that equity issue increases one and half times and the residual 
leverage changes and newly retained earnings likewise increase from 1st to 4th 
quartile firms. This might imply that firms use more external financing sources as 
their profits increase. This is consistent with the pecking order theory because as 
firms increase their profits, their issuing costs would decrease due to higher profits 
and lower bankruptcy probability. Therefore they can use more external finance. This 
is consistent with Bolton and Frexas‟ (2000) idea that firms can issue debt if they can 
issue equity. From the next table, we can also observe debt issue increasing with 
increasing profits, but there is no clear evidence of increasing equity issues. 
 
Table 7.38 Debt ratio changes based on profitability, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
The table imply that firms use more external financing sources as their profits increase.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, 
-(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.1168 0.1222 0.2779 0.2123 
Obs 8197 6672 7426 8653 
 
From Table 7.39, Panels A shows that „net long-term debt issuance‟ increases while 
profits increase. There is not a clear sign of change in equity issue with the exception 
of the first quartile. Panel B indicates that the net equity issue reaches its peak in the 
first quartile of profitability in which the average of profits is -0.4, with this being the 
only negative profit area among the four quartiles. Therefore, Panels A and B 




Table 7.39 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on profitability 
The table supports the trade-off theory because firms use more debt as profits increase and use equity 
when their profits are negative.  
Note, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-
Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: Net long-term debt issuancet/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0105 0.0140 0.0176 0.0137 
Obs 8299 5942 7374 8393 
 Panel B: Net equity issuancet/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2392 0.969 0.0998 0.1145 
Obs 8098 5896 7317 8467 
 
Both Panels A  and B in Table 7.40, using OLS and Sys-GMM respectively, shows a 
gradual increase of „capital structure adjustment speed,‟ as profits increase. One 
interesting factor is that firms in the first quartile have a relatively high „capital 
structure adjustment speed‟ compared to the second quartile. This is probably the 
same reason why firms in the first quartile issue equity more in Panel B in Table 7.39. 
They are close to bankruptcy unless they change leverage levels quickly. In addition, 
low issuing costs with high profitability may lead to a high adjustment speed in the 




Table 7.40 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison based on profitability 
The table shows high „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in the first and fourth quartiles. This implies 
that both transaction and bankruptcy costs work together to change firms‟ capital structures.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. The coefficient values are (1-λ) in Panel B. Thus, the adjustment 
speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating, we use all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not 
report these coefficients here. BDRt-1 is instrumented. xtabond2 command uses options of small robust 
twosteps, and sub-options of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for iv-style. 
The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value 
suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 
level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
OLS Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0513 0.0522 0.0795 0.1212 
Obs 4658 4669 4923 4615 
Sys-GMM Panel B: BDRt 



















AR(1) -4.29*** -6.53*** -4.44*** -5.75*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 5190 4802 5070 5430 
 
7.9.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ profitability 
In this section, there is no clear evidence of dominant capital structure theory, which 
is mainly explained by a change in a firm‟s profit. Descriptive statistics indicate a 
negative association between both book- and market-based debt ratios and increasing 
profits. This is related to two ideas. On the one hand, profits reduce debt ratio by 
increasing a firm‟s total assets by adding cash generated from the firm‟s operations 
(Hovakimian et al., 2004). On the other hand, high profits lead to high stock prices, 
which lead to stock issue. The first idea relates to the pecking order theory, and the 
second idea relates to the market timing theory. According to the argument put 
forward by Bolton and Freixas (2000), this follows both the pecking order theory and 
the market timing theory. Table 7.39 also shows that firms‟ behaviours in using 
external financing sources follow both the pecking order theory and the trade-off 
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theory. For example, inconsistent with Table 7.38, financial deficits are positively 
associated with long-term debt issue as profit increases. This supports the trade-off 
theory in that less risky firms use more debt to obtain tax benefits. The net equity 
issue variable likewise indicates that firms which are in the first quartile mostly issue 
equity. This also supports the trade-off theory. On the other hand, firms in the fourth 
quartile (i.e. those subject to high profits) are the second most likely to issue equity 
and more than the second and third quartiles. This is closely related to the market 
timing theory because there is high level of probability of over-valued stock prices. 
Therefore, we can argue that firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours based on firms‟ 




7.10 Asset tangibility 
The descriptive statistics in Table 7.41 show that both book- and market-based debt 
ratios increase with increasing asset tangibility. Tax, profits, firm size and capital 
expenditure show a positive relationship with asset tangibility; and R&D expenses, 
market-to-book ratios, net cash and earnings volatility are negatively associated. The 
relationship between these items and asset tangibility are similar to the relationship 
between debt ratio and these items. This implies that there is a strong correlation 
between asset tangibility and debt ratios. 
 
Table 7.41 Descriptive characteristics with asset tangibility 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics is based on 
asset tangibility levels between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The criterion of segregation of asset tangibility into 
quartiles is as follows: The value of 1st Q<0.063, 0.063≤2nd Q <0.183, 0.183≤3rd Q < 0.376, 0.376 
≤4th Q in asset tangibility. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 Asset tangibility 




































































































Obs 13122 13143 13163 13124 
 
Table 7.42 shows a very similar pattern to Table 7.38, in terms of the relationship 
between debt ratio changes and firms‟ profits. As asset tangibility increases, all three 
elements of leverage level change increase. The same explanation used with Table 
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7.38 can be applied, because asset tangibility is closely related to profits, bankruptcy 
costs as well as asymmetric information costs. However, Tables 7.43 and 7.44 
indicate increasing debt issue and decreasing equity issue as asset tangibility 
increases. Thus, the matter is still open for debate. 
 
Table 7.42 Debt ratio changes based on asset tangibility, using the Baker and 
Wurgler model (2002)  
The table shows that as tangibility increases, all three elements of leverage level change increase.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): 
equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.0945 0.1767 0.1757 0.1952 
Obs 7888 8045 7358 7530 
 
From Panel A in Table 7.43, we can see that the debt ratio is becoming more 
positively associated with new investments (It) as asset tangibility increases. It is 
more negatively associated with working capital (WCt). From Panel B, net long-term 
debt issuance is becoming more associated with new investments (It) as asset 
tangibility increases, and Panel C shows that the association between equity issuance 
and new investment is becoming less. Panel C also shows that working capital and 
internal cash (Ct) is becoming gradually less associated with net equity issue. The 
coefficients of working capital in Panel C indicate the improvement in the financial 
efficiency of firms as asset tangibility increases. This also implies that as a firm‟s 
asset tangibility increases, it has a more secure financial position. Together Tables 
7.41, 7.42, 7.43 and 7.44 indicate that firms increase debt as well as equity as their 
asset tangibility increases. However, the debt increase is greater than the equity 
increase. Therefore, these findings support both the pecking order theory and the 
trade-off theory. 
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Table 7.43 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on asset 
tangibility 
The table shows that firms use more debt as their asset tangibility increases.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after 
interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0568 0.0975 0.0858 0.1283 
Obs 9674 9785 9299 9202 
 Panel B:  Net long-term debt issuet / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.0072 0.0128 0.0537 0.1406 
Obs 7709 7996 7060 7181 
 Panel C: Net equity issuet / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.3121 0.3455 0.3023 0.2102 





Table 7.44 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on asset 
tangibility 
The table shows that firms use more debt for financial deficits as their asset tangibility increases.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined 
by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, 
C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are 
scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 
level 
 ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0083 0.0014 0.00 0.006 
Obs 9674 9785 9299 9202 
 
The „financial deficit‟ (DEF1) in Table 7.44 tells us the same story, in that firms use 
more debt with increasing asset tangibility, particularly those in the fourth quartile, 
which noticeably use more debt. The „book-based debt ratio‟s capital structure 
adjustment speed‟ decreases while asset tangibility increases (in Table 7.45) with the 
exception of firms in the 4th quartile. On the other hand, the market-based 
adjustment speed has not changed much with asset tangibility differences. The 




Table 7.45 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison based on asset tangibility 
The table shows that „book-based debt ratio‟s capital structure adjustment speed‟ decreases while 
asset tangibility increases.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. The coefficient values are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is 
(1-coefficient). We use all 7 capital structure determinants, though we do not report those coefficients 
here. BDRt-1 is used as instruments in Panels C and D. xtabond2 command uses options of twosteps 
robust and small and sub-options of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for iv-
style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test 
value suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 
0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: BDRt 



















AR(1) -5.41*** -6.72*** -3.00*** -3.86*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4812 5763 5539 4406 
 
7.10.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and firms’ asset tangibility 
Asset tangibility relates to the trade-off theory because firms with high tangibility 
have a higher collateral value when they go bankrupt (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
However, some researchers (e.g. Alderson and Betker, 1995) do not agree with this 
view. Tangibility likewise relates to the pecking order theory because tangible assets 
have low asymmetric information costs (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Therefore, firms 
with high tangibility can use more debt. In terms of asset tangibility, both theories 
expect the same behaviour in firms‟ debt ratio changes. In other words, as highly 
tangible firms have a low bankruptcy probability due to a high collateral value, and 
less adverse selection costs due to a low asymmetric information problem, both 
theories expect the issue of new debt as firms‟ tangible assets increase. Our results 
also indicate that the strength of the positive association between debt ratio change 
and debt issue substantially increases as the asset tangibility of firms increases. In 






There are many different arguments in the discussion of inflation. For example, 
Mania (2007) implies that inflation does not affect financial policy, at least in the 
long-term, because „monetary neutrality‟ leads to inflation and does not affect 
productivity. However, other economists suggest that inflation affects a firm‟s 
financial policy. For instance, Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that inflation levels can 
be considered as a proxy of decreasing the value of investment and, at the same time, 
high inflation can be a trigger for new debt issuance. Myers (2001) also suggests that 
high inflation is positively related to tax advantages. On the other hand, Desai et al. 
(2004) and Huizinga et al. (2008) show that inflation is negatively related to debt 
ratio. Their arguments might be explained by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) who 
aruge that inflation increases a firm‟s revenue, at least in nominal value, because it 
increases its incoming cash-flow.  
 
Bierman (1981) argues that the benefits of inflation, using debt, depend on inflation 
rates, interest rates and „expected increasing income.‟ He suggests that borrowers‟ 
real return is „inflation (1+i) divided by nominal interest rates (1+n).‟ This implies 
that if the „nominal interest rate‟ is greater than inflation, there is no benefit from 
borrowing. He also mentions that in a perfectly anticipated world, the issuance of 
debt is not worthwhile as the inflation rate is fully incorporated into the interest rate. 
With uncertainty surrounding the condition of future events, however, borrowers‟ 
real return depends on inflation, the nominal interest rate and a company‟s expected 
income (growth). Additionally, Gulati and Zantout (1997) assert that firms frequently 
adjust their capital structures in order to protect them from the effects (for example, 
changing the accumulation of cash holding) caused by inflation. Haas and Peeters 




7.11.2 GDP growth 
The GDP growth can be a proxy for the alternative opportunity in aggregate levels. 
For example, Huang and Ritter (2009) use real GDP growth as a growth opportunity. 
They assert that firms with high real GDP growth (as a variable of a firm‟s current 
growth opportunity) are more likely to issue debt. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2004) 
find that the „adjustment speed of capital structure‟ towards the target ratios will be 
faster with good economic prospects. Similarly, Haas and Peeters (2006) also find 
that high GDP growth increases the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in some 
countries, but not all.  
 
7.11.3 Other country-related factors and debt ratios 
Jong et al. (2008) show the relationship between leverage levels and bond 
capitalisation and GDP growth. They expect that „bond market capitalisation‟ is 
positively related to debt levels because it gives more bond issuing opportunities to 
firms. They also suggest the reverse of the conclusion of „stock market capitalisation,‟ 
because it gives more cheap-cost-stock-issuing opportunities. In Figure 2.5, „stock 
market capitalisation over GDP‟ indicates that „stock market capitalisation‟ has been 
reducing after it reached a peak in 1999, whereas from Figure 2.6 the overall „bond 
market capitalisation‟ has gradually been increasing over the last twenty years.  
 
In a similar way to Jong et al. (2008), in Panel A in Table 7.46, we regress the debt 
ratio with only country-related variables. We also include control variables in the 
second regression in Panel B to mirror more of the real world.  
 
Hypothesis 7.10.a: Inflation is positively associated with the debt level. 
Hypothesis 7.10.b: The legal system affects the debt level. 
Hypothesis 7.10.c: Bond market capitalisation-to-GDP is positively associated with 
the debt level. 
Hypothesis 7.10.d: Stock market capitalisation-to-GDP is negatively associated with 
the debt level 
Hypothesis 7.10.e: GDP growth is positively associated with the debt level. 
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DRi,t= β1·GDPi,t + β2·lawi,t + β3·bondi,t + β4·stocki,t + β5·inflationi,t + εi,t (7.5) 
 
where, GDP: GDP growth, inflation: GDP deflator, law: 0=common law system, 1= 
civil law system, bond: bond market capitalisation, stock: stock market capitalisation 
  
Since all macro-economic variables are exogenous to debt ratio, OLS is used in 
Panel A: and in Panel B, the GMM is used for considering endogeneity with the 
control variables. In Panel B, the coefficients of control variables are not reported, as 
the major purpose of the table is to observe the effects on debt ratio from macro-
economic factors.  
 
Table 7.46 shows that macro-economic factors affect the capital structure 
significantly. It also shows that firms with common law systems rely more on equity 
issuance during the given sample period. Inflation is positively related to long-term 
debt issue, and GDP growth is positively related to equity issuance, generally. This is 
not entirely consistent with our assumption that GDP growth represents a new 
investment opportunity at the country level, and should be positively related to debt 
issue, because firms with new profitable opportunities finance these with debt, so as 




Table 7.46 Debt ratio and country characteristics 
The table shows that macro-economic factors affect capital structure significantly. Panel A uses OLS 
without including control variables and Panel B uses GMM, including control variables.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, Net equity issue/asset =(sale stock-
repurchase stock)/total asset, Net debt issue/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset. The coefficients of control variables in Panel B are not reported. The control 
variables are bp-area, market-to-book ratio, net cash, log(asset), asset tangibility, tax rate, capital 
expenditure, R&D expenses, profitability, and earnings volatility. All variables are defined in Section 
5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. In Panel B, 
logasset, asset tangibility, capital expenditure, research and development to asset, profitability, 
earnings volatility and bankruptcy probability for Coiumn (1), tax rate, market-to-book ratio and 
earnings volatility for Coiumn (2), earnings volatility for Coiumn (3) and asset tangibility is 
instrumented for Coiumn (4), respectively.  
































































Adj-R2  0.0365 0.0939 0.0100 0.0631 
Obj  21357 19627 12077 12039 
  Panel B: with control variables 
GMM  BDRt MDRt 





























































Instruments  L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 









Observation  4747 4241 3768 4177 
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7.11.4 Capital structures and countries 
Table 7.47 shows several differences between countries. European-Continental and 
Anglo-Saxon economies hold low levels of debt ratios compared to the East Asian 
economy and also, in general, hold more cash. Generally, firm size is larger and asset 
tangibility levels are higher for East-Asian firms. The table also shows that firms in 
the European-Continental economy pay higher taxes compared to others. Firms in 
the Anglo-Saxon economy have the highest earnings volatility, followed by 
European-Continental and East-Asian firms respectively. In Table 7.47, descriptive 
statistics indicate that Asian firms are generally in a more secure place, financially. 




Table 7.47 Descriptive characteristics of different countries 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics is based on 
countries between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets.  
Note, AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, 
DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. All variables are 




































































































































































































































Table 7.48 Debt ratio changes based on different countries, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002) 
The table indicates that firms in all countries rely more upon equity issue than newly retained earnings and residual leverage changes. This implies that firms in all 
countries have been reducing their debt ratio.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): 
the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, 
USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 Panel A:  ∆BDR 
OLS AUS CAN UK USA AUT DEU FRA ITA JPN KOR TWN 


































































































































Adj-R2 0.0811 0.1445 0.1216 0.1423 0.1278 0.1044 0.1101 0.1333 0.2155 0.2327 0.1326 







From Table 7.48, we can observe that firms in all countries rely more upon equity 
issue than upon newly retained earnings and residual leverage changes. This implies 
that firms in all countries have been reducing their debt ratio. It also shows that there 
are differences between East-Asian and Western economies. Firms in the East-Asian 
economy issue more equity than Western firms during the sample time period. This 
is consistent with Figures 5.1 and 5.2. In fact, as Table 7.51 also indicates, firms in 
the East-Asian economy change their debt levels more rapidly. 
 
In Table 7.49, firms in the East Asian economy rely more upon debt for new 
investments (It) compared to the Anglo-Saxon and European-Continental economies. 
Austria and Italy are closer to the East Asian economy, and Germany and France are 
closer to the Anglo-Saxon economy.  
 
Table 7.50 shows that „financial deficit‟ is not positively related to debt ratio changes 
with the exception of Korea, at least among the countries whose coefficient levels are 
statistically significant. This also implies that the pecking order theory is not 
consistent with this result. 
 
Table 7.51 shows various „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ across countries. The 
„capital structure adjustment speeds‟ are similar between countries, but the table 
shows that firms in the European-Continental economy have a slower, and firms in 
the East Asian economy have a faster rate than the others, while the Anglo-Saxon 
countries sit between them. Firms in Korea and Taiwan, emerging economies, and 
Australia and the USA, show fast „capital structure adjustment speeds.‟ Our overall 
conclusion of this section is that capital structure is connected to country 
characteristics as well as macro-economic trends. This particularly shows that 
cultural matters such as legal systems affect debt levels, but that the „global scale of 





Table 7.49 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on different countries 
The table shows that firms in the East Asian economy rely more upon debt for new investments (It) compared to the firms in the Anglo-Saxon and European-
Continental economies.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United State of America, 
AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 Panel A: ∆BDR 
OLS AUS CAN UK USA AUT DEU FRA ITA JPN KOR TWN 




















































































































Adj-R2 0.0541 -.1074 0.0976 0.0757 0.1816 0.0802 0.0737 0.236 0.0983 0.1154 0.0593 







Table 7.50 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on different countries 
The table shows that financial deficit is not positively related to debt ratio changes with the exception of Korea.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, 
AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 Panel A: ∆BDR 
OLS AUS CAN UK USA AUT DEU FRA ITA JPN KOR TWN 















































Adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.0224 0.0012 0.0151 0.0087 0.0001 0.112 0.0001 0.003 0.0001 






Table 7.51 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on different countries 
The table shows that firms in the European-Continental economy have a slower „capital structure adjustment speed,‟ and firms in the East Asian economy have a faster 
rate than the others.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. The coefficient values are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). We use all 7 capital structure determinants though 
we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 is used as instrument. The System GMM and use options of small, robust and twosteps for options of xtabond2, the 
suboptions of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and eq(level) for iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-
value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: 
Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 BDRt 
OLS AUS CAN UK USA AUT DEU FRA ITA JPN KOR TWN 















































AR(1) -2.23*** -3.06*** -2.40** -6.18*** -0.28 -3.01*** -3.08*** -2.35*** -6.26*** -3.43*** -7.24*** 

























Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Obs 586 652 996 8685 57 616 478 109 4710 1566 2086 
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7.11.5 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and different countries 
We have observed that macroeconomic factors significantly affect capital structure 
and firms‟ debt and equity choices. This implies that country factors affect firms‟ 
capital structures because macro-economic factors are closely related to changes in 
the debt ratio. Our descriptive characteristics indicate that Asian countries such as, 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have high debt ratios compared to Western countries 
particularly Anglo Saxon firms. The debt ratios of European firms fall between these 
two countries. Table 7.47, descriptive characteristics, generally indicates four 
differences between those two different groups of countries for firms in our sample: 
(1) The Asian countries have large firm sizes and (2) more profitability and (3) have 
lower earnings volatility and (4) market-to-book ratios. These imply, namely, that 
firms in the Asian countries are in a financially stable condition, compared to firms 
in Western countries. Therefore, they can have higher debt levels compared to others. 
We can likewise observe in Table 7.49 that firms in the Asian countries use more 
debt for their new investments compared with firms in Western countries. 
Furthermore, firms in Anglo-Saxon countries have the highest capital structure 
adjustment speeds, followed by firms in Asian and European countries. From the 
results shown in the previous sections, financially less secure firms adjust their 
capital structure more rapidly. As western firms, particularly Anglo-Saxon ones, are 
financially in a less secure position, our results showing a fast adjustment speed for 
Anglo-Saxon firms are consistent with previous sections. This implies that, based on 
country characteristics, firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours, generally follows the 
trade-off theory. In other words, financially secure firms like those in Asia countries 
use more debt and do not feel the need to adjust their capital structure, but less secure 
firms in Anglo-Saxon countries use more equity and rapidly adjust debt ratios. In 
addition, Asian firms have the second fastest speed of adjustment. With regard to the 
previous sections, this might be interpreted that these relatively high adjustment 
speeds by financially secure Asian firms are the result of low transaction costs due to 





This section is closely related to several previous sections because different 
industries have different tangible assets and capital expenditure, earnings volatility, 
and R&D expenses; and as we have already discussed, these factors significantly 
affect debt levels. The descriptive statistics in Table 7.52 indicate that debt levels 
vary across industries. Firms with ICB code 5000 series (Consumer services) have a 
relatively high debt level and, with ICB code 9000 series (Technology) have a 
relatively low debt level. The table also indicates that debt ratio is generally 
positively associated with firm size (log asset) and asset tangibility and are 
negatively associated with cash holding and R&D expenses.  
 
Table 7.53 suggests that firms finance themselves in very different ways across 
industries. In general, industries with high debt levels, asset tangibility and large size 
(such as, firms in the steel, marine transportation, hotel and fixed- and mobile-
telecommunication industries) are more associated with newly retained earnings and 
residual leverage changes. The table also indicates that the change of debt level 
generally relies upon equity issuance across industries. 
 
Table 7.54 shows debt level change is mainly affected by „new investments‟ (It) and 
„working capital changes‟ (△WCt). They are closely related to industry 
characteristics and consider economics and industrial situations. There are some 
noticeable industries which show different behaviours between industries in terms of 
debt ratio changes. For example, internet, software and biotechnology firms use less 
debt for new investments, and steel, hotel and marine transportation firms generally 
use more debt (See Panels C and D in Table A.5.69 in Appendix 5 for details). 
 
Table 7.55 presents a variety of relationships between „debt ratio change‟ and 
„financial deficits.‟ However, this table also shows similar results to Table 7.54. 
Firms in steel and marine transportation are positively associated with „debt ratio 




Table 7.52 Descriptive characteristics by industry  
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on industry 
between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. Icbsub: the codes 
of ICB industry subsector classification are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.56 indicates significant differences in the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ 
between industries. The „capital structure adjustment speed‟ is high for travel, 
telecommunication, marine-transportation, steel, bio-technology, drug retailing and 
technology industries, while, aluminium, food production, health provider, broad line 
retailing, soft-drink and the hotel industries adjust their capital structures slowly.   
 
Even though there are significant differences in „capital structure adjustment speed‟ 
with regard to different industries, it is still difficult to find the right explanation 
before we understand the situation of industries in the given sample period. This is 
because capital structure might rely on the combined effect of industry, macro-







Table 7.53 Debt ratio changes based on different industries, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
The table suggests that in general, industries with high debt levels, tangibility and size use more external finance, viz. firms in the steel, marine transportation, hotel 
and fixed- and mobile-telecommunication industries.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): 
the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The full industry names are defined in Table 
A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 ∆BDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0083 0.2686 0.2011 0.1968 0.3541 0.2567 0.3027 0.3432 0.2779 





Table 7.53 Continued 
 ∆BDRt 




































































































































Adj-R2 0.1245 0.1257 0.2249 0.1302 0.3201 0.1899 0.1363 0.1853 0.0599 
Obs 2626 800 1592 2252 313 891 1692 399 869 
 ∆BDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.1799 0.2133 0.1710 0.1909 0.18 0.1507 0.1351 0.0655 0.1254 




Table 7.54 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on different industries 
The table shows that there are some noticeable industries which show different behaviours with regard to debt ratio change. For example, internet, software and 
biotechnology firms use less debt for new investments (It), and steel, hotel and marine transportation firms generally use more debt.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 ∆BDRt 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0612 0.1400 0.0700 0.0677 0.1348 0.2603 0.1891 0.0969 0.1486 
Obs 230 1682 3058 261 548 504 319 464 449 
 ∆BDRt 
































































































Adj-R2 0.1055 0.019 0.1226 0.0725 0.1364 0.0723 0.015 0.1552 0.0548 






Table 7.54 Continued 
 
 ∆BDRt 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0569 0.0508 0.1729 0.0827 0.0985 0.0866 0.0694 0.0697 0.0540 





Table 7.55 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on different industries 
This table also shows similar results to Table 7.54. Firms in steel and marine transportation are positively associated with debt ratio changes and those in internet or 
software industries are negatively associated.  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
*** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 
Obs 230 1682 3058 261 548 504 319 464 449 
 ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0056 0.0000 0.0026 0.0071 0.0000 0.0107 0.0113 0.0000 0.0017 
Obs 3532 890 1544 2654 378 1020 1915 375 854 
 ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0013 0.0031 0.0001 0.0016 0.0000 








Table 7.56 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on different industries 
The table indicates that the „capital structure adjusting speed‟ is high for frims in travel, telecommunication, marine-transportation, steel, bio-technology, drug retailing 
and technology industries, while, firms in aluminium, food production, health providers, broad line retailing, soft-drinks and the hotel industries adjust capital structure 
slowly.   
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio. BDRt-1 is instrumented. The options of small robust small and twostep are used for xtabond2 command, and the sub-options of 
eq(level) and laglimits(1 2) for gmm-style, and of eq(level) for iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test 
value suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 BDRt 







































AR(1) -2.93*** -2.40** -3.00*** -0.63 -1.39 -2.01** -2.03** -1.54 -2.14** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 40 39 41 41 41 41 





Table 7.56 Continued 
 
 BDRt 







































AR(1) -2.19** -2.70*** -3.37*** -3.27*** -2.15** -2.49** -3.74*** -1.68* -2.20** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 
Obs 2020 406 491 1416 132 328 527 93 409 
 BDRt 







































AR(1) -1.72* -1.04 -1.64 -1.07 -3.46*** -3.09*** -4.92*** -5.85*** -6.20*** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 39 40 41 38 41 31 41 41 41 
Obs 134 106 274 137 1207 454 3408 2075 3144 
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7.12.1 Conclusion with regard to debt ratio and different industries 
This section relates to all sub-sections in this chapter, with the exception of Section 
7.11. Each industry refers to a particular combination of business cycle, earning 
volatility, asset tangibility and asymmetric information. Furthermore, firms in high-
technology industries have higher asymmetric information costs because it is more 
difficult for outside investors to access the inside information and to understand their 
business. For example, prior research argues that firms with high R&D expenses 
(Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003) and with high growth (Frank and 
Foyal, 2003) have high asymmetric information. That implies that firms in high-
technology industries that have high R&D expenses and growth, could have higher 
asymmetric information problem than others.  
 
The data shows that firms in aluminium, steel, marine transportation, home 
construction, broad-line retailers, airline, hotels, „travel and tourism‟ and fixed line 
telecommunications, have generally high debt ratios. We define these industries as a 
traditional industry group. Firms in high technology industries, such as computer 
services, Internet, software, computer hardware and semiconductors have low debt 
ratios compared to firms in other industries. We define these industries as a high 
technology industry group. There are, of course, many other industries between these 
two industry groups. Firms in the traditional industry group generally use more debt 
for their new investments compared with firms in the high technology industry group. 
Firms in the traditional industry group show a strong association between changes in 
the debt ratio and financial deficits. In other words, more firms in the traditional 
industry group show positive associations between debt ratio changes and financial 
deficits, compared to firms from our entire sample, including firms in the high 
technology industry group. This implies that the debt ratios associated with industry 
classification more closely relate to the trade-off theory as our results indicate that 
financially, more secure firms use more debt.  
 
This section is particularly inconsistent with the pecking order theory for two reasons. 
First, firms, without taking into consideration the industries they belong to, are 
generally associated with using equity issue to cover their financial deficits. Second, 
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firms in the high technology industry group which has higher asymmetric 
information costs, are more strongly associated with equity issuance. Our overall 
conclusion in this section is that financial stability (bankruptcy costs) has a stronger 
influence on firms‟ debt ratio adjustment. 
  
7.13 Conclusion and remarks 
7.13.1 Conclusion  
We conclude this chapter by confirming that the segments of firms‟ characteristics 
significantly affect its gearing levels. This is particularly the case in terms of firms‟ 
size, previous years‟ leverage levels, profitability, asset tangibility and bankruptcy 
probability. The overall conclusion in this chapter is that these characteristics are 
generally related to financial stability and, of course, to the trade-off theory.  
 
Most previous research, such as that of Fischer et al. (1989), Hovakimian et al. (2004) 
and Leary and Roberts (2005), suggests that the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ 
depends upon „transaction costs‟, mainly issuing costs. If the „capital structure 
adjustment speed‟ relies entirely on transaction costs, financially secure companies 
will change their debt ratios more rapidly than those which are less secure. This idea 
is consistent with the pecking order theory and is not entirely consistent with the 
trade-off theory because, if firms‟ bankruptcy costs are greater than their transaction 
costs, then financially less secure firms should change their debt ratios first.  
 
Our results show, in this chapter, that the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ varies 
with different segments of firms‟ characteristics and this adjustment speed relies 
more on financial stability than transaction costs (see Table 7.57 for details). For 
example, firms with low profits, small size, and a short history, have higher 
adjustment speeds than firms which do not evidence these characteristics. This 
implies that staying in a financially secure place is a top priority and transaction cost 
is a less important factor. This conclusion is consistent with Bolton and Freixas 
(2000) and Korteweg (2010). Korteweg (2010) finds that over-leveraged firms are 
more likely to rebalance their debt ratios, but not if they have potential profits in the 
future. Furthermore, Bolton and Freixas (2000) likewise argue, in terms of the 
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importance of financial stability, that if bond financing is not feasible (due to high 
bankruptcy probability), then a firm‟s only option is to issue equity. However, our 
results also show that the „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ increase with 
increasing profitability and stock return. This is clear evidence of the pecking order 
theory. Therefore, in terms of „capital structure adjustment speed,‟ we can assume 
that firms jointly take into account transaction costs and bankruptcy costs. This 
phenomenon supports both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. 
 
Our results also show that firms issue equity when they face financial difficulties or 
when their stock returns are very high in that they can have arbitrage (abnormal) 
benefits from over-valued stocks. Specifically, firms issue equity in order to obtain 
excess benefits when the stock price is high, and for survival when they face 
financial difficulties. This also supports both the trade-off theory and the market 
timing theory.  
 
To explain this, in terms of the segments of firms‟ characteristics, our results shows 
that firms‟ behaviours associated with extremely high debt ratios, small size, net loss, 
low tangible assets and the industries of high-technology, or high earnings volatility, 
generally are explained more easily by the trade-off theory. On the other hand, firms‟ 
behaviours associated with high profits and high stock returns are more easily 
explained by the market timing theory. 
 
In this chapter, we can observe more clearly, evidence of firms‟ debt ratio changing 
behaviours in line with the segments of firms‟ characteristics. The results in this 
chapter indicate that the cluster analysis is more efficient and provides a stronger 
method for investigating the detail of firms‟ debt ratio changing behaviours, the most 
appropriate capital structure theory, and important capital structure determinants.   
 
Finally, the results summarised in Table 7.57 indicate that capital structure does not 
rely entirely upon tax shields, bankruptcy costs or adverse selection costs. Firms also 
consider the benefits from a high stock price, and increasing future debt capability 
and transaction costs when they issue equity and debt.  
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Table 7.57 Summary of results 
The table shows the relationship between „debt ratio choice behaviours‟ and capital structure 
determinants. 
 Increase Decrease 
Debt ratio Large firm size, high asset tangibility 
High stock return, high profits, high 
cash holding, high capital 
expenditure, high R&D expenses, 
high bankruptcy probability, high 
earnings volatility, high market-to-
book ratio 
Equity issue 
Short history, high bankruptcy 
probability, extremely over-
leveraged, capital expenditure, R&D 




Large firm size, long history, 
extremely under-leveraged, high asset 
tangibility 




Short history, high bankruptcy 
probability, extremely over-
leveraged, second time period, high 
capital expenditure, high profits, high 
stock returns 
High asset tangibility, large firm size, 
long history, extremely under-
leveraged 
 
7.13.2 Environmental factors and overall remarks 
The results in this chapter indicate that debt levels vary with different environmental 
factors such as, changes in the economy, industry and time. For example, there is a 
significant relationship between leverage levels and GDP growth, inflation and the 
legal system. The civil law system and inflation are positively related to debt ratio, 
and GDP growth is negatively related. Frank and Goyal (2009) and Desai et al. (2004) 
also show a positive relationship between inflation and the debt ratio. This result is 
inconsistent with Booth et al. (2001) who explain that companies borrow more 
during times of real economic growth, but not during times of inflation. 
 
In the sample period under consideration, firms increase equity and reduce debt 
continuously. This shows the existence of a time trend (or macro-economic effect) in 
terms of debt ratios. It can also be seen as evidence for the trade-off theory, in that 
firms adjust their leverage levels in order to achieve their optimal capital structures, 
based on the macro-economic situation and their own condition. 
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The chapter closes by mentioning that debt ratio change can be partially explained by 
all capital structure theories, such as the trade-off, the pecking order and the market 
timing theories. However, debt ratio changing behaviours are more likely to support 
the trade-off theory and subordinately support other theories concerned with the 
market situation. This conclusion is consistent with Brounen et al. (2006) who also 
support the trade-off theory as well as the market timing theory. They find that firms 
have target debt ratios and consider market situations such as the financial market 
system and country factors. Fitzpatrick and Ogden (2011) also conclude that firms‟ 
capital structure adjustment behaviours are mainly explained by the trade-off theory 
and arbitrage by taking advantage of any mispricing of their securities. 
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Chapter VIII Conclusions and implications 
 
There are many prior studies such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Hovakimian et 
al. (2004) and Leary and Roberts (2005), which argue the existence of an optimal 
capital structure. Our results also show some evidence of the trade-off theory. For 
example, firms suffering from financial distress issue equity and change debt ratios 
rapidly. 
  
However, there are some obstacles with regard to quick capital structure adjustment 
e.g. issuing costs, adverse selection costs, market timing and operating profits. In 
therms of market timing theory, for example, firms issue equity with high stock 
prices in order to have extra incoming cash-flows without taking into account present 
leverage levels because this is an opportunity for firms to obtain abnormal benefits. 
Although taking the opportunity does not lead the firms to their optimal leverage 
levels, the over-priced equity issue still increases the firms‟ value. Taking the 
opportunity is probably a priority because firms can increase their value by reducing 
the future issuing costs, and by creating extra cash inflow. In other words, attempting 
to take all the opportunities not to lose any chances which can increase a firm‟s value 
or reduce its costs, thereby maximising its value. The optimal capital structure, in the 
static trade-off theory, is achieved by a firm‟s value maximisation which is 
completed by minimising its capital costs. This therefore implies that the asymmetric 
information based models are also based on the same principle.  
 
Overall, this thesis suggests that firms try to stay near the optimal leverage level, and 
attempt to take low adverse selection cost opportunities at the same time in order to 
maximise their value.  
 
8.1 Research aims and findings 
Since capital structure is related to many factors, determining the key elements in 
leverage levels decisions is a difficult matter. Even though the observed phenomena 
are complicated, the basic idea is simple: we presume that firms attempt to increase 
their values by changing leverage levels, wherever possible. When investigating this 
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question, we looked at only three main factors: firms‟ future cash-flows, bankruptcy 
costs and their characteristics under the condition of asymmetric information.  
 
As there is a tax shield in the real world, it entices firms to use debt with considering 
the bankruptcy probability. These two factors are the most important elements, 
together with the transaction costs of securities in the trade-off theory. After 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), Myers (1984) also argues that debt issue is a better 
strategy than the issuance of equity, as long as firms do not go bankrupt and 
asymmetric information costs are low. This implies that both the static trade-off and 
pecking order theories indicate the same conclusion under these two conditions. 
 
The main finding of this research is that firms change their leverage levels and most 
firms‟ debt ratios move in the same direction. In other words, most firms in our 
sample have reduced their debt ratios by issuing equity over the last twenty years. 
This finding suggests that there are factors that guide firms‟ gearing levels in a 
specific direction. This thesis also suggests that some variables continually reveal 
their importance. The variables are asset tangibility, firm size, profitability, 
bankruptcy probability and market-to-book ratio. These variables are generally 
considered to be related to bankruptcy probability.  
 
The results also show that capital structure is related to country, industry and macro-
economic factors. The relationship between debt ratio and industry is closely related 
to the variables of asset tangibility, profits and earnings volatility, because firms 
within the same industry would be in a similar situation. Thus, they could have 
similar leverage levels. At the same time, the results also show the significant 
difference in debt ratios between countries. Hence, high technology firms have low 
debt ratios compared with the hotel or marine transportation industries across 
different countries, but the debt levels for these industries varies between countries. 
Namely, leverage levels of industries are of a similar order across countries, but they 
continuously show different debt levels. Firms in Korea, for instance, generally hold 
more debt than others, although they also have a similar order in terms of leverage 




Overall, the results of the thesis suggest that the trade-off theory becomes a priority 
theory, which considers a firm‟s survival, as well as its costs. The results also imply 
that both the pecking order and the market timing theories can explain how firms 
increase benefits and decrease costs, as well as obtain some arbitrage opportunities 
such as the issue of over-valued stock. As both the pecking order and the market 
timing theories are based on the phenomenon of asymmetric information, we could 
say that the market timing theory is part of the pecking order theory. In addition, the 
phenomena based on the pecking order and market timing theories do not necessarily 
mean that the static trade-off theory is wrong. In other words, the pecking order 
theory does not deny the static trade-off theory, but it emphasises more adverse 
selection costs due to high asymmetric information. Namely, it assumes that adverse 
selection costs caused by asymmetric information overwhelm tax benefits. Therefore, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) even assert that if there were no asymmetric information, 
the pecking order theory would be the same as the static trade-off theory.  
 
The overall conclusions with regard to our results can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. As Ross et al. (1995) mention, the capital structure decision is always about how 
to maximise the share price. Therefore, maximising a firm‟s value by capital 
structure adjustment (in the static trade-off theory), by issuing stocks with 
overvalued prices (in the market timing theory) and minimising the „debt financing 
costs‟ by not taking on too much debt (in the static trade-off theory), and by not 
issuing undervalued securities (in the pecking order theory) can be explained by Ross‟ 
insight. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show some evidence of this. 
  
2. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the evidence demonstrates that trade-off theory is the most 
appropriate theory in terms of debt level decisions, in terms of firms trying to achieve 
the optimal leverage levels. From the results, we can conclude that firms are more 
concerned with survival itself, rather than financing costs. This implies that 
bankruptcy costs are much greater than we previously thought. In other words, as 
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Fitzpatrick and Ogden (2011) mention, the equity issue might suggest that the 
asymmetric information costs are not as great as we previously though. According to 
their findings, and as well as our own findings, firms with an „operating loss‟ more 
actively use equity than firms with an „operating profit.‟ 
 
3. Our results indicate that the „optimal capital structure‟ based on static trade-off 
theory, could not properly explain firms‟ capital-structure-adjustment modes. Our 
results suggest that to change leverage levels, firms rely on their own characteristic 
circumstances as well as the two traditional factors of bankruptcy probability and tax 
shields. This implies that all firms might have their own optimal capital structures in 
line with their own circumstances (characteristics). Therefore, firms will change their 
debt levels as their circumstances change, not only with regard to a tax shield and 
bankruptcy probability change. This implies that the dynamic trade-off theory could 
give a better explanation than static trade-off theory with regard to our results. The 
overall conclusions of Chapter 7 demonstrate this argument. 
 
4. From Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the simple pecking order theory and market timing 
theory can partially explain the „leverage ratio alteration.‟ For example, the leverage 
ratio shows the negative association with profits, and firms with high stock returns 
lead to equity issuance. However, the pecking order theory cannot explain why firms 
have issued more equity over the last twenty years. Furthermore, in our sample, 
many firms issue equity and debt simultaneously every year (see, Table 6.13 in 
which the equity and debt issue are fully described). This is difficult to explain with 
the pecking order theory and with inertia theory, because if asymmetric information 
costs are too high, then firms should choose only one best method to reduce their 
issuing costs. 
 
5. The statistical evidence in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 indicates that the market timing 
theory is a part of the pecking order theory. The market timing theory simply 
suggests that firms take arbitrage opportunities by issuing overvalued stock. On the 
other hand, the pecking order theory suggests that firms use internal capital due to 
 255 
undervalued securities in the market. Furthermore, we find it difficult to accept the 
inertia theory proposed by Welch (2004), as firms change their debt levels gradually.  
 
6. In our research, we have observed some capital structure determinants which 
continuously show their importance. These variables are previous year debt ratio, 
asset tangibility, firm size, profitability, bankruptcy probability, market-to-book ratio 
and macro-economic environmental factors. These determinants are generally related 
to trade-off theory and market timing theory. 
 
7. From Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the variables of investment opportunity, e.g. capital 
expenditure, R&D expenses and GDP growth, are all considerably negatively related 
to debt ratio. This implies that firms generally use equity for new investments. This 
is inconsistent with both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. This 
might be reflected by the pessimistic expectations of future cash-flows or risk 
aversive behaviours on the part of management: because firms use external funds 
only when they have a positive NPV of new investment opportunity; and firms use 
debt rather than equity for such a new investment, depending on the probability of 
success and profits of the new project. 
 
8. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show some different results each other, occasionally. For 
example, profits are negatively associated with debt ratio in Chapters 5 and 6 but 
profitable firms issue more debt in Chapter 7. We can also observe the similar 
phenomenon with regard to bankruptcy probability. This indicates that cluster 
analysis shows clearer evidence of trade-off theory. 
 
9. Finally, we suggest the reason why it is so difficult to close optimal capital 
structure, even in the same industry and country. As Emery and Finnerty (1997) 
mention, a company cannot easily close the industry average gearing level (optimal 
leverage level) because all companies have different conditions such as size, 
competitive position, operating risk, bond rating, business prospects and willingness 
to bear financial risk. Similarly, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) also mention that 
each firm has a unique debt ratio, because all firms have different taxes, financing 
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costs and financial distress costs. From our results, we can likewise suggest that 
different firms‟ characteristics influence them to stay in different debt ratios. This 
implies that, as each firm faces a different situation e.g. in terms of future profits, 
bankruptcy probability, industry, country and firm size etc., each firm has a unique 




The contributions of this thesis to the literature can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. This thesis suggests the importance of macro-economic factors and their impact on 
changes in capital structure. In other words, we suggest that macro-economic factors 
and countries‟ characteristics (e.g. culture, legal system, and the attitude to firms‟ 
debt ratios and so on) affect firms‟ debt ratios. There are some previous studies, such 
as Antoniou et al. (2008), Gugler et al. (2004), and Jong et al. (2008), that consider 
country factors. However, in this thesis, we test the differences in firms‟ debt ratio 
changing behaviours using cluster analysis in Chapter 7, and comparison of debt 
ratios in Chapter 4. Our methods suggest clearer evidence showing that there are 
systematic differences in firms‟ debt ratios in line with different macro-economic 
factors and countries. We also show that firms continuously reduce their debt ratios 
over time. This indicates that there is a trend in terms of firms‟ debt ratio change on a 
world scale. This is important because most of the previous research noted above 
does not show that firms across the world continuously change their debt ratios in 
one direction. Therefore, in their research they do not take account the effect of 
trends in debt ratio shifting in their research, nor when they interpret the results of 
their research. 
 
2. In this thesis, we compared three different economy groups, Anglo-Saxon, 
European and Asian Economies. Previous research such as that of Antoniou et al. 
(2008), Jong et al. (2008), Booth et al. (2001), La Porta et al. (2000) and many others, 
in general classifies their sample based on an individual county or legal system. 
Therefore, they generally consider a country‟s legal system and country specific 
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factors such as the size of the financial market, interest rates, and GDP growth. 
However, in this thesis, we also take account of the different economies as capital 
structure is also affected by such differences. We address whether there are general 
differences in firms‟ leverage levels, debt-and-equity issuances, capital structure 
adjustment speeds in line with the different economies to which our sample firms 
belong. Our results indicate that there are significant differences in debt ratios and 
capital structure adjusting behaviours in different economies.  
 
3. Evidence in the thesis likewise suggests that the biggest concern for firms is their 
survival, rather than obtaining benefits from leverage level adjustments. This idea 
has not often been considered in capital structure theory and in the literature. 
Traditional capital structure theories do not take the possibility of bankruptcy 
seriously. For example, most important research into capital structure such as, 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), do not 
consider bankruptcy costs as being important. According to our survey of the 
literature, only Beattie et al. (2006) and Shefrin (2007) suggest that survival is the 
most important factor when firms decide on their capital structure. We have 
confirmed their argument and furthermore have firmly established and embodied the 
likelihood that a firm‟s survival is the most important capital structure determinant.  
 
4. We use the GMM methods which statistically suggest more accurate results with 
regard to endogeneity in panel data. Therefore, our statistical results are more 
reliable than those of previous studies. There are only a few articles on capital 
structure using this method, including those of Antoniou et al. (2008), Gonzalez and 
Gonzalez (2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008). In other words, we can take endogeneity 
problems into account because the GMM is more efficient than OLS.  
 
5. We have shown how the „capital structure adjustment speed‟ varies across the 
segments of a firm‟s characteristics. Particularly, our findings imply that that the 
adjustment speed relies more on bankruptcy costs than on transaction costs. Our 
results also show that survival is more of a priority than adjustment costs. This is not 
consistent with most previous research as we mentioned earlier. For example, 
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Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that transaction costs 
are an important matter for changing debt ratios. This is because firms need to spend 
to change their debt ratios. This implies that firms change their capital structure when 
their transaction costs are low. In addition, in terms of the pecking order theory, 
firms with high profits, high stock prices, high market-to-book ratios, or a long 
history, would change their debt ratios more quickly than other types of firms. Our 
results, however, indicate that firms‟ capital structure adjustment speeds are faster for 
those with a short history, extremely over-leveraged, small size or have a net loss. 
These phenomena imply that firms consider bankruptcy costs more seriously than 
transaction costs. We were able to observe this situation because we used cluster 
analysis to segment the firms in our sample. 
 
6. The methods we used in Chapters 4 and 7 are rarely observed in academic journals. 
In Chapter 4, we used comparisons in debt ratios based on classifications. We 
classified our sample in respect of economies, countries and industries to which the 
firms under consideration belong. According to the details of our review of the 
literature, not since Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) has a study such as ours examined 
the fact that there are debt ratio differences based on these classifications, although 
many researchers have already presumed that there are differences in debt ratios 
based on firms‟ classification. This chapter is important for two reasons. First, since 
Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) work, about 40 years have passed and it is worthwhile to 
test again whether the situation has changed as our economic environment, 
technology, and financial market conditions have all greatly changed during this 
period. Second, this is the first step in developing all capital structure theories. This 
is because, since Modigliani and Miller (1958), it is still regarded as controversial as 
to whether there is an optimal capital structure. As was discussed in Chapter 4, if 
there is no systemic difference in debt ratio in respect of firms‟ characteristics, we 
could argue that there is no optimal capital structure as Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
indicate. The trade-off theory does not explain firms‟ debt ratios.  
 
In Chapter 7, we used cluster analysis, which is rarely used in work published in 
academic journals. However, as we have seen from Chapter 7, it reveals very 
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significant and different phenomena in line with the segments of firms‟ 
characteristics compared to that found in many published papers. Autore and Kovacs 
(2010) and Ovtchinnikov (2010) use cluster analysis for their research, but they focus 
only on one or two characteristics, such as economic deregulation level 
(Ovtchinnikov, 2010) and asymmetric information levels (Autore and Kovacs, 2010). 
However, these studies do not focus on testing different capital structure theories. In 
Chapter 7, we mainly focus on searching for the most appropriate capital structure 
theory and important debt ratio determinants within our sample. The results in 
Chapter 7 elaborate on the details of firms‟ gearing ratio adjusting behaviours. 
 
For example, in terms of capital structure adjustment, Huang and Ritter (2009), 
Leary and Roberts (2005), and many others, show that firms change their debt ratios, 
but do not show the change in adjustment speeds based on firms‟ characteristics. On 
the contrary, we show that capital structure adjustment speeds can vary in line with 
different firms‟ characteristics and with different segments of these firms‟ 
characteristics. In other words, our study takes account of a much greater number of 
determinants and, more importantly, our cluster analysis tests all three major capital 
structure theories together.  
 
Last but not least, our results in Chapter 7 reinforce the importance of firms‟ 
bankruptcy costs and survival. The cluster analysis suggests that all three major 
capital structure theories partially work to explain firms‟ gearing level adjusting 
behaviours. In other words, Chapter 7 mainly supports the trade-off theory by 
admitting to the idea that firms use opportunities to increase their values by issuing 
over-priced stock. That is to say, the cluster analysis strongly supports the wider 
trade-off theory as the most appropriate capital structure theory. Therefore, the 
method we used in Chapter 7 contributes to finding the most important capital 
structure theory and debt ratio determinants, and embodies three traditional major 
capital structure theories by explaining how they can relate to each other.   
 
7. In this thesis, we created a new measure for testing firms‟ genuine choices in the 
situation where firms usually issue equity and debt simultaneously. With prior 
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measures, there is always some positive correlation between net equity-or-debt issues, 
and financial deficits and new investments. 
 
However, our new variables, the pure debt issuance (which is the negative value of 
pure equity issuance) and the pure equity issuance, indicate what firms really choose 
(increase) between equity and debt when they issue both debt and equity 
simultaneously every year. According to our survey of the literature, we have not yet 
found any previous studies which have used this measure as a proxy of firms‟ debt-
and-equity choice. (see Section 5.3.2.6 which describes full details of the pure 
issuance measure). 
  
8. Last but not least, this thesis tries to integrate three different capital structure 
theories with one general principle in that all firms try to increase their value and 
reduce their expenses. This idea was suggested by Megginson (1977) and Ross 
(1995). Myers (2001) mentioned that one debt ratio changing behaviour may be 
related to more than one capital structure theory, and these theories may be 
correlated to each other. Recently, many researchers such as Morellec (2004), Fama 
and French (2005), and Frank and Goyal (2009), consider the trade-off theory with 
factors from other capital structure theories, such as the pecking order and market 
timing theories. In this thesis, we try to show deeper associations between these 
major capital structure theories by using various methods, such as the static model, 
the dynamic model, cluster analysis and the pure issuance of equity-and-debt. 
 
We have successfully shown that, in terms of the trade-off theory, there is an optimal 
capital structure for each firm. We have also indicated that, in terms of the pecking 
order theory and the market timing theory, firms issue equity when stock is 
overpriced. Therefore, we suggested that these three major capital structure theories 
could be integrated in terms of the wider trade-off theory (see Section 2.2.2.2 which 
describes the details of the wider trade-off theory). It also implies that these three 
major capital structure theories have, in principle, the same motivation. In other 
words, firms like to minimise their costs and maximise the benefits. 
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8.4 The limitations of the thesis 
In this thesis, there are several limitations which may well reduce the reliability of 
our research results. Our forthcoming research should improve its quality by 
resolving these limitations.  
 
1. This thesis mainly focused on quantitative methods but qualitative methods could 
point to different conclusions in terms of changes in firms‟ debt ratios. As Shefrin 
(2007) and Wald (1999) mention, CFOs‟ experiences, manager‟s risk preference and 
cultural factors in a country, could affect firms‟ leverage levels. In other words, 
considering both quantitative and qualitative methods, and related data, could 
improve our research results and reliability. 
 
2. When we classified our sample based on firms‟ ages in Section 7.3, we based it on 
the years in which our sample firms first appear in the database we used. As we 
could not obtain the data for the years in which the firms in our sample were founded, 
we had to decide on a date using the most rational method, as far as possible, by 
studying earlier research. For instance, Fama and French (2002) use firms‟ size as a 
proxy for firms‟ ages because they thought that bigger firms probably have a longer 
history. Our criterion is a result of the limitations of the database we used (Thomson 
One Banker). Although our criterion cannot represent exact years for when firms 
were founded, our results indicate significant differences between the two age groups 
(see Sections 2.3.4, 3.4.5 and 7.3 for more details of a proxy of firms‟ ages and the 
relationship between debt ratio and their ages). 
 
3. In this thesis, we use only listed firms. These are generally big firms and their 
managers have a reasonable level of knowledge of capital structure decision matters. 
Therefore, they may have target capital structures and will change their debt ratios to 
achieve these. They are also more likely to be able to access the financial markets 
compared to unlisted firms. However, unlisted firms are generally small, could have 
less knowledge of capital structure theories, and do not have a chance to access the 
financial market. Excluding these unlisted firms could have affected our results, 
therefore our results cannot represent the debt ratio changing behaviours of all firms. 
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4. When we were in the process of collecting our data, we realised that some 
countries did not have enough sample firms, which means that the ones used may not 
represent their countries‟ capital structure very well. For example, we have only 24, 
62 and 194 sample firms from the countries of Austria, Italy and Canada, 
respectively. We consider that these firms may not fully represent all companies in 
their countries, and particularly in the industries of these countries. 
 
5. As we mentioned in the limitation section of Chapter 6, we do not know what debt 
ratio can truly represent a firm‟s target debt ratio. Since we do not know the 
authentic target debt ratio, many researchers use different proxies for these unseen 
target ratios, such as the mean debt ratio of an industry (Emery and Finnerty, 1997), 
each firm‟s historical mean across their samples (Marsh, 1982), estimated values by 
using OLS cross-section regression (Fama and French, 2002) or by using Tobit 
regression (Nguyen and Shekhar, 2007). Furthermore, some researchers (e.g. Fama 
and French, 2002) estimate target debt ratios year-by-year as we did, while some (e.g. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) estimate the target debt ratio only once using the 
entire sample. It is therefore the case that, although we tried to obtain the best target 
debt ratios by estimating new target debt ratios every year, and including more 
capital structure determinants through a careful study of a great deal of previous 
research, there might be better ways to determine target debt ratios than those we 
estimated.   
 
8.5 Further research 
1. From the results of our thesis, debt ratio is affected by country factors. The term 
„country‟ implies the legal system (including (de-) regulations for new industry, see 
Ovtchinnikov, 2010), macro-economic variables and cyclical behaviour. In particular, 
the relationship between regulation and capital structure is a relatively new area of 
study. 
  
2. From the results, „capital structure adjustment speeds‟ vary based on a firm‟s size, 
asset tangibility, profitability and macro-economic factors. We can observe that the 
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adjustment speeds are affected by these variables, but we still do not know what the 
most important driving factors are, and how these factors are combined. This is a 
new and challenging research area.  
 
3. Since a large body of research has generally investigated only listed firms, the 
capital-structure-decision modes of non-public corporations are not yet clear. There 
may be some differences between listed and unlisted firms. However, according to 
the details of our research survey, no paper has been published in this area. This 
research might give us other views on capital structure theory. 
 
4. From Chapters 5 and 7, cash holding and debt ratios show a negative relationship. 
The cash holding has two aspects. Holding too much cash has a cost implication but 
reduces the technical default probability. This implies that understanding cash 
holdings could help us understand capital structure. 
 
5. This research explains observed phenomena, based on three major capital structure 
theories using statistical methods, rather than explain them in terms of management‟s 
decision making criteria, e.g. CFOs‟ risk preference. The method of interviewing 
financial directors and CEOs may offer different reasons for the „leverage level 
change modes‟ of firms than do our statistical interpretations. In addition, this can 
give us a new chance to confirm our conclusions, or to consider other factors which 
previous capital structure models did not include. This method can also bridge a gap 
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These appendices have been added to the thesis and they include supplements which 




The appendix construction 
 
Appendix 1 describes the data and offers definitions of the variables. 
Appendix 2 presents capital structure theory with tax.  
Appendix 3 describes statistical considerations.  
Appendix 4 shows additional analyses of results contained in Chapter 4.  
Appendix 5 presents the full study results of analyses based on firms‟ characteristics. 








Appendix 1 Data and definition of variables 
 
1.1 Number of firms in industry and period 
The tables in this section show the number of firms in different industries, countries 
and time ranges. 
 


















Basic Materials 1000 0 131 208 
Steel 1757 
Heavy Construction 2357 
Industrials 2000 1 311 424 Delivery Services 2771 




3000 2 464 665 
Brewers 3533 
Distillers & Vintners 3535 
Soft Drinks 3537 
Food Products 3577 
Home Construction 3728 
Health Care Providers 4533 
Health care 4000 3 278 520 
Biotechnology 4573 
Drug Retailers 5333 
Consumer 
Services 
5000 4 382 673 

















Computer Services 9533 
Technology 9000 6 863 1952 
Internet 9535 
Software 9537 
Computer Hardware 9572 
Semiconductors 9576 








Table A.1.2 The codes of the ICB sub-sector and the number of firms 
ICB sub-sector Code 
ICB sub-sector 
dummy code 
No of firms 
(89-98) 
No of firms 
(99-08) 
Aluminium 1753 0 15 24 
Steel 1757 1 116 184 
Heavy Construction 2357 2 252 338 
Delivery Services 2771 3 17 26 
Marine Transportation 2773 4 42 60 
Automobiles 3353 5 33 44 
Brewers 3533 6 25 30 
Distillers & Vintners 3535 7 31 47 
Soft Drinks 3537 8 33 55 
Food Products 3577 9 285 398 
Home Construction 3728 10 57 91 
Health Care Providers 4533 11 117 186 
Biotechnology 4573 12 161 334 
Drug Retailers 5333 13 21 43 
Broad-line Retailers 5373 14 73 104 
Broadcasting & 
Entertainment 
5553 15 117 241 
Airlines 5751 16 21 37 
Gambling 5752 17 57 101 
Hotels 5753 18 42 65 
Travel & Tourism 5759 19 51 82 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
6535 20 50 91 
Mobile Telecommunications 6575 21 25 65 
Computer Services 9533 22 149 346 
Internet 9535 23 57 180 
Software 9537 24 328 654 
Computer Hardware 9572 25 128 309 
Semiconductors 9576 26 201 463 


























0 1300 2212 
Australia 
(AUS) 
0 45 247 
Canada 
(CAN) 
1 76 194 
Britain 
(GBR) 
2 142 301 
USA 3 1037 1470 
Sub-total      1300 2212 
Continental 
Economy 
1 364 548 
Austria 
(AUT) 
4 14 24 
Germany 
(DEU) 
5 166 235 
France 
(FRA) 
6 151 227 
Italy 
(ITA) 
7 33 62 
Sub-total      364 548 
East Asia 
Economy 
2 840 1838 
Japan 
(JPN) 
8 684 1046 
Korea 
(KOR) 
9 92 315 
Taiwan 
(TWN) 
10 64 477 
Sub-total      840 1838 





Table A.1.4 Tax and countries 
 Corporate tax17 Income tax18 Capital gains tax19 Tax on dividends 
Austria 
25% 
 (flat rate)20 
0% ~ 50% 25% 25% 
Australia 30% (general) 0 ~ 47% 
Included in income 
tax21 
NA 
Canada 32% ~ 38% 16% ~ 29% 50% 25% 
France 33.83% (general) 0% ~ 40% 
Included in income 
tax 
0~1.7% 
Germany 25% 0% ~ 42% 25%,  60% 26.37% 
Great Britain 10% ~ 30% 10%, 40% 18% 10%, 32.5%22 
Italy 33% 23 ~ 43% 12.5%, 25% 27% 
Japan 30.80 ~ 44.79% 10 ~ 37% 
Included in income 
tax 
Included in income 
tax 
Korea 13 ~ 25%23 9 ~ 36% 6~35% 15.4% 




United States 15% ~ 35% 10% ~ 35% 
Included in income 
tax 
0%24, 30% 
                                               
17 Source: The Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) 
18 Source: The Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) 
19 Source: www.worldwide-tax.com, for the data of tax on capital gain and dividend based on 2010. 
20 Before, 1st January 2005 corporate tax rate was 34%. Since 2005, the calculation of taxes in Austria 
has altered. 
21  Source: www.globalpropertyguide.com, for the data on tax on capital gains and dividends for 
Australia, South Korea and Taiwan. 
22 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/Taxes/TaxOnSavingsAndInvestments/DG_40164
53 
23 Surtax of 10% is not included 
24 By the Job and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, there are no dividend taxes in 2008. 
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1.2 Theoretical background to the selection of variables  
The theoretical background and the research hypotheses in this thesis are related to 
three major capital structure theories. These hypotheses are related to the cost of 
capital, bankruptcy costs, tax shields, and some nominal measures such as industry, 
time and country.  
 
1.2.1 Taxes  
When Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected their irrelevance theorem (1958), taxes 
were classed as the most important matter in the capital structure decision. Miller 
(1977) further developed the irrelevance theorem by using the personal tax effect.  
 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller assumed that Tp (tax rate on personal income) and TE 
(tax rate on dividend) equals zero. In this case, the benefits from debt are changed into 
Tc×D and the value of a firm which has debts D, changes to Equation (1.1). 
 
Valuewith debt = Valueno debt + DDc rDrT  = Valueno debt + TcD (1.1) 
 
where, r: interest rate on debt, TcD: tax shield 
 
From Miller‟s (1977) model, which includes taxes on personal income and dividend, 
the benefit of having debt is calculated using Equation (1.2): 
 




where, Tc: tax rate on company income, TE: tax rate on dividend, Tp: tax rate on 
personal income, D: amount of debt issued by a firm 
 
Note that Equation (1.1) is identical to Equation (1.2) if we follow Modigliani and 
Miller‟s 1963 criterion that Tp and TE equals zero, TP=TE, as Graham showed (2003). 
This is called the marginal tax rate and is employed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
and by Graham et al. (1998).  Equation (1.1) is applicable to an investigation at both 
country and individual company levels for two reasons. Firstly, generally speaking, the 
difference between TP and TE is not as great as Miller (1977) argued, although it is 
different between countries. Secondly, Modigliani and Miller‟s assumption of no 
bankruptcy costs is partly fulfilled, because firms in the real world do not have extreme 
levels of debt. Therefore, the debt levels for most of the firms in our sample, after 
removing outliers, generally speaking, are not such that the firm is in danger of 
bankruptcy.  
 
1.2.2 Bankruptcy probability 
It is generally presumed that financial distress reduces the wealth of firms, as the costs 
of financial distress are positively associated with the possibility of bankruptcy. The 
financial costs are encountering increasing financing costs, legal fees, creditor 
pressures, decreasing sales, and so on. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Miller 
(1977) assumed that the costs of financial distress
25
 are small, or do not even exist. 
Deangelo and Masulis (1980) however, show the significance of bankruptcy costs. 
                                               
25 Myers (1984) explained financial distress costs as the legal and administrative costs associated with 
bankruptcy, moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs.  
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Shefrin (2007) states that a tax shield is a less important matter than bankruptcy costs. 
It is clear that, in the real world, firms go bankrupt and the probability of bankruptcy 
increases as debt increases. When firms increase debt levels, their costs will be 
increased (Sanz, 2006). Andrade and Kaplan (1998) suggest that the cost of financial 
distress is about 10% to 20% of a firm‟s value. Altman (1984) also shows that 
bankruptcy costs are between about 11% and 20% of the value measured in the year 
prior to going bankrupt. Opler and Titman (1994) also indirectly support this argument 
that highly leveraged firms lose relatively more market share when industry takes a 
downturn.  
 
The probability of bankruptcy is therefore considered to play an important role in the 
market. Therefore the market attempts to measure the bankruptcy probability in order 
to accurately estimate a firm‟s value.  
 
1.2.2.1 The measurements of bankruptcy probability 
In order to evaluate bankruptcy probability, this study generally uses an accounting-
based measurement. However, this section describes both accounting- and market-
based measurements for Section 7.4 in which we compare the two different 
measurements. In the 1930s, studies found that failing firms show significant 
differences in terms of accounting ratios, particularly profitability, liquidity and 
solvency (Hickman, 1958; Altman, 1968). On the other hand, Merton (1974) realises 
that stockholders are in the same position as call (or put) option holders. Using 
Merton‟s idea, we can analyse bankruptcy probability by using the Black-Sholes-
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Merton (BSM) model. An important factor is that, regardless of methodology, the two 
methods imply that debt ratios and growth rates are the most important factors in terms 
of deciding on bankruptcy probability. 
 
1.2.2.1.1 Z-score models (Altman’s ZPROB) 
Z-score (1968), Z  -score (1983), and Z  -score (1993) models were developed by 
Altman, while the EM-score model (1995, 2005) was developed by Hartzell, Peck, 
Altman, and Heine (1995) and Altman (2005). 
 

















1.2   (1.3) 
 
Where, Z: Overall Index, WC: Working Capital, TA: Total Asset, RE: Retained 
Earnings, ME: Market Value Equity, EBIT: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, BD: 
Book Value of Total Debt, SALE: sale.  
 
Altman (1968) notes that if a firm‟s Z-score is greater than 2.99, below 1.81, and 
between 1.81 and 2.99, it will fall into non-bankruptcy, bankruptcy and gray area, 
respectively.   
 
The Z-Score model has limitations because it was developed for US listed 
manufacturing companies. In order to apply the Z-score model to private firms, Altman 



















0.717   (1.4) 
 
where, BE: Book Value Equity, BTL: Book Value of Total Liabilities 
 
With a revised Z-Score model ( Z  -Score), the non-bankruptcy area is greater than 2.09 
in terms of the Z  -Score, the gray area is between 2.09 and 1.23 and the bankruptcy 
area is below 1.23, respectively. 
 
The Z-score model has been, once again, modified for non-manufacturing firms and 
for firms in emerging markets. This model also applies to non-US corporations 
(Altman et al., 1995; Altman, 2002).  
 












6.56   (1.5) 
 
With a further revised Z-Score model ( Z  -Score), the Z  -Score of the non-bankruptcy 
area is greater than 2.60, the gray area is between 2.60 and 1.1, and the bankruptcy 
area is below 1.1, respectively. Samarakoon and Hasan (2003) test Z-score models by 
using Sri Lankan firms. They find that all three models work well, though the Z  -
Score model shows the best predicted performance.  
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1.2.2.1.2 Emerging Market Score Model (EMS model) 
The Emerging Market Score Model (EMS model) was developed by Hartzell, Peck, 
Altman and Heine (1995) and Altman (2005) for rating credits in emerging markets. 
This EMS model is an upgraded version of the Z  -Score model. Unlike the original Z-
Score model, EMS can be used for non-manufacturing companies, and firms in 
emerging markets, as well as for manufacturers (Altman, 2005). Altman (2005) shows 
that the EMS model can be successfully applied to non-US firms. The EMS model 
should involve six steps when it comes to obtaining an appropriate bond rating. 
Analysts first of all should obtain a bond rating using the EM score, through the use of 














6.56ScoreEM   (1.6) 
where, OI: Operating Income, BE: Book of Equity TL: Total Liabilities 
 
The constant 3.25 in the model is the median Z  -Score for bankrupt US entities. If the 
Z  -Score (EM score) is greater than 5.85, between 4.15 and 5.85 and smaller than 4.14, 
then the bond is in a safe, gray and distress zone, respectively. There are five more 
steps to consider after obtaining the EM score. The second, involves adjusted bond 
ratings for foreign currency devaluation vulnerability; the third, adjusted for industry; 
the fourth, adjusted for competitive positiveness; the fifth, incorporates special debt 
issue features; and the sixth, involves a comparison with the sovereign spread. Altman 
however, suggests that even without Steps 2 to 6, the EM score is still applicable. The 
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EMS model should be used to measure bond ratings and intrinsic fixed income values 
(Hartzell et al., 1995).  
 
1.2.2.1.3 O-score models 
The O-score models were developed by Ohlson (1980), using the logit model. Ohlson 
finds that the size of a firm‟s „total liability to total asset,‟ „net income to total asset‟ 
and „working capital to total asset‟ are the most important factors when deciding the 
probability of bankruptcy. He suggests three models for firms expecting to go bankrupt 
in one or two years, or within one or two years. He also suggests that each model is 
reasonable for predicting bankruptcy under different conditions, even though Model I 
has a better error rate and R-square. In the case of Model I, the cut-off point of whether 
a firm goes bankrupt is 3.8%. At this point, prediction error is minimum in Type I, as 
well as in Type II
26
. Deciding the cut-off point is very important for lenders. If there 
are too many Type I errors, then the creditors will lose their lending opportunities by 
wrongly estimating borrowers‟ credit; or if there are too many Type II errors, then 
borrowers could fail to make repayments. Therefore, Stein (2005) shows that a firm 
with a more accurate cut-off point will have higher profits.    
 





















                                               
26 Type I error is when a firm is expected to go bankrupt, but this does not happen; and Type II error is 

































































































where, SIZE: log(total assets/GNP price-level index). The GNP price-level index is 
based on the value of 100 for 1968. TL: Total Liability, CL: Current Liability, CA: 
Current Asset, NI: Net Income, FU: Fund provided by operations=EBITDA (earnings 
before interest and taxes (Chartkou et al., unknown year)), INTWO: one if net income 
was negative for last two years, zero otherwise, OENEG: one if total liabilities exceeds 
total assets, zero otherwise. 
 
1.2.2.1.4 Black-Sholes-Merton model 
The Black-Sholes option pricing model can be used for calculating bankruptcy 
probability. Unlike the „accounting-based bankruptcy probability‟ model, the Black-
321 
 
Sholes-Merton (BSM) model uses market-based variables, such as the market value of 
equity and the standard deviation of equity returns (Hillegeist et al., 2004).    
 
The value of a European call option (c) is the stock price (p) minus the strike price (x) 
on the expired day, c=p-x. Black-Sholes (1973) realised that equity can be a call (or 
put) option, and Merton (1973, 1974) cemented this idea. Therefore, the formula, c=p-
x, can be interpreted as the value of equity. c is the value of equity, p is the value of 
asset, and x is the value of debt when a firm goes into liquidation. When x is greater 
than p, then there is no value in call options and shares, and firms no longer belong to 
the shareholders.  
 
As was discussed, the Black-Scholes formula as the equation of the BSM model, the 








   (1.10) 
Tζ))T)2ζ(δ(r)XV(ln(d A
2
AA1   (1.11) 
Tζ))T)2ζ(δ(r)XV(ln(Tζdd A
2
AAA12   (1.12) 
 
where, VE: current market value of equity, VA: current market value of assets, X: the 
face value of debt maturing at time T, r: continuously compounded risk-free rate, A : 
standard deviation of asset returns,  : continuous dividend rate, N(d): cumulative 




From the formula, N(d1) is the probability of the stock price (VA) that is no less than 
the exercise price (X) at time T
27
; and N(d2) is the probability of the call option that is 
stuck; because N(d) is the probability from a cumulative normal distribution function 
which is less than d (McDonald, 2009). Therefore, firms go bankrupt when total debt 
(X) is greater than total assets (VA). From the option pricing model, the probability of 
bankruptcy at time, T (VA (T) < X), can be expressed as follows (McDonald, 2006): 
 
 Tζ))T)2ζ(δ(μ)XV(ln(N A2AA  =BSM-Prob (1.13) 
 
where,  : return of asset 
 
Here,  r,1)(tV1))(tVDividends(t)(Vmaxμ(t) AAA   replaces risk-free 
interest rates (r) from the original Black-Scholes model, because return of assets (μ ) 
represents the future growth of a firm‟s cash-flows. The N(-d2) in this formula is based 
on the Black-Sholes model; and d2 expresses the „distance to default‟ (McDonald, 
2006). This BSM formula shows that the probability of bankruptcy relies on a firm‟s 
current value (VA), debt (X) and future growth ( μ ) (Hillegeist et al. 2004). These 
assumptions are the same as those associated with the „accounting-based bankruptcy 




                                               
27 When the stock price is higher, the call option is very likely to be in-the-money (Jarrow and Turnbull, 
2000). Therefore, this can be a delta or hedge ratio, Sc  . 
323 
 
1.2.2.1.5 The Expected Default Frequency (EDF) Model 
From Equation (1.13), the probability of bankruptcy relies on a firm‟s current value 
(VA), debt (X), and future growth (μ ). As indicated in Equation (1.14), in the EDF 
model, as in the BSM model, the market value of the equity of a public listed firm is 
decided by the book value of liabilities, the market value of assets, the volatility of 
assets and time horizons. This indicates that the EDF model is also based on the same 













































































































If we do not take the cumulative distribution function into account from Formula 




AA   
Tζlog(X)))(Elog(V AAT   (1.16) 
 
where, VAT: asset value at time T 
 
Formula (1.16) defines the „distance to default‟ and shows that the bankruptcy 
probability is due to asset value at time T (VAT), future growth (μ ) and the debt (X). 
When X is greater than VAT, the firm would go into bankruptcy. However, as Lando 
(2004) argues, the „distance to default‟ greatly differs from the model, in practice. 
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Therefore, the distance of the default value should be combined with the empirically 
estimated default frequency. This is the basic idea of EDF. The KMV
28
 has found the 
most frequent default point and was defined in Crosbie and Kocagil (2003) (cited by 
Altman, 2002; Lando, 2004).  
 
The default point =0.5[long-term debt] + [short term debt] (1.17) 
 
From this we can get the net value of a firm; 
 
The net value of a firm = [the market value of asset]-[the default point] (1.18) 
 
where, the market value of assets = market value of equity + book value of liability 
 
From Formula (1.16), if normal or log-normal distribution is not used, the distance 






  (1.19) 
 
where, expected market value of assets: market value of assets 
 
The stock price, the volatility of stock price and the book value of liabilities are 
collected from the financial market for listed firms; and from observed characteristics 
and values, based on market comparables for private firms (Altman, 2002). Using 
                                               
28 The EDF model was developed by the KMV Corporation which was merged with Moody‟s. The EDF 
from Moody‟s KMV was based on the BSM model. The EDF is defined as the area of distribution that is 
below the book liabilities of a firm.  
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Formula (1.19), we can calculate the default probability after considering other 
variables, such as industry, size, time, etc.   
 
1.2.2.1.6 Accounting-based models versus market-based models 
Begley et al. (1996) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) show that the coefficients from the 
Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models have changed over time. This implies that 
the probability of bankruptcy decision making criteria have changed from time to time. 
According to Altman (2002), the probability of bankruptcy varies over time, and more 
firms go bankrupt when economic situations are poor, and vice versa. Accounting-
based models, however, do not indicate change in macro-economic situations in 
general.   
 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) compare expected bankruptcy probabilities between 
accounting-based scoring models and the BSM, using the methodology of Vuong 
(1989), and show that the BSM model shows better results even though there are some 
problems. As the BSM model uses market data, market participants can observe the 
structure of bankruptcy risk from the market price. Financial markets, however, do not 
take all information into account if they are not efficient (Hillegeist et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the BSM model cannot predict the bankruptcy probability for high risk 
firms; markets over-estimate the real probability of bankruptcy. They also show that 





Reisz and Perlich (2007) find that accounting-based models (Altman‟s models) show 
better performance, at least for a one year prediction. Campbell et al. (2008) conclude 
that market-based models do little to help increase explanatory powers, but the 
importance increases as time horizons increase. All in all, even though there are some 
differences between the two model groups, there is a strong correlation between them 
(Hillegeist et al., 2004). Agarwal and Taffler (2008) also compare the performance of 
market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models, and conclude that 
there are no significant differences in the power of prediction between them. 
 
1.2.3 Growth opportunity and investment 
A firm with a high growth opportunity should increase debt level in order to have tax 
benefits as debt in growing firms is almost a risk free asset. Namely, if firms show 
continuous growth, they try to use more quasi risk-free debt
29
. On the other hand, 
Goyal et al. (2002) expect low levels of debt ratio for a firm with a great growth 
opportunity, and  it will have short-term, private and senior debt (e.g. secured debt) 
instead of long-term or public debt, because it needs to prepare cash-holdings for 
future investment in terms of the pecking order theory. 
 
According to Goyal et al. (2002, p.40), five proxies are generally used for growth 
opportunities; “1. the ratio of the market value of a firm‟s assets to the book value of its assets 
(MBA) …2. the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity (MBE)… 3. the 
earning-to-price ratio (EPR)… 4. the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of asset 
                                               
29 Myers (1984) suggests that new debt with a certain amount of future income is as good as cash. 
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(CAPEX)…. and finally, the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditure to the book 
value of assets.” 
 
Here, MBA, MBE and EPR are related to market expectancy for firms‟ future value, 
and CAPEX and R&D expenditure are related to the operation of firms. This thesis 
uses CAPEX and R&D expenses as proxies for investment and growth opportunities 
but they have very different characteristics. 
 
Capital expenditure and R&D expenses are associated with future profitability and risk 
profiles (Amir et al., 2007). They also find that the importance of capital expenditure, 
and research and development expenses depend on the industry concerned, and 
whether firms belong to R&D intensive industries or to CAPEX intensive industries. 
They also suggest that this importance is related to a time period when a certain 
industry begins to develop. When the Internet industry booms, for example, R&D 
expenses are more important than CAPEX. One more important finding of theirs is that 
CAPEX is less risky in terms of future operating income, but R&D expense has greater 
uncertainty in terms of future cash flows in R&D intensive firms.  
 
Opler et al. (1999) suggest that R&D expense is related to asymmetry information and 
the financing hierarchy theory. The financing hierarchy problems can occur when the 





. They suggest that a firm with high R&D expenses should have 
high financial costs. They give two reasons for this: (1) high asymmetric information 
leads to a high level of discount rate when firms issue new securities; and if so (2) an 
investment opportunity leads to a shortage of liquid assets (cash) (Opler et al., 1999; 
Opler and Titman, 1994). Thus, R&D expenses lead to holding more cash (Opler et al., 
1999). Graham (2000) also shows that R&D expenses are positively related to 
financial distress costs and growth opportunities. This implies that firms with high 
investment opportunities or R&D expenses, would have a high risk of uncertainty in 
terms of either present or future cash-flows. This conclusion is consistent with Chapter 
4 in this thesis. The leverage levels of hi-technology industries are lower than those of 
other industries. This implies that high R&D expenses in these hi-technology industries 
increase the volatility of income. This is supported by the findings of Coles et al. (2006) 
in that R&D expenses are positively associated with stock price volatility. This implies 
that R&D expenses increase the volatility of future cash-flows and make the 
expectation of cash-flows difficult. 
 
As we have seen, those two variables (CAPEX and R&D expenditures) are very 
similar. We can easily presume that these similarities could lead to a correlation 
problem and the validity of the variable. From the correlation tables (Tables 5.3 and 
5.4), however, there is not a strong correlation between the two variables and from 
                                               
30  A firm with a high level of R&D expenditure has a problem with a high level of asymmetry 
information. The price of newly issued securities could be over- or under-estimated. In the event that 
security prices are under-estimated, the pecking order theory would prove correct (Opler et al., 1999).  
329 
 
some previous research, we can easily find articles which use those two variables 
together, such as that of Hovakimian et al. (2006). 
 
1.2.4 Profitability 
Profitability is one of the most important matter in a financial decision. Modigliani and 
Miller‟s (1958) conclusion is that the value of a firm is decided only by its profits and 
not by its leverage levels. Profitability is the core item when borrowing more money 
(Wald, 1999)
31
. Profitability is generally negatively related to debt ratios (Mitton, 2007; 
Antoniou et al., 2008; Hennessy and Whited, 2005). This can support the pecking 
order theory as well as the static trade-off theory with transaction costs. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) mention that firms use more debt when they have high profits, 
although the results from regression indicate a negative relationship between market-
based debt ratio and profits. They suggest that this is because operating income 
increases the firm‟s value. 
In terms of the pecking order theory, profitability is negatively associated with debt 
ratio because the issuing costs lead to an accumulation of earnings. Jensen (1986) 
however, documents that bankruptcy costs and agency costs caused by issuing new 
debt are not important for rapidly growing firms with high profitability. This implies 
that high profits cause high debt levels. This idea is consistent not only with the static 
trade-off theory, but also with Myers‟ (1984, 2001)
32
 suggestion. Antoniou et al. (2008) 
add that a growth opportunity could be positively associated with leverage. As profits 
                                               
31 He finds that profitability is the most important determinant of the leverage level. 
32 Myers (2001) mentions that firms with profitability could use more debt to obtain more tax benefits 
without considering increasing debt levels and bankruptcy probability. 
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reduce leverage levels, firms do not need to issue equity when they need to reduce debt 
levels based on the static trade-off theory; and when firms need external finance for a 
positive NPV investment plan because their financial slack is not enough for the 
investment, then issuing debt is a better strategy according to the pecking order theory. 
Namely, a positive incoming project increases debt capacity, and reduces the need to 
issue new stock (Myers, 1974; Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
 
1.2.5 Firm size 
Stonehill and Stitzel (1969), Remmers et al. (1974) and Huizinga et al. (2008) and 
others point to the importance of a firm‟s size in the capital structure theory. Kurshev 
and Strevulaev (2006) and Shumway (2001) consider that a firm‟s size is a vital 
variable for estimating bankruptcy probability. The size of a firm has been thought to 
be related to managerial risk and credit standing. In general, most research shows that a 
firm‟s size is positively related to debt ratios, as large firms have greater financial 
stability and less asymmetric information. Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude that 
smaller firms do not follow the pecking order theory but that larger firms do because 
small high-growth firms probably have more problems with asymmetric information. 
 
1.2.6 Financial slack 
Financial slack was defined by Myers and Majluf (1984, p.190) as “…the sum of cash on 
hand and marketable securities,[...] and default-risk-free debt the firm can issue.” There are two 
different points of view with regard to cash holding. One the one hand, there is no 
optimal cash-holding level such as is suggested by the pecking order hierarchy model. 
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Cash holding is simply created by firms accumulating internal funds (Opler et al., 
1999). On the other hand, in terms of the point of view of the trade-off theory, too low 
a level of cash holding could cause a firm to miss positive investment opportunities, 
and a very high level of financial slack could lead to inefficiency in terms of the costs 
of capital. Opler et al. (1999) also argue that there are two disadvantages for firms 
which have financial slack, lower rates of return from those assets and tax 
disadvantages, and two advantages, savings transaction costs and having investment 
opportunities. From the point of view of the agency theory, Opler et al. (1999) also 
indicate that managers prefer to have cash holdings in order to reduce risk to the firm 
and to increase their discretion. However, their findings suggest that excess cash 
holding is used mostly for covering operation losses rather than for new investments. 
Similarly, judging by the recent financial crash, since 2007, financial slack is not the 
main concern for new investments but for survival. A Korean newspaper, for example, 
announced that the most vital concern for Korean firms is cash holding whilst in the 
middle of this economic recession
33
. Sanyal Dev, group treasurer at BP, the energy 
group, also mentioned at the Association of Corporate Treasurers annual meeting that 
“…holding cash had moved from being economically inefficient... to being a vital element in the 
battle to maintain liquidity at times of capital market disruptions.34” John (1993) finds that 
financial slack is used more for firms with high debt ratios and low tangible asset ratios. 
This implies that financial slack prevents increasing financial distress costs, 
particularly when firms have high levels of probability of financial distress. This also 
                                               
33 www.edaily.co.kr, April 16th 2009. 
34 www.ft.com, April 28th 2009, Welcome to a world of low predictability 
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implies that financial slack is closely related to a firm‟s financial policy, especially 
when it is in financial difficulties (John, 1993) or during an economic recession 
(Brealey et al., 2008). 
 
In terms of asymmetric information, as firms with a high volatility in terms of future 
income have high financing costs, they prefer to hold more cash. For example, Bates et 
al. (2009) suggest the motivation for cash holding is that holding cash helps firms to 
cope better when accessing the costly capital market. Agency and financing hierarchy 
theories together suggest that firms like to hold more cash.  
 
1.2.7 Tangibility 
It is widely accepted that a firm with high tangibility has a high collateral value. Thus, 
the firm can have higher levels of debt ratio. Harris and Raviv (1990) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) explain that firms with tangible assets generally have a higher 
liquidation value. Braun and Larranin (2005) also show that firms which are tangible 
are affected less by the impact of recession, than firms which are less tangible, even in 
the same industries. They also suggest this phenomenon is universal across countries 
and industries. Lee et al. (2000), using Korean firms, however, argue that high levels 
of fixed assets increase fixed operating costs, and therefore the probability of 
bankruptcy increases. Thus, there will be a negative relationship between the two 
variables. Alderson and Betker (1995) also explain that tangibility does not always 
align collateral values because there are liquidation costs. When liquidation costs are 
high, the leverage levels would be low, even though the firm has high tangibility. This 
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implies that a high level of tangibility is not a sufficient condition for available 
collateral. Low liquidation costs or easy encashment are necessary for tangible assets. 
This implies that leverage levels are associated with tangibility as well as liquidation 
costs. 
 
1.2.8 Earnings volatility 
Outside investors as well as inside managers can easily presume future cash-flows 
when earnings volatility is low. In other words, low earnings volatility makes easy and 
accurate expectations of a firm‟s future cash-flows. Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Fama and French (2002) therefore expect a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage levels. Fama and French (2002) explain that high earnings 
volatility increases bankruptcy costs by reducing tax benefits and increasing 
bankruptcy probability. They use a firm‟s size (log(total asset)) as a proxy of earnings 
volatility, because they think that larger firms have a lower earnings volatility
35
. This 
thesis follows Titman and Wessels (1988) who use the standard deviation of the annual 
percentage change in operating income (operating incomet+1/operating incomet).  
Bradely et al. (1984) also use this variable and show a negatively correlated debt ratio 
with volatility in annual operating earnings. 
 
                                               
35 Fama and French (2002) use this because of lack of data. They mention that 5 or 10 years clearly 
estimated volatility better than the proxy by log(firm size). 
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1.2.9 Market-to-book ratio 
The variable, market-to-book ratio (M/B), is used for various purposes. As described 
before, market-to-book ratio can be a proxy of growth opportunity (Goyal et al., 2002). 
The ratio of „market value over book value shares‟ can be used as a proxy of Tobin‟s Q 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). This implies that this can be a proxy of market efficiency or 
market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Thus, this variable is related to asymmetric 
information costs by having too high or too low stock prices. 
 
Leary and Roberts (2005) suggest, by citing Titman and Wessels (1988), that a firm‟s 
growth (investment) opportunities should be measured by the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total assets and that the market-to-book ratio (a proxy of Tobin‟s Q) 
should be used less.  
 
1.2.10 Leverage level differences with some nominal measures 
1.2.10.1 Country differences 
In Chapter 4, the differences in debt level have been noted between countries. 
Leverage levels might be affected by country effects. For example, Far Eastern 
economies in Chapter 4 had higher leverage levels than Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
economies in the first and second period. The average debt ratios, especially in the case 
of Korean firms, dropped dramatically in the second period. This happened when 
Korea was affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (Kim et al., 2006). This 





Chui et al. (2002) show that capital structure is affected by aspects of national culture 
such as „conservatism.‟ Using country specific variables such as legal enforcement, 
creditor and shareholder rights‟ protection, and GDP growth, Jong et al. (2008) and La 
Porta et al. (1997) find that external financing is affected by the legal system
36
 (Section 
2.3.1 has a clearer description). McClure et al. (1999) suggest that the 1980‟s 
globalisation of the financial market has increased, yet there is still a capital structure 
difference.  
 
1.2.10.2 Industry differences 
Firms in different industries use different assets in order to operate their businesses 
(Brav, 2009). Thus, firms in different industries show different leverage levels. For 
example, firms in the hotel industry have more debt ratios than those in other industries, 
especially in high-technology industries. Opler et al. (1999) expect that firms with high 
R&D have a lower debt ratio. Miao (2005, p.1464) also conclude that “…mean capital 
structure is systematically related to technology and risk choices relative to industry.” MacKay 
and Phillips (2005) analyse industries in terms of several factors such as the speed of 
technology growth, risky technology, bankruptcy costs, fixed operating costs and high 
entry costs, and suggest that debt levels are related to industry. Bradley et al. (1984) 
find that 56% of advertising and R&D expenses is explained by variables in the 
industry under consideration.  
                                               
36 Korea, Germany, Italy, Austria, Taiwan, France and Japan have a civil or Romano-German legal 
system, and the U.K, U.S, Canada, and Australia have a common legal system (Porta et al., 1998). 
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Appendix 2 Capital structure theories with tax 
To explain the static trade-off theory, this appendix begins with Modigliani and 
Miller‟s irrelevance theory, their amendment in 1963, and Miller‟s (1977) paper 
including personal tax. Millers‟ model is followed by DeAngelo and Masulis‟ (1980) 
extension model; and this section finishes with DeAngelo and Masulis‟ optimal capital 
structure.  
2.1 Irrelevance theory  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that capital structure is not relevant to the value of 
a firm based on seven assumptions (Megginson, 1997): (1) all physical assets are 
owned by corporations; (2) capital markets are frictionless; (3) corporations can issue 
[…] only risk equity and risk-free debt; (4) both individuals and corporations can 
borrow and lend at the risk-free interest rate; (5) investors have homogenous 
expectations about the future stream of corporate profits; (6) there is no growth; and (7) 
all corporations can be classified into one of several „equivalent return classes.‟ 
 
2.1.1 Proposition I  
“That is, the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is 
given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate k appropriate to its class. 
(Modigliani and Miller,1958, p.268).” 
 




where, Vj : the market value of firm j, Sj : the market value of common shares of firm j, 
Dj : the market value of debts of firm j, jX  : expected return of firm j, k  : market rate 
of capitalization for k class firm (weighted average cost of capital). 
 
Proposition I can be valid with an „arbitrage argument‟ and „homemade leverage.‟ If 
there is an inequality between two firms (i.e. VL > VU or VL < VU, where, VL: the value 
of leveraged firm, VU: the value of unleveraged firm) whose expected returns are the 
same, then, by an arbitrage transaction, the value of these two firms becomes equal. By 
this arbitrage transaction, it is clear that the value of firms is not based on capital 
structure.  
  
2.1.2 Proposition II 
“That is, the expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate k  for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related 
to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between k  and 
r ” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, p.271). 
 
Modigliani and Miller (ibid.) derive the expected rate of return of company ij from 
proposition I.  
 
)SD()r(ρρi jjkkj   (2.2) 
 




From Equation (2.2), the fact that ij is increased as Dj increases does not happen as 
long as managers have the ability to undo the debt ratio without having transaction 
costs; namely from Equation (2.2), k   can be constant by an arbitrage opportunity 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Thus, as long as a firm does not go bankrupt, 
Modigliani and Miller‟s Proposition I is valid and compensation from increasing debt 
will be offset against increasing risks because k  does not change.  
 
2.1.3 Proposition III 
“The cut-off point for investment in the firm in all cases be k  and will be 
completely unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment” 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958, p.288).  
 
From Propositions I and II, if a firm‟s value is not affected by its capital structure, 
financing sources would not affect stockholders‟ wealth.    
 
2.2 Modigliani and Miller’s theory with taxes  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) issued a new capital structure theory incorporating 






2.2.1 Amended Proposition I 
Modigliani and Miller (1963, p.434) amended their (1958) Proposition I by stating; 
“Since the distribution of returns after taxes of two firms will not be proportional, 
there can be no “arbitrage” process which forces their values to be proportional to 
their expected after-tax returns.”  
 
From Modigliani and Miller (1963), the value of a leveraged firm is composed of the 
value of the unleveraged firm and its tax shield. From the their (1963) paper, we can 








: the rate at which the market capitalise the expected returns net of tax of an 
unleveraged company of size X , U
η VX)η1(ρ  , therefore, 
η
U ρX)η1(V  ; 
LDη   : tax shield,   : the marginal corporate tax, LD : permanent level of debt, R: 
interest payment, r: interest rate on debt 
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), if they follow their original assumption 
that the distribution of returns after taxes from two firms
37
 is proportional, then 
















  (2.4) 
 
                                               
37 Two firms have different levels of leverage. 
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where, X : the variance of after-tax returns, RηX)η1(X)(XE
ηη    
 
Both Equations (2.3) and (2.4) indicate that the value of a firm is decided by tax and 
leverage. The difference between the two equations is that Equation (2.4) considers the 
relationship between the rate of debt capitalisation and the weighted average cost of 
capital, ηρr
38
. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are the same as Equation (2.8) in Miller‟s 




2.2.2 Amended Proposition II 
From Equation (2.3), if we replace X)η1(   to )RηX(
η  , we can obtain Equation 
(2.5). 
L
ηη Dηρ)RηX(V   (2.5) 
To obtain the after-tax yield on the equity capital, D must be subtracted from Equation 
(2.5), and X needs to be broken down into two components, expected net profits after 
taxes,  ,and interest payments, R = r·D, (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) 
 
)Dρr)ρ(()η1(ρπDVS ηηηη   (2.6) 
 
where, S: equity value, V: firm value, D: debt value,  :net profits after taxes, R = r·D: 
interest payment 
 
                                               
38 If ρτ=r, Equation (3) is the same as Equation (4). The difference arises from the changes in their 
assumptions between 1958 and 1963. 
39 If  (1-TPB)<(1-TC)(1-TPS) is satisfied in Equation (10), Equation (4) will be the same as Miller‟s model. 
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  (2.7) 
 
Equation (2.2) is replaced by Equation (2.7) in Modigliani and Miller (1963). Equation 
(2.7) implies that the expected return of equity is greater than that of the original 
argument by (1-τ), and that the expected return of equity is not completely independent 
of leverage level (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Modigliani and Miller (1963) confirm 
that if there were no bankruptcy costs and the other basic assumptions from Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) were still valid, debt financing is always the best financial policy.  
 
2.2.3 Miller’s model 
Miller (1977) declared that Modigliani and Miller (1963) were wrong because 
bankruptcy and agency costs were too small, or because the tax advantage of debt 
financing is too small.  
 
From Equation (2.3), VL – VU = TC·D = G, where Tc: tax for firm, D: debt, and G: the 
gain from leverage.  If we presume the existence of personal tax as well as income tax, 



























  (2.8) 
 
where, kb: risk-free rate, BL: bPBd k)T1(Dk  , the market value of the levered firm‟s 
debt 
 

















  (2.9) 
 
where, GL: the gain from leverage, TC: the corporate tax rate, TPS: the personal tax rate 
on income from stocks, TPB: the personal tax rate on income from bonds 
 
Equation (2.8) is identical to Equation (2.4) when TPS = TPB or TPS and TPB are equal to 
zero as Modigliani and Miller stated in their correction (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
Equation (2.9) implies that personal income tax on bonds reduces the gain from 
leverage or tax shields. Generally, personal income tax on interest income is greater 
than personal income tax on stocks. If Equation (2.10) turns out to be true, there is no 
more tax advantage (Copeland and Weston, 1992).  
 




Miller‟s explanation of Equation (2.10) with market equilibrium being that whenever 
investors could have extra income (from arbitrage transactions) by holding stocks or 
bonds, they would change their ownership patterns to stocks or bonds, respectively, to 
have extra income. Therefore, Equation (2.10) is always true. This also implies that 
leverage levels are irrelevant to the value of firms. If )1()1()1( PSCPB TTT  , firms 
would have 100% debt in order to maximise their value and, vice versa. Leverage 
levels, therefore, should be at the equilibrium point, and capital structure is irrelevant 
at that point.    
 
2.2.4 Extension of the Miller model  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extended Miller‟s model. They developed Miller‟s 
model using more realistic assumptions and employed heterogeneous personal and 
corporate tax rates, and corporate tax deductions from accounting depreciation, e.g. 
depreciation, oil depletion allowances and investment tax credits (Copeland and 
Weston, 1992). 
 
They made a new equilibrium Equation (2.11) from Miller‟s model, including 
heterogeneous tax rates, tax shield and corporate tax deductions. This equation also 
considers the market prices of debt and equity. Namely, marginal incomes from debt 





PD PT(1P)T(1  , due to Miller‟s Equation (2.10) (DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980). If they are not in equilibrium, then prices will move towards the market 
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equilibrium in terms of Equation (2.11). This equation must be achieved without 





















where, DP : The market equilibrium price of debt, current price per unit of before 
personal tax expected debt; EP : The market equilibrium price of equity, current price 
of units of equity, before personal tax expected equity; 
u
PDT : Tax rates for marginal 
investors for debt; 
u
PET : Tax rates for marginal investors for equity; S
1
: The state in 
which earnings just cover debt charges; S : The state in which a corporate tax bill is 
positive and all deductions and credits are fully utilised; π(s) : The probability of state 
S occurs. 
 
Since the bracketed term is zero for equilibrium, when, 
u
PDc TT  , marginal corporate 




PE   in 
Millers‟ case (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
 
2.2.4.1 Optimal leverage level in DeAngelo and Masulis 
Extending Miller‟s model, they arrive at an equilibrium equation which argues that 
each firm has a different optimum leverage level, based on debt prices, earning 



























: the state in which the corporate tax bill is just driven to zero, S
3
: the state in 
which all deductions and credits are just fully utilised, B
*
: The firm‟s interior optimum 
leverage 
 
From Equation (2.12), Deangelo and Masulis (ibid.) show that optimum capital 
leverage depends on a firm‟s earning state. Therefore, all firms have different optimum 
leverage levels. If 0BV  , there will be no more debt beyond Bfull 40  at price 
)T(1PP cED  , where B
full
 is the maximum promised debt level (Deangelo and 
Masulis, ibid.). 
 
 As a firm increases its leverage level beyond B
full
, a higher debt price is required as 
compensation
41
. With any given price of ED PP ,  and )T(1P CE  , each firm has a 
unique interior optimum leverage B
*
 when 0BV  . From Equation (2.12), the 
term in brackets equals zero at an equilibrium point (B
*
); namely, the expected 
                                               
40
 X(0)TθΓΔX(0)B c
full  , where, X(0): earning of zero,  : corporate tax deductions 
resulting from non-cash charges such as accounting depreciation,  : dollar value of tax credits,  : 
statutory maximum fraction of gross tax liability which can be shielded by tax credits. 
41 Deangelo and Masulis (1980) assert that with a high debt level between X(0)BB
full  , debt is 
still risk free, but  as debt levels increase, the tax shield decreases in a low earning state. It is therefore 
the case that new issuing debt requires a higher price. 
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marginal corporate tax benefit equals the expected marginal personal tax disadvantage 
of debt (
u
PDT ).  
 
By using Equations (2.11) and (2.12), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) explain that each 
firm has a unique interior optimum leverage level, and show the differences in leverage 
levels across industry, time and tax rates
42
.   
 
2.2.5 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (hereafter, WACC), VSkVBrρk  , is 
“…the weighted sum of costs of the individual capital sources” (Reilly and Wecker, 1973, 
p.124) and is related to investment and capital structure decisions (Myers, 1974
43
; 
Miles and Ezzell, 1980). The expected return of a new investment must be higher than 
the WACC. Otherwise, the firm‟s value will collapse.  
                                               
42 Brennan (1970) also shows that in terms of marginal tax rates, optimal financial policies differ across 
investors. 
43  Myers (1974) formulates WACC; L)η(1ρρ oj
*
j ˆ  with MM Proposition I and
VSkVBη)r(1ρ*j ˆ  with MM Proposition II. These two formulae come from Myers‟ 
general condition for the „optimal investment condition‟ (APVj). This implies that MM propositions are 
a special case of the Myers model, and also implies that investment and financing policies are based on 
the same criteria.  In this formulation, ojρ : appropriate discount rate from all equity financing, 
*
jρ̂ : A 
proposed value for 
*
jρ , η : corporate tax rate, r : firm‟s borrowing rate at time zero, k: the cost of equity 
capital, B: the market value of currently outstanding debt, S: the market value of currently outstanding 




In general, to obtain the value of WACC, very simple criteria are required (Reilly and 
Wecker, 1973; Linke and Kim, 1974). In the real world however, WACC is calculated 
in terms of different expectations in the market, and there are many different kinds of 
financing sources, because it is about future risk expectations associated with paying 
back credit. This implies that if an expectation of future earnings is great, the risk of 
lending money is expected to be low, and WACC will also be low. This implies that 
optimal leverage levels are not the same between companies, as noted by DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980). 
 
2.3 Optimal capital structure 
Damodaran‟s formula (1999, see Section 2.2.2.1) can be simplified as follow (Ho and 
Lee, 2004):  
 
VL=VU+ C(D)Dηc   (2.13) 
0DC(D*)ηDV cL   





: debt level of maximum firm value, C(D): bankruptcy costs 
 
From Equation (2.14), the value of a leveraged firm begins to decline when the 
leverage level is above the level of D
*
.  Here, D
*
 is the optimal capital structure with 




Altman (1984, 1993) also shows the optimum debt level by using an expression of 
bankruptcy probability. The optimum debt level is the point where the tax benefit from 
debt and the expected bankruptcy costs are the same.  
 
)P(1)(Id)T(PV)(PV)BCI(BCDP tB,tCtttttB,   (2.15) 
 
where, PB,t: the probability of bankruptcy estimated in period t, BCDt: direct 
bankruptcy costs estimated in t, BCIt: indirect bankruptcy costs estimated in t, PVt: 
present value adjustment to period t, TC: marginal tax bracket of the corporation, Idt: 




Appendix 3 Statistical consideration 
3.1 Statistical consideration with panel data 
Panel data generally have an endogeneity problem and, in particular, partial adjustment 
method has a strong probability of endogeneity. Ozkan (2001) adds that endogeneity 
problems can occur because capital structure decision matters are affected by 
observable and unobservable factors, and by a firm‟s specific characteristics, e.g. the 
market value of equity. Thus, the GMM method is more efficient than OLS in dealing 
with this endogeneity problem. In order to use GMM estimators in this thesis, this 
section studies the panel data and the GMM estimator. Furthermore, Arellano and 
Bond (1991, p.291) suggest that “…there is a serious upward bias on lagged dependent 
variables [in OLS estimation using panel data].” Ozkan (ibid.) also shows consistent 
results. 
 
3.1.1 Panel data 
In this research, fiscal data have two aspects, cross-sectional and time series aspects. 
An independently pooled cross-sectional data set and a panel data set (longitudinal data) 
have these aspects. Pooled cross-sectional data sets are collected from randomly 
selected samples taken annually or at very regular time periods. Panel data sets, 
however, are randomly selected from the research population at the beginning of the 
research, and collected at very regular intervals from the same samples. Therefore, 
from the panel data, we can observe historical changes in the samples over a period of 
time, and we should not assume that the observations are independently distributed 
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across that time period (Wooldridge, 2006). In addition, the panel data sets generally 
have a wide range of cross-sectional samples in relatively short periods of time. Since 
a panel data set is cross-sectional, each individual (firm, country and economy, for 
example) could have different intercepts called „cross-sectional heterogeneity.‟ It is 
most likely that an individual could be affected by the same factors over time. If this is 
the case, there would be a different intercept across the cross-section. These problems 













,,,  (3.1) 
 
where, Yit is the debt ratios of firm i at time t, Xi,t,k is a matrix for k variables of i firms 
at time t, and vector residual uit.  
 
In most panel data applications, the vector residual ui,t is compounded with εi,t and ξi. ξi 
is unaffected by time (et) or unknown factors (fu) that are not included in the regression, 
whereas εi,t
44
 is affected by time, individual variables and “other usual disturbance in the 
regression” (Baltagi, 2005, p.11; Davison and MacKinnon, 2004). This implies that ξi is 
referred to as an unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2006). 
 
3.1.1.1 First differenced and fixed effect (within) estimator 
Since, panel data generally have correlation problems over time (Verbeek, 2008, 
p.356), removing the fixed effect (ξi) is an important matter. From Equation (3.1), ξi is 
                                               
44 εi,t is called an idiosyncratic error or time-varying error because it represents unobserved factors that 
change across time and affect dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2006).    
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correlated to regressors. Using the fixed effect (FE) model or first differencing (FD) 
model, ξi can be removed. The first effect model and first differencing model are 
identical when the length of time is 2 (T=2) (Wooldridge, 2006).  
 
From Equation (3.1), 
 
itiitu    (3.2) 
 
where, εit is homoskedastic and is uncorrelated over time, and ξi is time invariant and 
homoskedastic across individuals (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
The equation )u(uβ)x(xyy 1ti,it1ti,it1ti,it    or ititit ΔuβxΔΔy   
expresses a first-differenced estimator (FD): and the fixed effect estimator (FE) is 





When uit are serially uncorrelated, the fixed effect estimator is more efficient, and if uit 
follows a random walk
46
, the first differenced estimator is a better estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2006). The serial correlation in the first-differenced model can easily be 
checked with the AR(1) model (Wooldridge, 2006). Let, itit ur  , then AR(1) model 
                                               




i yTy . 
46 This implies that there is positive serial correlation, and itΔu is serially uncorrelated 
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it1ti,it eρrr   . If H0: oρ   from pooled OLS, there is no serial correlation. However, 
it is not generally clear about how to decide the right methodology between FD and FE, 
particularly when T (time) is large, and K (the number of variables) is relatively small. 
It is therefore used to report both sets of outcomes with an explanation of the reason 
for the differences (Wooldridge, 2006). 
 
3.1.1.2 Random effect (EGLS) estimator 
From FD and FE, we assume that ξi is correlated, and we try to have it removed. 
Unlike FD and FE, if we assume that ξi is not correlated to independent variables, ξi is 




The ideal random effect model shows that unobserved effects are not correlated with 
any independent variables.  
 
0),( iitjxCov  , t=1,2, …, T; j=1,2, …, k (3.3) 
 
Even though ξi is not correlated to independent variables in each time period, it is still 
correlated to auto-regressive time serial correlation. 
                                               
47 If ξi is uncorrelated to regressors, the equation is the same as a simple cross sectional OLS, except that 
the cross-sectional OLS would not count the information from across time periods (Wooldridge, 2006).   
48 If a random effect transformation is close to one, the results from the random effect and from the fixed 
effect are close to each other; and by using the Hausman test, we can decide whether the random effect 
is close to the fixed effect. When the Hausman test rejects a null hypothesis H0, we should use the fixed 
effect (Wooldridge, 2006). In other words, if the statistic fails to reject the H0, FE and RE leads to 








ξisit  , st   (3.4) 
 
where, itu is a composite error term. 
 
This can be solved by a feasible GLS estimator (FGLS) or estimated GLS (EGLS) 
(Verbeek, 2008). 
 








From practice, however, we never know the  . We generally use an alternative that is 
taken from the error term of the pooled OLS or the fixed effect model; the alternative 




ˆˆˆ  . FGLS equation is derived by ̂ , 
)uλ(u)xλ(xβ...)xλ(xβ)λ(1βyλy iitiktki,ki1t1i,10iit
ˆˆˆˆˆ  ; and the 
random effect estimator can be computed by regressing pooled OLS. In practice, 
unlike the assumption of FD or FE, the “…random effect (RE) model […] assumes that 
unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables” (Wooldridge, 2006, p.497). 
Thus, the RE can use variables such as, gender, country or dummy variables, which do 
not change over time. The RE should be used when there is a large K and a small T. As 





3.1.1.3 Fixed Effect (FE) or Random Effect (RE)? 
Wooldridge (2006) mentions that when ξi is correlated with any independent variables, 
the fixed effect (FE) estimator or first differencing estimator should be used; and when 
ξi is uncorrelated 0),( iitjxCov   with regressors, random effect (RE) estimators 
should be used. The FE is thought to be in a more general form than the RE, because 
the RE became the FE, as ̂ tends to be close to one with increasing the length of time 
period of the sample. The RE, however, has one advantage in that it can be used with 
variables that do not change over time. It is therefore the case that if we are interested 
in time varying explanatory variables, the FE would be preferred to the RE, otherwise 
the RE is a more general estimator with one condition in which 0)ξ,Cov(x iitj  .     
  
3.1.2 Methodology for the panel static model  
Either non-panel data sets or panel data sets with i.i.d. (Independent and Identically 
Distributed) error terms would not be a problem when using an Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimator. Sufficiency of the i.i.d. assumption, however, is hardly realistic with 
panel data (Davidson and Mackinnon, 2004).  
 
Panel data, like time series data, are likely to have correlation problems between 
explanatory variables and error terms, and these can occur in between times
49
. This 
problem can be solved by using Maximum Likelihood (MLE), Instrumental Variables 
                                               
49  This correlation can be checked by the first-order auto-correlation (AR(1)) model or Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests. 
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(IV), Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), Two or Three-stage Least Square 
Estimators (2SLS or 3SLS) and Hayashi-Sims (Verbeek, 2008; Phillips, 1993).  
 
To use Instrumental Variable (IV) or General Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, 
the instrumental variables (or instruments) play an important role in estimating 
equations. To estimate equations based on IV or GMM estimators, the number of 
instruments required must be at least the same as the numbers of [endogenous] 
independent variables (known as just identified). Namely, the number of instruments 
should be no less than the number of moments ([endogenous] independent variables), 
otherwise the equation could not find a unique solution (Davidson and Mackinnon, 
2004). We do not know the optimal number of instrumental variables, but 
asymptotically, we will not have a bad result, but we can get better results when we use 
a larger number of instruments (Wooldridge, 2002). However, it is better to use a small 
set of optimal instruments instead of using many instruments, because it is getting 
more difficult to find suitable instruments (Wooldridge, 2002). Any variables can be 
instruments with two conditions. Firstly, instrumental variables (z) should be highly 
correlated with independent variables (x), and should be uncorrelated (orthogonalised) 
with the error term (ε), cov(z, x) 0 , and cov(z, ε) 0  (Wooldridge, 2006). There is no 
assumption as to how the residuals (ε) are formed in the GMM model (Kapinos, 2006). 
Any vectors can be instrumental variables if the vectors satisfy the two conditions; but 
finding the right instrumental variable is the most important and difficult matter in 
using the GMM model. One of the most common methods is to choose lagged values 
as instrumental variables (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Phillips, 1993; Kennedy, 1988). 
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In addition, Baum et al. (2003, p.11) mention that “the advantages of GMM over IV are 
clear: if heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV 
estimator, whereas if the heteroskedasticity is not present, the GMM is no worse asymptotically 
than the IV estimator.”  
 
This thesis mainly uses the GMM estimator because, as Baum et al. (ibid.) mention, 
GMM is one of the most general methods for panel data. Some other estimators for 
panel data, such as IV, two-stage least square, three-stage least square, are special 
cases of GMM (Baum et al., 2003). GMM estimators are mainly sorted by weight 
matrices. Namely, GMM uses the same algorithm to analyse data, but it has the most 
general weight matrices.  
 
3.1.2.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
3.1.2.1.1 Identification problem 
The meaning of being identified is that, from a given regression, ( i22i11ii εβxβxy  ), 













 50. Where, this regression fulfils a moment condition, then 
1β and 2β are identified. Therefore, this regression needs no additional moment 
condition which is generally derived from instruments (Verbeek, 2008; satyaM  , 
1999).  
 
                                               
50 This formula comes from OLS estimator )b,b(b 21  for )β,β(β 21  (Verbeek, 2008) 
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Let us suppose that β is p×1 vector and instruments (z) are q×1 vector. As was 
discussed, the number of instruments required must be q ≥ p for identification. This is 
called the “order condition,” and when q = p, this is called “just identified”, and when   
q > p, this is called “over identified”. 
 
Identifying moment conditions can be tested statistically using the Hausman test, when 
instruments are over-identified (Verbeek, 2008), because the optimal weighing matrix 
for instrument estimators is asymptotically chi-squared distributed with a pq   degrees 
of freedom. If q=p, the degree of freedom will be zero, and it cannot be tested 
(Verbeek, 2008, see next section for details). 
 
3.1.2.1.2 GMM 
The most noticeable advantages of using GMM are: 
 
 “(1) it does not require distribution assumptions; (2) it can allow for 
heteroskedasticity of unknown from; and (3) it can estimate parameters even if 
the model cannot be solved analytically from the first-order conditions” 
(Verbeek, 2008, p. 161). 
 
To understand the GMM easily, let us explain OLS using matrices. From the basic 
assumption of OLS, error term 0u . Therefore, from the regression y=bX+u, we can 
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, in the form of matrices, and ŷ  =X(X‟X)-1X‟y=PXy 
because y=bX+u, where PX is a projection matrix. 
 
From the assumptions of the instruments, cov( z , x) 0  and cov( z , ε) 0 , the IV 
estimator can be expressed as follows: 0}b)zxE{(y}zE{u iiiii  , where z is kT  
instruments which satisfy the moment condition, 0)uZE( ii  ; and yZX)Z(b
1
IV
  if 
endogenous variables are just identified. In the case of over identification, then the 
instrument matrix is not symmetric and is impossible to calculate. To solve this, we 




N   (3.5) 
 
This implies IVNN XbZZWXyZZWX  , and yZZWXX)ZZWX(b N
1
NIV
  . 
Since WN follows the method of moment with minimising the quadric loss function, 












 (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
                                               
51 Since error term Xbyu  orthogonal to X ( 0uX  ) from the OLS assumption, 0Xb)(yX  , 
yXX)X(b 1    
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The IV is a special case of GMM
52
. When an equation is just identified, IV and GMM 
arrive at the same outcome. Unlike the IV estimator, GMM does not require i.i.d of 













   ˆ
53
, where weighing matrix WN is a covariance 
matrix. Thus the GMM allows heteroskedasticity of iu  (Davidson and Mackinnon, 





3.1.2.1.3 System GMM  
The Difference GMM estimator shows sample bias and poor precision in simulation 
studies, when it is used for linear dynamic panel data models
54
. One explanation is 
weak instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1999 cited by Blundell et al., 2000)
55
. The 
                                               
52
 Not only the IV but also the OLS are special cases of GMM. In the special case when instruments are 





















53 Where uu  is a covariance matrix from an OLS estimator. 
54 An example of the dynamic panel data model is itit1itit uxbαyy   , itiit εξu  . 
55  Blundell and Bond (1999) use first-differenced variables. The term “weak instrument” refers to 
instruments which become less informative for various reasons. 
360 
 
problem with weak instruments occurs when   goes towards unity, and i comes close 
to it  in the Difference GMM for the pure auto-regressive model (Blundell et al., 2000). 
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose System GMM, using the Difference GMM with an 
extra moment condition called “initial condition”
56
 and a Levels GMM.  
 
The Difference GMM is suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The orthogonal 




































































N )ZuΔΔuZ(NW . 
 
The Level GMM is suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). The orthogonal condition 
of Levels GMM is 0]uZE[ iil,  . 
                                               












































































  (3.9) 
 
One advantage of the Levels GMM is that the lagged differences are still informative, 
even if α goes towards unity (Soto, 2007).  
 
A weak instrument problem can also occur in the Levels GMM, when the time series 
data are persistent (Bun and Windmeijer, 2007). Therefore, the System GMM is 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to improve the efficiency of the 
estimator, especially when the number of time-series observations is small. The 
System GMM is made by combining the Difference GMM and the Levels GMM. 
Therefore, the System GMM estimator is a weighted average between the two 
estimators, and while the explanatory power of instruments decrease, the System 
GMM comes closer to the Levels GMM (Soto, 2007). The moment condition of the 













































































 , the coefficient 














  (3.10) 
 
Blundell et al. (2000, p.30) mention that “the System GMM can both greatly improve the 
precision and greatly reduce the finite sample bias when these additional moment conditions are 
valid”. Hayakawa (2007) also finds a smaller bias in the System GMM estimator. 
 
3.2 Variables choice criteria 
This section describes some matters which have to be considered for better analysis 
while using panel data. The section shows the variables choice criteria and testing 
methods with regard to the reliability of variables, including instrument variables.   
 
3.2.1 Causal relationship between regressands and regressors 
To analyse regression models, there are several criteria for choosing regressands and 
regressors. There must be a causal relationship between them (Wooldridge, 2006) and 
regressors should affect regressands, not the other way round. Namely, regression 
models should make sense and should reflect the researcher‟s research purpose 





In general, if a regressor is correlated with other independent variables in a regression, 
then the regressor will be removed from the regression because “…it will reduce error 
variance” (Wooldridge, 2006, p.213). Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) mention 
however, that as a sample size increases, the correlation between independent variables 
is dismissed. Correlation can be checked using the correlation matrix. When there are 
more than two dummy variables in a regression, the measure of correlation, based on a 
correlation coefficient calculation, is not appropriate. If this is the case, the correlation 
matrix should be made by the measure of correlation based on the Chi-Squared test, 
with one degree of freedom (Cameron, 2005).  
 
3.2.1.2 Multi-collinearity:  
Correlations between independent variables lead to multi-collinearity (Kennedy, 1998). 
Even though there is no correlation between a pair of variables, multi-collinearity can 
occur with two, three or more independent variables combined together (Cameron, 
2005). Auxiliary regression (see Section 3.2.2.1.1.1 in Appendix 3 in which auxiliary 
regression is described) can calculate multi-collinearity with its R squared value; VIF 
(variance inflation factors) estimates can also be used (Cameron, 2005). The auxiliary 
regression is that one of the explanatory variables (x1) becomes a dependent variable, 











where, X: independent variables, α1: intercept, β1: coefficient, k: the number of 
independent variables, ε1: stochastic error term  
 
The VIF1 associated with X1 is defined as: 
 
)R(11VIF 211   (3.12) 
 
In general, if the largest value of VIF from any variable is greater than 10, then there is 
evidence of collinearity (Baum, 2006). This multi-collinearity can occur for several 
reasons; especially the dummy variable trap where there are too many dummies, over-
specification, common trends and seasonal effects are the most common reasons 
(Cameron, 2005) and they are difficult to control, even if we know the reasons for the 
multi-collinearity. Cameron (ibid.) suggests that if the purpose of research is 
forecasting, or the problem of multi-collinearity occurs locally in a regression, 
researchers might not worry too much. Kennedy (1998, pp.187-189) suggests eight 
ways to solve the multi-collinearity in multi-variate regression with multi-collinearity; 
“(a) Do nothing57, (b) Obtain more data, (c) Formalize relationships among regressors, (d) Specify 
a relationship among some parameters, (e) Drop a variable, (f) Incorporate estimates from other 
studies, (g) From a principal component, and (h) Shrink the OLS estimates.”  
 
                                               
57 Kennedy (1998, pp.187-189) suggests this with three reasons, “1) if R2 from the regression exceeds the R2 of 
any independent variable regressed on the other independent variables, 2) if the t statistic are all greater than 2, 3) if 




The homoskedasticity assumption (constant variance assumption) can be completed 
when the variance of error terms (unobservable, ε) is independent of explanatory 
variables. In other words, variance of error terms and dependent variables are constant 
given by any explanatory variables. The heteroskedasticity assumption means, 
however, that the error term is affected by explanatory variables, Var(ε| explanatory 
variable) = Var(dependent variable | explanatory variable) (Wooldridge, 2006). There 
is a problem of using OLS if there is heteroskedasticity, because OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) is no longer BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) oriented by Gauss-
Markov‟s assumptions
58
 (Wooldridge, ibid.) and i.i.d (independent, identically 
distributed) (Green, 2003). If there is heteroskedasticity present, GLS (Weighted Least 
Squares) (Wooldridge, ibid; Cameron, 2005) or GMM should be used as estimators.  
 
3.2.2.1 Testing for Heteroskedasticity 
The LM (Lagrange Multiplier), BP (Breush-Pagan), and White tests are generally used 
for testing for heteroskedasticity. 
 
3.2.2.1.1 LM test (Breusch-Pagan test) 
3.2.2.1.1.1 Auxiliary regression 
Suppose there are m variables in a regression model „A‟, and we like to ascertain the 
existence of heteroskadesity from the regression model. From regression A, we can 
                                               
58 Hypotheses tests based on Gauss-Markov assumptions. 
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obtain an error term ̂ . Using this error term ̂ , we can regress the second regression 
with the same independent m variables. That is an auxiliary regression.   
 
Auxiliary regression, termerrorxδ...xδxδδε mm22110
2 ˆ  (3.13) 
 
The value of the LM test is computed after auxiliary OLS regression because the LM 
statistic is based on auxiliary regression.   
 
H0 : There is a homoskedastic error in regression 
 
LM = size of observations × 
2
ˆ 2





R : R2 of auxiliary regression, cdf: cumulative distributive function, df: degree 
of freedom, number of restrictions being tested (number of new regressors) 
(Wooldridge, 2003; Kennedy, 1998).  
 
3.2.2.1.2 White test 
The White test is a special form of the LM test. It has a different auxiliary regression 
compared to the LM test. Supposing that, if there are three variables in an OLS 










2 ˆ  (3.15) 




3.2.3 Endogeneity  
In the OLS estimator, we presume that the error term is zero (exogeneity, 0 ) and is 
not correlated to independent variables. If these assumptions are not sufficient, 
(endogeneity, 0 ), the OLS estimator cannot be used. As was discussed before, if 
there are correlations between independent variables, we should use the Maximum 
Likelihood (MLE) or the Instrumental Variables (IV), instead of using endogenous 
independent variables (Verbeek, 2008).  
 
The second problem of endogeneity is reverse causality and simultaneity (Verbeek, 
2008). That is to say, the error term   is affected, not only by regressors, but also by 
the regressand. This can happen when regressors and regressand affect each other 
simultaneously. An equation for the demand and supply curves in economics is an 
exemplar. An equilibrium price is decided by simultaneous effects among the variables 
from the supply and demand equations. This should not occur for OLS estimator.   
 
Using GMM and IV, it is not clear as to whether the models have an endogeneity 
problem (Green, 2003). However, it is possible to find out this by using the Hausman 
test. Hall (2005) also suggests that exogeneity can be tested by comparing the OLS 





3.2.3.1 Hausman test  
 






Where βIV: a vector of coefficients from IV estimator, βOLS: a vector of coefficients 
from OLS estimator, V: the estimates of covariance matrix 
 
Hausman statistic follows the chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom equal to 
the number of coefficients (Kennedy, 2003).  
 
3.2.4 Over-identifying restriction 
The validity of the instrumental variables can be tested by the condition of over-
identifying restrictions. Namely, the validity of the GMM estimator itself can also be 
tested by this method. When there are more instrumental variables (exogenous 
variables) than explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002), the over-identifying 
restriction can be tested in terms of whether additional instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with   (Wooldridge, 2002). When the instrumental variables are “just 
identified”, there is no over-identification problem, because the weighting matrix of 
GMM is not relevant to the calculation of the estimator (Green, 2003).  
 
3.2.4.1 J-test 
The J-statistic test from Hansen (1982) is employed as one of the most common 
estimators in order to evaluate the „goodness of fitness‟ of the GMM estimator (Baum, 




H0: The difference in coefficients is not systemic (the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid (Wooldridge, 2002)). 
J-statistic = m× F (3.17) 
p-value = 
2 ~cdf (J-statistic, degree of over-identification) (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2006) 
 
where, m: number of instrumental variables, F: F-statistic from an auxiliary regression 
of IV̂ , or GMM̂ . This auxiliary regression is regressed with all instrumental and 
control variables. 
 
The J-test follows the 
2 distribution with a degree of freedom of over-identification, 
equal to when a „number of instrumental variables subtract a number of independent 
variables.‟  
 
3.2.4.2 Sargan test 
The Sargan test is another important method for testing over-identifying restrictions for 
GMM and IV estimators. The Sargan test is basically the same as the LM test. In the 
LM test, error terms ( ̂ ) are collected from OLS regression for auxiliary regression. 
However, in the Sargan test, the error terms ( IV̂  or GMM̂ ) are collected from IV or 
GMM estimators. The independent variables of auxiliary regression for the Sargan test 
are a full set of instrumental variables (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
S=n × R2 (3.18) 
 
where, S: Sargan statistic (Sagan, 1958), n: number of observations, R2: R square from 




Just like the J-test, the Sargan test also follows the chi-square distribution. The p-value 
of the Sargan test is, therefore, that p-value = 
2 ~cdf (Sargan statistic, degree of over-
identification) (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2006). 
 















   (3.19)  
 













2    




, the adjusted R square can be negative. 
 
The R square expresses how the amount of the variation of dependent variables is 
explained by independent variables. There is no required R square level. A small R 
                                               
59 Newbold, 1995, p.454 and Goldberger, 1991, p.177 
60 Cameron, 2005, p.128 and Goldberger, 1991, p.178 
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square presumes that the error variance of y is large and there is difficulty when 
estimating the coefficients of independents. The matter of large error variance, 
however, can be solved with bigger sample size (Wooldridge, 2002). Some authors 
(Wooldridge, 2006; Kennedy, 1998) state that the value of R
2
 is not as important as 
econometricians think. Cramer (1987, p.253, cited by Kennedy, 1998, p.27) mentions 
that: 
 
“These measures of goodness of fit have a fatal attraction. Although it is 
generally conceded among insiders that they do not mean a thing, high values 
are still a source of price and satisfaction to their authors, however hard they 
may try to conceal these feelings.” 
 
Cameron (2005, p.358) says that: 
 
“Don‟t try to compare different estimation techniques for an equation, in a 
system of equations, using the R squared, as this is not relevant.” 
 
Similarly, Wooldridge (2006) states that it could be a problem using an R square as a 





Unlike the R square, the value of the adjusted R square can either rise or fall when a 
variable is newly included (The value of the R square only rises when a new variable is 
included in an unadjusted R square estimation). Therefore, it is not possible for 
researchers to increase the R square by adding more variables when using adjusted R 
square (Cameron, 2005). This property makes the adjusted R square a better estimator. 
 
We note that methods which use instruments do not report on the (adjusted) R square, 
because the definition of the (adjusted) R
2
 is not unique when an OLS estimator is not 





Appendix 4 Additional results for the Chapter 4 
Table A.4.1 presents the results of the ANOVA test between two periods with regard 
to different industries. The table shows that 11 industries at the 0.05% level and 3 
industries at the 0.1% level are significantly different between two periods. This 
implies that 14 industries in the sample have changed their leverage levels significantly.  
 
Table A.4.1 Anova test between two periods based on industry 
Note, Icbsub: the codes of ICB industry subsector classification are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 
1. 
 F Statistic Prob > F  F Statistic Prob > F 
Airlines 4.07** 0.0442 Gambling 0.11 0.7348 












Broad-line retailer 5.91** 0.0152 Hotels 11.35*** 0.0008 







Computer Hardware 0.09 0.7701 Mobile Telecom 14.87*** 0.0001 
Computer Service 4.16** 0.0415 Semiconductors 0.00 0.9551 
Delivery Service 0.87 0.3529 Soft Drinks 0.64 0.4243 
Distillers & 
Vintners 
3.74* 0.0535 Softwares 1.04 0.3077 
Drug Retailers 1.70 0.1930 Steels 3.38* 0.066 








Table A.4.2  Means of debt ratio by industry and country. 
Note, means of debt ratio with industries and countries and medians are in the square bracket. NA: no data, P1: period one, P2: period two. Icbsub: the codes of ICB 
industry subsector classification are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
Industries AUS AUT CAN DEU FRA GBR 




































NA NA NA NA 













































































































Computer hardware NA 
.0627 
[.0029] 





















































































Table A.4.2 Continued  
 
Industries AUS AUT CAN DEU FRA GBR 







































































































































Home Construction NA 
.1193 
[.0922] 












































































Table A.4.2 Continued  
 
Industries AUS AUT CAN DEU FRA GBR 












































































































































































Table A.4.2 Continued 
 
Industries ITA JPN KOR TWN USA 


















































































































































































































Table A.4.2 Continued 
 
Industries ITA JPN KOR TWN USA 
Period P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 
































































































































































































Table A.4.2 Continued 
 
Industries ITA JPN KOR TWN USA 









































































































































Table A.4.3 The rank of mean debt ratio in countries in the first period 
Note, the industry names are in parentheses. soft wa: software, semico: semiconductors, brewer: brewers, com ha: computer hardware, bio tech: biotechnology, com ser: 
computer services, drug ret: drug retailers, travel: travel & tourism, heavy: heavy construction, bro reta: broad-line retailers,   food: food products, health: health care 
providers, delivery: delivery service, dist&vin: distillers & vintners, alumi: aluminium, mobile: mobile telecommunications, fixed tel: fixed line telecommunications, 
auto: auto mobile, home: home construction, gamble: gambling, soft dri: soft drinks, marine: marine transportation, broadcast: broadcasting & entertainment. Icbsub: 
the codes of ICB industry subsector classification are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 























































































































































































































Table A.4.3 Continued   
 




































































































































































































Table A.4.3 Continued   
 




















































































25    
0.3985 
(hotel) 






26    
0.6303 
(fixed tel) 






27    
0.8538 
(gamble) 








Table A.4.4 The rank of mean debt ratio in countries in the second period 
Note, the industry names are in parentheses. soft wa: software, semico: semiconductors, brewer: brewers, com ha: computer hardware, bio tech: biotechnology, com ser: 
computer services, drug ret: drug retailers, travel: travel & tourism, heavy: heavy construction, bro reta: broad-line retailers,   food: food products, health: health care 
providers, delivery: delivery service, dist&vin: distillers & vintners, alumi: aluminium, mobile: mobile telecommunications, fixed tel: fixed line telecommunications, 
auto: auto mobile, home: home construction, gamble: gambling, soft dri: soft drinks, marine: marine transportation, broadcast: broadcasting & entertainment. Icbsub: 
the codes of ICB industry subsector classification are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 





















































































































































































































Table A.4.4 Continued 
 




















































































































































































































Table A.4.4 Continued 
 













































































































































26    
0.3772 
(health) 






27    
0.5614 
(hotel) 












Table A.4.5 Representative stock indices across countries for two decades 
Note, all indices used the stock prices at the end of each year. ASX: Australian Securities Exchange, ATX: Austira Stock Exchange, Wiener borse, CAC 40: Cotation 
Assistee en Continu 40 Index, DAX: Deutscher Aktien Index, FTSE 100: Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange 100 Index, KOSPI: Korea Stock Price 
Index, MIB: Milano Italia Borsa, NYSE: New York Stock Exchange, S&P/TSX 60: SToronto Stock Exchange  60 Index, TAIEX: Taiwan Capitalisation Weighted 
Stock Index, TOPIX: Tokyo Stock Price Index 
   AUS AUT CAN DEU FRA ITA GBR JPN KOR TWN USA 
 ASX ATX S&P/TSX60 DAX CAC40 MIB61 FTSE100 TOPIX KOSPI TAIEX62 NYSE 
87 1318.85 473.61 156.93 1000 1000 7560 1712.7 1562.55 525.11 NA 1461.61 
88 1487.2 535.97 167.48 1327.87 1573.94 9169 1793.1 1690.44 907.2 NA 1652.25 
89 1649.84 1164.22 197.96 1790.37 2001.1 10684 2422.7 2375.3 909.72 NA 2062.3 
90 1279.82 1038.54 168.42 1398.23 1517.93 8007 2143.5 2867.7 696.11 4,503.16 1908.45 
91 1651.4 883.25 184.39 1577.98 1765.66 7830 2493.1 1740.92 610.92 4,600.67 2426.04 
92 1589.9 747.7 175.07 1545.05 1857.78 6916 2846.5 1714.68 678.44 3,377.06 2539.92 
93 2173.6 1128.78 221.49 2266.68 2268.22 9500 3418.4 1305.81 866.18 6,070.56 2739.44 
94 1912.7 1055.24 221.84 2106.58 1881.15 9813 3065.5 1445.97 1027.37 7,124.66 2653.37 
95 2203 959.79 250.51 2253.88 1871.97 9138 3689.3 1553.4 882.94 5,173.73 3484.15 
96 2424.6 1140.19 321.59 2888.69 2315.73 10332 4118.5 1631.06 651.22 6,933.94 4148.07 
97 2616.5 1294.94 378.09 4249.69 2998.91 16341 5135.5 1470.94 376.31 8,187.27 5405.19 
98 2813.4 1120.77 375.98 5002.39 3942.66 23035 5882.6 1175.03 562.46 6,418.43 6299.93 
99 3152.5 1197.82 495.86 6958.14 5958.32 28169 6930.2 1064.92 1028.07 8,448.84 6876.1 
00 3154.7 1073.3 528.72 6433.61 5926.42 29681 6222.46 1717.47 504.62 4,739.09 6945.57 
01 3359.9 1140.36 442.55 5160.1 4624.58 22232 5217.35 1280.94 693.70 5,551.24 6236.39 
02 2975.5 1150.05 373.15 2892.63 3063.91 16954 3940.36 1053.96 627.55 4,452.45 5000 
03 3306 1545.15 458.72 3965.16 3557.9 19483 4476.87 843.29 810.71 5,890.69 6440.3 
04 4053.1 2431.38 511.91 4256.08 3821.16 22886 4814.3 1043.69 895.92 6,139.69 7250.06 
05 4715.2 3667.03 634.72 5408.26 4715.23 26056 5618.76 1153.38 1379.37 6,548.34 7753.95 
06 5644.3 4463.47 742.77 6596.92 5541.76 31005 6220.81 1673.07 1434.46 7823.72 9139.02 
 
                                               
61 Milan Mib Storico General – price index 
62 From World Federation Exchange and Financial Times, TAIEX is called as WeightedPr in the Financial Times 
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Appendix 5 Full study results with characteristics 
 
This appendix presents the full study results with different characteristics as 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
5.1 Firm size 
 
Table A.5.1 Descriptive characteristics, based on firms‟ size 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics based on their 
size between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. -4.6052< 1st quartile < 3.4366, 3.4366 ≤ 2nd quartile < 
4.9822, 4.9822 ≤ 3rd quartile < 6.5403 and 6.54 ≤4th quartile <13.044 in Log(total asset). All 
variables are defined in Section 5.3. 























































































































Table A.5.2 Debt ratio changes based on firms‟ size, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Obs 6210 6606 8031 10178 
Adj-R2 0.1246 0.1058 0.2420 0.1813 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 










































































Obs 5611 6039 7543 9746 
















Table A.5.3 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on firms‟ size 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment 
(capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow 
or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 




















































Obs 8104 9899 9819 10310 
Adj-R2 0.1023 0.0806 0.0645 0.06 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 














































Obs 6865 8826 9177 9844 














Table A.5.3 Continued 
 
Note, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-
Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel C:  Net long-term debt issue / assett 














































Obs 6144 6600 7775 9578 
Adj-R2 0.0314 0.0388 0.0536 0.0846 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 














































Obs 5954 6569 7771 9558 









Table A.5.4 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on firms‟ size 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 





















 0.0018 0.0025 0.0001 0.0015 
Obs 8104 9899 9819 10307 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















R2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0049 0.0045 
Obs 6865 8826 9177 9844 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















R2 0.0138 0.0094 0.0269 0.05 
Obs 6144 6600 7775 9578 
 Panel D: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















R2 0.2348 0.1586 0.1745 0.1142 




 Table A.5.5 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on the size of firms 
From Panels A and B, stock price more affects small firms. The small firms more likely adjust their 
leverage levels in Panel B. As a consequence, from Panel C that stock returns are more related to big 
firms‟ debt ratio because the change of debt ratio are solely affected by stock price without adjustment 
for great firms. From Panels D and E, it seems that there is no relation between equity issuance with 
stock prices and firm size in terms of book based debt ratio.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, 
MDR: market-based debt ratio, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
OLS 
Panel A:  MDRt 






























 0.5805 0.7783 0.8129 0.8355 
Obs 8667 10451 11442 11777 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























R2 0.2326 0.2348 0.1476 0.1467 
Obs 1875 3379 4407 5460 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















R2 0.1007 0.1274 0.1477 0.2038 
Obs 8643 10447 11442 11777 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















R2 0.0101 0.016 0.0124 0.0207 
Obs 8527 10745 11776 11978 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















R2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.00 







Table A.5.6 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different measures, based on 
firms‟ size 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio. Panels C and D use System GMM. 
We do not report the capital structure determinants since the purpose of this regression is to test the 
capital structure adjustment speed rather than to investigate their effects. speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, 
speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio is calculated using OLS, target2: 
market-based target debt ratio is calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure 
adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in 
Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and 
D, we use all 7 capital structure determinants although we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-
1 is instrumented and the 7 variables are assumed exogenous in Panel C used by the System GMM. 
MDRt-1 and R&Dexpendituret-1 are instrumented for Panels D. The values in the square brackets are 
the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables. 
Options for xtabond2 syntax are small, twostep, and robust; and the sub-options for gmm-style are 
equation(level), laglimits(1 2), collapse and for iv-style is equation(level). *** significance at 0.01 
level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
OLS 
Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















R2 0.0877 0.0672 0.0438 0.0592 
Obs 3176 4527 5217 5992 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















R2 0.1345 0.0773 0.0557 0.0430 












Table A.5.6 Continued 
 
 Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -3.91*** -7.52*** -4.18*** -6.75*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 3730 5145 5557 6109 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -6.25*** -8.33*** -10.08*** -9.93*** 











Inst L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 
Inst No 11 11 11 11 









5.2 Firm age 
Table A.5.7 Descriptive characteristics, based on firms‟ age 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on firms‟ 
history between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets.  
Note, long: long history firms, short: short history firms. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 




































































Table A.5.8 Debt ratio changes based on firms‟ age, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, long: long 
history firms, short: short history firms, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity 
issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 










































































Obs 7198 15936 7108 14977 









Table A.5.9 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on firms‟ age 
The table shows that firms with long history use more debt for a new investment from Panels A, B 
and C; and Panel D indicates that short history firms use more equity for a new investment.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 






















































Obs 7412 20560 7305 19065 
Adj-R2 0.0748 0.0742 0.0280 0.0392 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue/ assett Panel D: Net equity issue/ assett 














































Obs 6423 15808 6410 15637 





Table A.5.10 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on firms‟ age 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.00 0.0002 0.00 0.00 
Obs 7412 20560 7305 19065 
 
Panel C: Net long-term debt issue/ 
assett 
Panel D: Net equity issue/assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0095 0.0094 0.2065 0.2383 
Obs 6423 15808 6410 15637 
 
Table A.5.11 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with firms‟ age 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: MDRt  Panel B: ∆MDRt 































R2 0.8658 0.7460 R2 0.1253 0.2193 
Obs 8566 22033 Obs 4292 8016 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt Panel D: ∆BDRt 
Panel E: Net equity 
issue/assett 



























Adj-R2 0.1251 0.1335 0.0148 0.0108 0.00 0.003 







Table A.5.12 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different 
measures, based on firms‟ age 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjusting speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 
capital structure determinants though we do not report these coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are 
used as instruments in Panels C and D respectively. For the syntax of xtabond2, eq(level) lag(1 2) and 
collapse options are used for gmm-style and eq(level) option is used for iv-style. The values in the 
square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the 
endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 





















Adj-R2 0.0521 0.0675 0.0673 0.0791 
Obs 4708 10506 4329 8127 
 Panel C: BDRt Panel D: MDRt 









































Inst L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 L1. L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 







5.3 Bankruptcy Probability 
 
Table A.5.13 Descriptive characteristics, based on bankruptcy probability 
 
A univariate comparison of the means and medians of measures of firm characteristics are based on 
the bankruptcy probability between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, Median values are in square brackets. The combined pb-area is defined by a series of z‟-score 
based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which the details of Z-score models are described). All 
variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
Variables Combined bp area Z‟ score area 
















































































































































BP 1 2 3 1 2 3 







Table A.5.14 Debt ratio and the component of Z‟-score model, based on bankruptcy probability 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, (∆)DRt=(WC/TA)t+(RE/TA)t+(EBIT/TA)t+(ME/BD)t+(SALE/TA)t+εt. This table is based on Z‟-score model rather than using the 
values from combined models since the variable of combined bankruptcy probability (BP) is calculated with different variables from different models. Therefore, even 
though firms are in the same good area in bankruptcy probability, they contain different determinants for the bankruptcy probability decision. WC: Working Capital, 
TA: Total Asset, RE: Retained Earnings, ME: Market Value Equity, EBIT: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, BD: Book Value of Total Debt, SALE: sale, *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Panel A 
  BDRt MDRt 

















































































































Adj-R2 0.3798 0.5028 0.2897 0.1199 0.1668 0.5537 0.4317 0.4211 






Table A.5.14 Continued  
 
 Panel B 
   ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 






















































































































Adj-R2 0.2828 0.3103 0.3541 0.3253 0.2057 0.4180 0.3982 0.2774 








Table A.5.15 Debt ratio changes based on bankruptcy probability, using the Baker 
and Wurgler model (2002) 
 
The combined pb-area is defined by a series of z‟-score based models (see Section 5.3.2.2.6 in which 
the details of Z-score models are described).  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, A: total asset, RE: retained 
earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the 
residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance 
at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A: ∆BDRt 
 Combined pbarea Z‟-score area 
















































































































Adj-R2 0.1630 0.2845 0.1362 0.1598 0.2654 0.1821 
Obs 14460 4653 7381 14242 3657 5822 
OLS Panel B: ∆MDRt 
 Combined pbarea Z‟-score area 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0642 0.894 0.0210 0.0579 0.0623 0.0413 









Table A.5.16 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on 
bankruptcy probability 
 
Panels A and B show that working capital increase dramatically and investment is negatively 
associated with debt ratio for bad condition firms. This implies that financially bad firms increase 
equity for new investment unlike rest conditional firms and they also accumulate or increase cash-
holding in the firms by issuing equity.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. This table is based by combined bankruptcy probability rather than z‟-
score area. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 


































































Adj-R2 0.0637 0.1021 0.1396 0.0434 0.0522 0.0569 
Obs 17361 5680 9096 16363 5292 8282 
 Panel  C: Net long-term debt issue/ assett Panel  D: Net equity issue/ assett 


































































Adj-R2 0.0517 0.0815 0.0468 0.3728 0.2136 0.2677 











Table A.5.17 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on bankruptcy 
probability 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity 
issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-
term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial 
deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: 
working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. This table is based by combined bankruptcy 
probability rather than z‟-score area. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 



























Adj-R2 0.0028 0.0016 0.0091 0.0021 0.0026 0.0002 
Obs 17361 5680 9096 16363 5292 8282 
 Panel  C: Net long-term debt issue/assett Panel  D: Net equity issue/assett 



























Adj-R2 0.0159 0.0244 0.0139 0.2491 0.1216 0.2549 









Table A.5.18 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with leverage level, based on 
bankruptcy probability 
 
The first columns imply that capital structure is not decided by only stock prices and does not support 
Welch‟s (2004) inertia theory. It is clear however that observing MDRt-1, and IDRt,t+1, firms in good 
area are more affected by stock price effect. This implies that rather issuing new securities, firms let 
change their capital structure by stock price effect when their bankruptcy probabilities are low. From 
the second column, that firms likely change capital structures more actively and stock price effect 
(SPEt,t+1) is getting reduced as bankruptcy probability increases. This implies that firms with high 
level of bankruptcy probability conduct more actively to escape from the situation.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset. This table is based by combined bankruptcy probability rather than 
z‟-score area. MDR: market-based debt ratio, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock 
returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: 
target2t-MDRt-1, target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 
0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel  A: Goodt-1 
 MDR ∆MDR ∆MDR ∆BDR 
























   
SPE t,t+1  
.3697 
(38.00)*** 
   







Adj-R2 0.7131 0.1811 0.1401 0.0152 0.003 
Obs 19541 7572 19539 19769 13978 
 Panel  B: Gray t-1 
 MDR ∆MDR ∆MDR ∆BDR 
























   
SPE t,t+1  
.2458 
(20.61)*** 
   







Adj-R2 0.7119 0.1951 0.1937 0.0187 0.00 










Table A.5.18 Continued  
 
 Panel  C: Bad t-1 
 MDR ∆MDR ∆MDR ∆BDR 
























   
SPE t,t+1  
.1892 
(18.48)*** 
   







Adj-R2 0.7313 0.1694 0.1273 0.011 0.0039 











Table A.5.19 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different 
measures, based on bankruptcy probability 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t – BDRt-1, 
speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-
based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment 
speed) in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C 
and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use 
all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDR and capital 
expenditure is instrumented in Panel C. MDR and capital expenditure is used as instruments in Panel 
D. Command xtabond2 uses eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style, and eq(level) for iv-style. The 
values in the square brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value 
suggests the endogenous variables. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. This table is based by 
combined bankruptcy probability rather than z‟-score area. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 





















   







Adj-R2 0.0363 0.0619 0.0741 0.0268 0.0629 0.0820 
Obs 9503 2698 3924 7724 2579 3315 
 Panel  C: BDRt Panel  D: MDRt 





















   













AR(1) -8.99*** -1.97** -4.63*** -7.00*** -5.34*** -7.43*** 















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 11 11 11 11 11 11 








5.4 Overleveraged and underleveraged firms 
 
Table A.5.20 Descriptive statistics of over-and-under-leverage level firms with 
different target debt ratios  
 
Note, BDR-un: the levels of underleveraged book based debt ratios, the target calculated using OLS 
regression. BDR-ov: the level of overleveraged book based debt ratios, the target calculated using 
OLS regression. MDR-un: the levels of underleveraged market-based debt ratios, the target calculated 
using OLS regression. MDR-ov: the levels of overleveraged market-based debt ratios, the target 
calculated using OLS regression. TBDR-un: the levels of underleveraged book based debt ratios, the 
target calculated using Tobit model, TBDR-ov: the levels of overleveraged book based debt ratios, the 
target calculated using Tobit model, TMDR-un: the levels of underleveraged market-based debt ratios, 
the target calculated using Tobit model, TMDR-ov: the levels of overleveraged market-based debt 
ratios, the target calculated using Tobit model. 













N 8864 10060 5794 9703 9691 8803 6321 8922 
mean 0.082 -0.204 0.051 -0.172 0.100 -0.195 0.063 -0.165 
min 0.000 -1.837 0.000 -0.709 0.000 -1.837 0.000 -0.685 
p25 0.037 -0.275 0.018 -0.254 0.044 -0.259 0.023 -0.243 
p50 0.070 -0.153 0.039 -0.142 0.085 -0.140 0.050 -0.133 
p75 0.113 -0.071 0.073 -0.061 0.140 -0.063 0.090 -0.059 
p99 0.280 -0.003 0.185 -0.002 0.331 -0.002 0.225 -0.002 
max 0.659 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.795 -0.000 0.471 0.000 
sd 0.062 0.200 0.043 0.136 0.075 0.200 0.051 0.132 
skewness 1.719 -2.699 1.387 -0.927 1.595 -2.772 1.330 -0.976 










Table A.5.21 Descriptive characteristics by leverage levels 
 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on leverage 
level between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets.  
Note, all variables are defined in Section 5.3. Extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined 
as firms are in the fourth quartile among the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the 
over-leveraged firms respectively. For example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is 
greater than 0.113 and smaller than -0.275 with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in 
Appendix 5).  
 OLS regressed target Tobit regressed target 













































































































































































































































Table A.5.22 Debt ratio changes based on leverage levels, using the Baker and 
Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among 
the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively. For 
example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and smaller than -0.275 
with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio 
change, 
∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, e: equity, RE: retained earnings, -(e/A): equity 
issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. 
Independent variables with ∆MDR are based on market-based target debt ratios for the decision of 
level of debt ratio criteria, and the independent variables with ∆BDR are based on book based target 
debt ratio. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.2181 0.0623 0.0873 0.0464 










Table A.5.23 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on leverage 
levels 
 
Panels A and B show that debt increasing with extremely overleveraged firms is less associated with 
new investment while extremely underleveraged firms is more associated with new investment. This 
implies that underleveraged firms more use debt for new investment than overleveraged firms. This is 
also evidence of static trade-off theory.  
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms in the fourth quartile among the 
under-leveraged firms and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively (see, Table 
A.5.20 in Appendix 5). DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: 
book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net 
long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: 
financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital 
expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. All regressions in this table are based on 
book based target ratio except the models with the independent variable of ∆MDR. *** significance at 
0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel  A: ∆BDRt Panel  B: ∆MDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.1597 0.0719 0.0472 0.05 
Obs 1946 1543 1676 1078 
 
Panel  C: Net long-term debt issue / 
assett 
Panel  D: Net equity issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.1001 0.0413 0.2158 0.5333 








Table A.5.24 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1) with Flannery and 
Rangan‟s (2006) model, based on leverage levels 
 
The table implies that over-leveraged firms at time t-1 use equity at time t, while under-leveraged 
firms use debt for new investments.  
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms in the fourth quartile among the 
under-leveraged firms and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively (see, Table 
A.5.20 in Appendix 5). DEF1t=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: 
market-based debt ratio change, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: 
dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and 
taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. DEF1 
levels indicate the levels of financial deficit for only firms who are extremely over-leveraged or 
under-leveraged at time t-1. The regression with ∆BDR uses book based OLS regressed-target debt 
ratio and with ∆MDR uses market-based OLS regressed-target debt ratio. Independent variables with 
∆MDR are based on market-based target debt ratios for the decision of level of debt ratio criteria, and 
the independent variables with ∆BDR are based on book based target debt ratio. *** significance at 
0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
Leverage level Panel A : Extremely overleveraged at time t-1 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0293 0.002 0.0256 0.0367 
Obs 1214 732 1031 645 
Leverage level Panel B : Extremely underleveraged at time t-1 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0422 0.0105 0.005 0.0224 














Table A.5.25 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on leverage 
levels 
 
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among 
the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively. For 
example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and smaller than -0.275 
with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio 
change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt 
retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after 
interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. 
The leverage level is based on time t-1. All regressions in this table are based on book based target 
ratio except the models with the independent variable of ∆MDR. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.01 0.0467 0.0048 0.0054 
Obs 1946 1543 1676 1078 
 
Panel C: Net long-term debt issue/ 
assett 
Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0623 0.0316 0.20 0.4702 







Table A.5.26 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with leverage levels 
 
Table shows that stock price effect is greater for extremely overleveraged firms and that extremely 
overleveraged firms adjust capital structure more rapidly than extremely underleveraged firms. It also 
shows stock prices lead debt decrease more for extremely overleveraged firms. This result is not much 
different with the result moderately over- or under-leveraged firms.  
Note, extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth quartile among 
the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms respectively. For 
example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and smaller than -0.275 
with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). Independent variables with MDR and 
∆MDR are based on market-based target debt ratio for the decision of level of debt ratio criteria, and 
the independent variables with ∆BDR and stock issue to asset are based on book based target debt 
ratio. MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: Extremely overleveraged t-1 



























   







Adj-R2 0.3880 0.1637 0.0276 0.1608 0.0006 
Obs 1937 1807 2130 1934 1822 
 Panel B: Extremely underleveragedt-1 



























   







Adj-R2 0.3197 0.0310 0.0150 0.0553 0.0091 







Table A.5.27 A comparison of „capital structure adjustment speeds‟, based on 
leverage levels 
 
Independent variables with (∆)MDR are based on market-based target debt ratios for the decision of 
level of debt ratio criteria, and the independent variables with (∆)BDR are based on book based target 
debt ratio.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio. Overt-1 and undert-1 indicate that 
over-and under leveraged firms and ex-unt-1 and ex-ovt-1 are extremely underleveraged and 
overleveraged. Extremely over- and under-leveraged firms are defined as firms are in the fourth 
quartile among the under-leveraged firms, and in the first quartile among the over-leveraged firms 
respectively. For example, the value (of target debt ratio-actual debt ratio) is greater than 0.113 and 
smaller than -0.275 with book-based debt ratios (see, Table A.5.20 in Appendix 5). Speed1= target1t-
BDRt-1, speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: 
market-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure 
adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in 
Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). BDRt-1 is instrumented for 
Panel C, MDRt-1 and profitability are instrumented for Panel D. Panels C and D use System GMM 
with options of small robust and two step, with sub-options of eq(level) and lag(1 2) collapsed for 
gmm-style, and of eq(level) for iv-style. The values in the square brackets are the significant levels of 
J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous variables.  *** significance at 0.01 
level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 



























    









Ajd R2 0.0541 0.0109 0.0764 0.0311 0.0702 0.0089 0.0537 0.0063 
Obs 8311 6959 2022 1606 7725 4337 1842 1132 
 Panel C: BDRt Panel D: MDRt 

































    









AR(1) -7.04*** -1.09 -3.70*** 0.60 -6.74*** -1.11 -2.55** 0.84 



















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 39 12 73 73 71 





5.5 Different period 
 
Table A.5.28 Descriptive characteristics with two periods 
 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on two 
different periods between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets.  
Note, all variables are defined in Section 5.3. 1995 is the first year in this table because the variable of 
„Vol‟ is a 5 year standard deviation of earnings. 
 1995-2001 2002-2008 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
BDR .23 [.18] .22 [.15] 
MDR .18 [.12] .16 [.1] 
Netcash .69 [.16] .71 [.19] 
Lnasset 5.05 [5.11] 4.69 [4.69] 
Tang .26 [.21] .22 [.15] 
Tax .35 [.34] .30 [.26] 
Capex .07 [.04] .05 [.02] 
R&D .08 [.02] .08 [.02] 
MB 1.92 [1.28] 1.81 [1.29] 
Profit -.03 [.04] -.05 [.038] 
Vol .07 [.03] .09 [.04] 
BP 1.69 [1] 1.8 [1] 
Obs 17003 30318 
 
 
Table A.5.29 Debt ratio changes between different period, using the Baker and 
Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 










































































Obs 9236 19499 8371 18398 








Table A.5.30 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on different 
period 
 
The two periods are very similar, but table shows that new investment are less associated debt 
increase and firm increase working capital in the second period. This implies that firms decrease debt 
in the second period.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0823 0.0756 0.0410 0.0401 
Obs 10972 24748 9739 22690 
 
Panel C: Net long-term debt issue/ 
assett 
Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.0421 0.0388 0.3483 0.2879 










Table A.5.31 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on different 
period 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0031 0.0006 0.00 0.00 
Obs 10972 24748 9739 22690 
 net long-term debt issue / assett Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0067 0.0125 0.2814 0.24 










Table A.5.32 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with different period 
 
Table shows that stock price effect is greater in the second period than in the first period though the 
difference is not great.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t=target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: 1995-2001 

























   
SPE t,t+1  
.2029 
(17.85)*** 
   







Adj-R2 0.8262 0.1410 0.1152 0.0066 0.0029 
Obs 12225 2896 12225 12583 9307 
 Panel B: 2002-2008 

























   
SPE t,t+1  
.2437 
(39.94)*** 
   







Adj-R2 0.7609 0.1822 0.1351 0.0147 0.0031 









Table A.5.33 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between two periods 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, Speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). Panels C and D use the System GMM. 
BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are instrumented for Panels C and D respectively. The values in the square 
brackets are the significant levels of J statistic (Hansen p-value); C test value suggests the endogenous 
variables. xtabond2 uses options of robust small and twosteps, and eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed as sub-
options for gmm-style and eq(level) for iv-style. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 
level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 





















Adj-R2 0.0623 0.0625 0.0441 0.0696 
Obs 3785 14178 2984 11614 
 Panel C: BDR Panel D: MDR 





















AR(1) -4.50*** -9.08*** -9.02*** -13.01*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 





5.6 Stock return 
 
Table A.5.34 Descriptive characteristics by stock return 
 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on stock 
return between 1989 and 2008. Median values are in square brackets.   
Note, we segregate data based on log(stock return). 1Q<-.43, -.43≤2Q<-.046,  -.046≤3Q <.25 and .25≤ 
4Q. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
































































































































Table A.5.35 Debt ratio changes based on stock return, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.1198 0.1313 0.1081 0.1847 
Obs 6687 6863 7199 8053 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


















































































Adj-R2 0.0329 0.0414 0.0432 0.0499 











Table A.5.36 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on stock 
return 
 
From Panel D, the new investment reduces as stock return increase and working capital change and 
internal cash increase. This implies that new issuance of equity is more related to increase liquidity 
asset rather than to real investment. This supports the idea of issuing equity caused by overvalued 
stock price.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0817 0.0539 0.0652 0.0511 
Obs 8049 8427 8732 9449 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0431 0.0471 0.0346 0.0174 











Table A.5.36 Continued  
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.0386 0.0621 0.0511 0.0408 
Obs 6459 6487 6918 7929 
 Panel D : Net equity issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.2490 0.3605 0.3665 0.3925 











Table A.5.37 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on stock return 
 
From Panel D, gradual increase of equity issuance with increasing stock return is observed.  
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity 
issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-
term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial 
deficit defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: 
working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.00 0.0015 0.0001 0.0024 
Obs 8049 8427 8732 9449 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0005 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 
Obs 7782 8254 8574 9243 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0110 0.0115 0.02 0.0113 
Obs 6459 6487 6918 7929 
 Panel D: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2191 0.2673 0.2669 0.3137 






Table A.5.38 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with stock return 
Table shows that stock return affects on mostly first and fourth quartile firms, but Panel B indicates 
that stock price effects are similar across the sample, based on stock return. Panel D shows clear 
evidence that firms with extremely overvalued (high stock returns) issue equity otherwise stock return 
is in generally negatively associated to equity issuance.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-
term debt retirement‟)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Panel A:  MDRt 






























 0.7154 0.8519 0.8521 0.8011 
Obs 9999 10728 10749 10817 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.0553 0.0183 0.0929 0.2777 
Obs 3342 3826 3923 4018 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0402 0.0056 0.0026 0.0249 
Obs 9999 10728 10749 10817 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0096 0.00 0.00 0.0017 
Obs 10189 10921 10906 11010 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0119 0.0007 0.0001 0.0147 
Obs 7795 7503 7787 8797 
428 
 
Table A.5.39 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison between different stock 
return 
The table shows that „capital structure speed‟ increases as stock returns increase.  
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 
capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are 
used as instrument for Panels C and D respectively. The Panels C and D use System GMM and use 
options of small, robust and twostep for options of xtabond2, the suboptions of eq(level) lag(1 2) 
collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for iv-style. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 
0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0358 0.0383 0.0868 0.1075 
Obs 4502 4585 4559 4865 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0033 0.0184 0.0917 0.2330 
Obs 3342 3826 3923 4018 
 Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -3.03*** -5.92*** -4.40*** -3.06*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4868 4917 4856 5447 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -3.85*** -6.38*** -6.26*** -4.83*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4819 4898 4850 5419 
429 
 
5.7 Growth opportunities 
 
Table A.5.40 Descriptive characteristics by growth opportunities 
 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on capital 
expenditure and research and development expenses between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The criteria of capital expenditure and R&D expenses are 
as follows: 1Q<0.011, 0.011≤ 2Q<.031, 0.031≤3Q<0.07, 0.07≤4Q in capital expenditure to asset; 
1Q<0.0017, 0.0017≤2Q<0.018, 0.018≤3Q<0.092, 0.092≤4Q in R&D to asset. All variables are 
defined in Section 5.3. 
 Capital expenditure / assett R&D / assett 
























































































































































































































Table A.5.41 Debt ratio changes based on growth opportunities, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): 
increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: Capital expenditure / asset 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 








































































































































































Obs 6634 7986 8128 7837 6243 7540 7703 7110 
Adj-R
2








Table A.5.41 Continued 
 
 Panel B: R&D / asset 
 ∆BDRt ∆MDRt 






































































































































































Obs 4737 4060 4700 5269 4388 3871 4439 5000 
Adj-R
2







Table A.5.42 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components with capital expenditure 
 
Table shows that the association between debt ratio change and working capital change is increased with increasing capital expenditure whereas the association 
between debt ratio change and working capital change is decreased.  
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase 
stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and 
Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net 
income+depreciation). All items are scaled by total asset. We do not analysis based on research expenditure, because the DEF1 includes the capital expenditures. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Capital expenditure/ asset 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt Panel B: ∆MDRt 






















































































Adj-R2 0.0778 0.0671 0.0860 0.0960 0.0258 0.0254 0.0363 0.0475 











Table A.5.42 Continued 
 
 
 Capital expenditure/ asset 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 






















































































Adj-R2 0.0178 0.0142 0.0098 0.0491 0.2692 0.2914 0.2911 0.3732 







Table A.5.43 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on capital 
expenditure 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Capital Expenditure / asset 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 



























Adj-R2 0.0005 0.00 0.001 0.0179 
Obs 9004 9723 9731 9671 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs 8315 8957 8957 8483 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0171 0.0136 0.006 0.004 
Obs 6448 7613 7960 8076 
 Panel D: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2331 0.2314 0.2169 0.3016 









Table A.5.44 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on R&D 
expenditure 
 
Note, DEF1t=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Research and Development Expenditure / asset 
 Panel E: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.00 0.0105 0.0012 0.0003 
Obs 5245 5342 5708 5827 
 Panel F: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0003 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs 4823 4998 5204 5383 
 Panel G: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0111 0.0154 0.0210 0.0196 
Obs 4674 3989 4638 5320 
 Panel H: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.1572 0.1936 0.2318 0.3255 





Table A.5.45 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on capital expenditure 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total 
asset, BDR: book-based debt ratio, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Capital expenditure /asset 
Panel A:  MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.7401 0.8269 0.8295 0.7741 
Obs 9942 10117 9955 9132 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.1432 0.1534 .0716 0.2672 
Obs 3559 4202 4040 3264 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.99 0.1366 0.1692 0.1898 
Obs 9919 10110 9947 9129 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0131 0.0134 0.0209 0.0114 
Obs 10028 10265 10118 9343 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0014 0.0034 0.0002 0.004 





Table A.5.46 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on R&D expenditure 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return), SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Research and Development expenditure / asset 
Panel A:  MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.7602 0.8007 0.76 0.64 
Obs 5696 6246 5782 5694 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.1391 0.1396 0.2556 0.2573 
Obs 3885 4762 3862 2173 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.1451 0.1418 0.1461 0.1492 
Obs 5684 6246 5780 5689 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0145 0.0161 0.0137 0.0177 
Obs 5784 6356 5854 5666 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0079 0.0113 0.00 0.0001 




Table A.5.47 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on capital 
expenditure 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, speed1= 
target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, 
target2: market-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital 
structure adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment 
speed‟ in Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating 
panels C and D, we use all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients 
here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are instrumented for Panels C and D respectively. The options for xtabond2 
command are twostep small robust and suboptions for gmm-style are eq(level) lag(1 2) and collapsed 
and for iv-style is eq(level) for the Panels C and D. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 
0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Capital Expenditure / Asset 
Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0506 0.0496 0.0826 0.0721 
Obs 4518 5378 4972 3964 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0728 0.0554 0.0614 0.0524 
Obs 3621 4262 4115 3388 
 Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -3.66*** -4.26*** -6.15*** -5.02*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4814 5790 5419 4429 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -6.98*** -7.50*** -7.52*** -5.45*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4789 5764 5397 4395 
439 
 
Table A.5.48 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on R&D 
expenditure 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 
capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are 
instrumented for Panels C and D respectively. The options for xtabond2 are twostep small robust and 
suboptions for gmm-style are eq(level) lag(1 2) and collapsed and for iv-style is eq(level) for the 
Panels C and D. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS 
Research and Development Expenditure/ Asset 
Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



























Adj-R2 0.0661 0.057 0.0784 0.0566 
Obs 4486 5113 4847 3911 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0579 0.0687 0.0769 0.077 
Obs 4022 4794 3956 2215 
 Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -4.95*** -6.83*** -5.55*** -5.66*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4608 5169 5219 4949 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -7.64*** -7.27*** -8.70*** -6.06*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 





Table A.5.49 Descriptive characteristics by profitability 
 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firms‟ characteristics based on 
profitability between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The value of 1st Q <= -0.022, -0.022 < 2nd Q <= 0.04, 
0.04 < 3rd Q <= 0.093, and 4th Q > 0.093. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 Profit / asset 






























































































































Table A.5.50 Debt ratio changes based on profitability, using the Baker and Wurgler 
model (2002)  
 
Note, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained 
earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, 
∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.1168 0.1222 0.2779 0.2123 
Obs 8197 6672 7426 8653 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.0241 0.0462 0.1056 0.07 









Table A.5.51 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on 
profitability 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0915 0.0629 0.0635 0.0572 
Obs 9831 8353 9689 10146 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0426 0.0660 0.0508 0.0255 










Table A.5.51 Continued 
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 




















































Adj-R2 0.0294 0.0876 0.0667 0.0401 
Obs 8299 5942 7374 8393 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.2679 0.1759 0.2156 0.2379 












Table A.5.52 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on profitability 
 
Note, DEF1t=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0069 0.0011 0.0002 0.00 
Obs 9831 8353 9689 10146 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0025 0.00 0.003 0.003 
Obs 8941 7736 8930 8993 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0105 0.0140 0.0176 0.0137 
Obs 8299 5942 7374 8393 
 Panel D: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2392 0.969 0.0998 0.1145 







Table A.5.53 Debt ratio change and stock price effect with profitability 
 
From the table, firms in the fourth quartile and in the first quartile are affected most by stock price 
effect. This table also implies that firms in the first quartile adjust capital structure rapidly. This is 
consistent to the next analyse of partial adjustment speed.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return), SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A:  MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.6589 0.8241 0.8024 0.7821 
Obs 9988 11081 10770 9828 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.2256 0.0933 0.1563 0.2608 
Obs 3235 4164 4348 3332 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.1167 0.1228 0.1491 0.1401 
Obs 9960 11081 10769 9827 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0098 0.0092 0.0062 0.0096 
Obs 10110 11402 11050 10042 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0025 0.0024 0.0016 0.0014 




Table A.5.54 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on profitability 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 
capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are 
instrumented for Panels C and D respectively. xtabond2 command uses options of small robust 
twostep, and sub-options of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for iv-style for 
Panels C and D. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0513 0.0522 0.0795 0.1212 
Obs 4658 4669 4923 4615 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0808 0.0387 0.0633 0.175 
Obs 3308 4241 4434 3418 
Sys-GMM Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -4.29*** -6.53*** -4.44*** -5.75*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 5190 4802 5070 5430 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -7.93*** -7.89*** -7.59*** -6.38*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 




5.9 Asset tangibility 
 
Table A.5.55 Descriptive characteristics with asset tangibility 
 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on tangibility 
between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. The value of 1st Q<0.063, 0.063≤2nd Q <0.183, 
0.183≤3rd Q < 0.376, 0.376 ≤4th Q in asset tangibility. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 
 Tangibility 























































































































Table A.5.56 Debt ratio changes based on asset tangibility, using the Baker and 
Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, 
RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-
1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 










































































Adj-R2 0.0945 0.1767 0.1757 0.1952 
Obs 7888 8045 7358 7530 
 Baker and Wurgler (2002): ∆MDRt 


















































































Adj-R2 0.0210 0.0441 0.0283 0.0457 









Table A.5.57 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on asset 
tangibility 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0568 0.0975 0.0858 0.1283 
Obs 9674 9785 9299 9202 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 














































Adj-R2 0.0219 0.0365 0.0617 0.0824 










Table A.5.57 Continued 
 
 Panel C:  Net long-term debt issue / assett 




















































Adj-R2 0.0072 0.0128 0.0537 0.1406 
Obs 7709 7996 7060 7181 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 














































Adj-R2 0.3121 0.3455 0.3023 0.2102 








Table A.5.58 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on asset 
tangibility 
 
Note, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, ∆MDR: market-based debt 
ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-term debt 
issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1: financial deficit 
defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working 
capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). All 
items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0083 0.0014 0.00 0.006 
Obs 9674 9785 9299 9202 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0008 0.0001 0.00 0.0011 
Obs 8468 8994 8703 8409 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0068 0.0066 0.0097 0.0375 
Obs 7709 7996 7060 7181 
 Panel D: Net equity issuance/ assett 



















Adj-R2 0.2672 0.2651 0.2302 0.1452 






Table A.5.59 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on asset tangibility 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale 
stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), 
SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, 
target2: „market-based target debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** 
significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A:  MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.671 0.7486 0.79 0.7831 
Obs 9929 10610 10950 10636 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 




























Adj-R2 0.1550 0.1478 0.1611 0.2233 
Obs 2399 3904 4773 4030 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0834 0.1311 0.1393 0.1987 
Obs 9905 10605 10941 10632 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0055 0.0198 0.0141 0.0175 
Obs 10034 10684 11098 10982 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 



















Adj-R2 0.0001 0.0024 0.005 0.0071 
Obs 7928 8259 7650 7841 
453 
 
Table A.5.60 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison based on asset 
tangibility 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= 
target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS, target2: market-based 
target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) 
in Panels A and B. The coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D 
are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we use all 7 
capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are 
used as instruments in the Panels C and D. xtabond2 uses options of twostep robust and small and 
sub-options of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style and of eq(level) for iv-style for Panels C and 
D. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
OLS Panel A:  ∆BDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.1087 0.0414 0.0433 0.0581 
Obs 4143 5165 5249 4337 
 Panel B:  ∆MDRt 



















Adj-R2 0.0575 0.0589 0.0627 0.0737 
Obs 2436 3961 4884 4146 
 Panel C: BDRt 



















AR(1) -5.41*** -6.72*** -3.00*** -3.86*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 
Obs 4812 5763 5539 4406 
 Panel D: MDRt 



















AR(1) -6.49*** -7.58*** -8.00*** -9.42*** 











Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 





Table A.5.61 Descriptive characteristics of different countries 
 
The univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics is based on countries between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, 
ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. 




































































































































































Table A.5.61 Continued 
 












































































































































Table A.5.62 Debt ratio changes based on different countries, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): 
increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: 
Taiwan. 
 Panel A:  ∆BDRt 


































































































































Adj-R2 0.0811 0.1445 0.1216 0.1423 0.1278 0.1044 0.1101 0.1333 0.2155 0.2327 0.1326 









Table A.5.62 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 




































































































































 0.0279 0.0500 0.0222 0.028 0.0407 0.0084 0.0590 0.0663 0.058 0.1261 0.0887 






Table A.5.63 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on different countries 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-
term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). 
All items are scaled by total asset. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United State of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: 
Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 




















































































































Adj-R2 0.0541 -.1074 0.0976 0.0757 0.1816 0.0802 0.0737 0.236 0.0983 0.1154 0.0593 












Table A.5.63 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 




















































































































Adj-R2 0.0456 0.0395 0.0333 0.0346 0.0458 0.0372 0.0356 0.1052 0.0516 0.0799 0.0567 









Table A.5.63 Continued 
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 






























































































































Adj-R2 0.0329 0.0333 0.0245 0.0367 0.0025 0.0210 0.0845 0.0497 0.0873 0.0541 0.2119 
Obs 1389 1161 2517 14216 95 1004 1530 371 4049 1929 1836 
 Panel D: Net equity debt issue / assett 
































































































































Adj-R2 0.2863 0.5163 0.3500 0.2809 0.7622 0.2831 0.2192 0.2105 0.285 0.2892 0.1873 





Table A.5.64 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on different countries 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-
term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). 
All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, 
USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 















































Adj-R2 0.00 0.00 0.0224 0.0012 0.0151 0.0087 0.0001 0.112 0.0001 0.003 0.0001 
Obs 1524 1479 2530 14322 198 2008 2132 488 7940 2343 3165 















































Adj-R2 0.00 0.0005 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001 0.0177 0.0002 0.00 0.00 







Table A.5.64 Continued 
 















































Adj-R2 0.00 0.0152 0.0001 0.0112 0.00 0.01 0.0292 0.00 0.0437 0.0134 0.0762 
Obs 1389 1161 2517 14216 95 1004 1530 371 4049 1929 1836 















































Adj-R2 0.1895 0.4307 0.1823 0.2599 0.5875 0.1878 0.0714 0.1291 0.1129 0.1504 0.0562 






Table A.5.65 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on different countries 
 
The table shows that debt ratios are affected by stock price effect. Generally speaking, debt ratios in Taiwan, the U.S, Korea and Germany are heavily affected by stock 
price. Table also indicates that debt ratio change is negatively associated stock price across countries. Panel C implies that firms issue equity all the time. As we know 
that last two decades, firms across countries gradually reduces debt ratio, Panel C is also reflected by the debt reducing.  
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-
1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return). SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, Speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, target2: „market-based target 
debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: 
Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level  
 Panel A: MDRt 






































































Adj-R2 0.632 0.7666 0.7041 0.7460 0.8713 0.7321 0.7746 0.7759 0.8728 0.7189 0.7685 
Obs 1761 1481 2667 14439 200 2207 2127 492 11597 2334 3032 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 






































































Adj-R2 0.1791 0.1253 0.1514 0.2420 0.4847 0.2218 0.1966 0.0718 0.0649 0.1796 0.3760 






Table A.5.65 Continued 
 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 





























































Adj-R2 0.0354 0.0934 0.0809 0.1746 0.1758 0.1296 0.1360 0.1668 0.0358 0.166 0.2745 
Obs 1756 1480 2659 14409 200 2207 2127 492 11597 2334 3032 















































Adj-R2 0.0013 0.02 0.0067 0.0139 0.00 0.0186 0.01 0.0143 0.002 0.0259 0.0349 
Obs 1816 1562 2716 14320 203 2245 2165 498 11918 2474 3109 































































Adj-R2 0.0239 0.0001 0.0066 0.0012 0.0031 0.0049 0.003 0.00 0.0073 0.0075 0.009 







Table A.5.66 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on different countries 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio calculated 
using OLS, target2: market-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The 
coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we 
use all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. BDRt-1 and MDRt-1 are used as instrument in Panels C and D respectively. 
Panels C and D use System GMM and use options of small, robust and twostep for options of xtabond2, the suboptions of eq(level) lag(1 2) collapsed for gmm-style 
and of eq(level) for iv-style. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: 
United States of America, AUT: Austria, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, TWN: Taiwan. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 















































Adj-R2 0.0811 0.0352 0.0539 0.0662 0.2006 0.0347 0.0495 0.0062 0.0497 0.1072 0.0603 
Obs 537 575 866 7504 53 581 450 107 4665 1557 2017 















































Adj-R2 0.0365 0.0664 0.0857 0.0666 0.236 0.055 0.0532 0.0246 0.0539 0.0822 0.0872 







Table A.5.66 Continued 
 
 Panel C: BDRt 
Sys 
GMM 















































AR(1) -2.23*** -3.06*** -2.40** -6.18*** -0.28 -3.01*** -3.08*** -2.35*** -6.26*** -3.43*** -7.24*** 

























Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Obs 586 652 996 8685 57 616 478 109 4710 1566 2086 



































































AR(1) -2.67*** -2.93*** -2.71*** -9.98*** 0.82 -3.00*** -3.10*** -1.95* -9.04*** -4.48*** -6.02*** 

























Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 






Table A.5.67 Descriptive characteristics by industry 
Univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of firm characteristics based on industry between 1989 and 2008.  
Note, median values are in square brackets. All variables are defined in Section 5.3. Icbsub: the codes of ICB industry subsector classification are defined in Table 
A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 














































































































































































































































Table A.5.67 Continued 





























































































































































































































































































































Table A.5.67 Continued 
 








































































































































































Table A.5.68 Debt ratio changes based on different industries, using the Baker and Wurgler model (2002)  
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, A: total asset, RE: retained earnings, e: equity, -(e/A): equity issue, -(RE/A): 
increased retained earnings, -(Et-1(1/At-1/At-1): the residual change in leverage. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. 
The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0083 0.2686 0.2011 0.1968 0.3541 0.2567 0.3027 0.3432 0.2779 







Table A.5.68 Continued 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.1245 0.1257 0.2249 0.1302 0.3201 0.1899 0.1363 0.1853 0.0599 
Obs 2626 800 1592 2252 313 891 1692 399 869 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.1799 0.2133 0.1710 0.1909 0.18 0.1507 0.1351 0.0655 0.1254 
Obs 520 541 757 408 1904 768 3852 2026 3020 
472 
 
Table A.5.68 Continued 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0786 0.0766 0.1046 0.1829 0.1094 0.1094 0.1650 0.0956 0.0139 
Obs 162 1167 2222 181 359 438 236 357 383 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0185 0.0805 0.0707 0.0374 0.0506 0.1139 0.0296 0.00 0.0303 





Table A.5.68 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


















































































































Adj-R2 0.0733 0.0348 0.0027 0.0479 0.0254 0.0192 0.0351 0.0243 0.06 









Table A.5.69 Debt ratio changes and financial deficit components, based on different industries 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-
term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). 
All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The full industry names are defined in Table 
A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0612 0.1400 0.0700 0.0677 0.1348 0.2603 0.1891 0.0969 0.1486 










Table A.5.69 Continued 
 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 


































































































Adj-R2 0.1055 0.019 0.1226 0.0725 0.1364 0.0723 0.015 0.1552 0.0548 
Obs 3532 890 1544 2654 378 1020 1915 375 854 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0569 0.0508 0.1729 0.0827 0.0985 0.0866 0.0694 0.0697 0.0540 






Table A.5.69 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 








































































































Adj-R2 0.1158 0.0906 0.0522 0.0965 0.1080 0.0466 0.0828 0.0521 0.0655 
Obs 202 1566 2932 227 502 472 310 436 430 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


































































































Adj-R2 0.0444 0.0000 0.0528 0.0329 0.0357 0.0825 0.0364 0.1042 0.0368 








Table A.5.69 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


































































































 0.0412 0.0171 0.0568 0.0459 0.0501 0.0426 0.0307 0.0518 0.0511 






Table A.5.69 Continued  
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.1792 0.1234 0.0370 0.1899 0.2199 0.0917 0.0946 0.0415 0.0672 
Obs 149 1237 2145 207 400 447 230 367 362 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0574 0.0732 0.0497 0.0150 0.0192 0.1362 0.0262 0.2441 0.0815 






Table A.5.69 Continued  
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.1349 0.0000 0.0711 0.0217 0.0298 0.0181 0.0139 0.0705 0.0729 




Table A.5.69 Continued 
 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.0513 0.2187 0.1816 0.1993 0.0334 0.1045 0.1749 0.3125 0.5409 
Obs 146 1230 2165 200 392 446 225 350 362 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.3069 0.0851 0.1764 0.3655 0.2697 0.0843 0.2429 0.1482 0.2367 






Table A.5.69 Continued 
 
 Panel D: Net equity issue / assett 
































































































Adj-R2 0.1501 0.2560 0.2636 0.1306 0.1500 0.2057 0.3152 0.2667 0.2935 







Table A.5.70 Debt ratio changes and financial deficits (DEF1), based on different industries 
 
Note, ∆MDR: market-based debt ratio change, ∆BDR: book-based debt ratio change, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, Net long-
term debt issuance/asset=(„long-term debt issue‟-„long-term debt retirement‟)/total asset, DEF1=DIVt+It+∆WCt-Ct, DEF1: financial deficit defined by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), DIV: dividend, I: investment (capital expenditure), WC: working capital, C: cash-flow after interest and taxes (=internal cash-flow or net income+depreciation). 
All items are scaled by total asset. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level. The full industry names are defined in Table 
A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 
Obs 230 1682 3058 261 548 504 319 464 449 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0056 0.0000 0.0026 0.0071 0.0000 0.0107 0.0113 0.0000 0.0017 
Obs 3532 890 1544 2654 378 1020 1915 375 854 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0013 0.0031 0.0001 0.0016 0.0000 







Table A.5.70 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0057 0.0034 0.0010 0.0053 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057 
Obs 202 1566 2932 227 502 472 310 436 430 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0011 0.0216 0.0016 0.0117 0.0000 
Obs 3382 804 1400 2338 347 959 1699 347 759 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 






Table A.5.70 Continued 
 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0063 0.0248 0.0012 0.0260 0.1259 0.0394 0.0000 0.0200 0.0172 
Obs 149 1237 2145 207 400 447 230 367 362 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0149 0.0198 0.0126 0.0096 0.0008 0.0526 0.0020 0.0523 0.0071 
Obs 2544 718 1370 2399 296 837 1614 371 792 
 Panel C: Net long-term debt issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0227 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0056 0.0131 0.0084 0.0152 0.0262 






Table A.5.70 Continued 
 
 Panel D: Net equity issue/ assett 













































Adj-R2 0.0191 0.1099 0.0835 0.0465 0.0059 0.0517 0.1411 0.1728 0.2102 
Obs 146 1230 2165 200 392 446 225 350 362 
 Panel D: Net equity issue/ assett 







































Adj-R2 0.2246 0.0756 0.1581 0.3305 0.2462 0.0411 0.2185 0.1303 0.2134 
Obs 2513 733 1385 2295 298 848 1598 367 793 
 Panel D: Net equity issue/ assett 





















































Adj-R2 0.0330 0.2150 0.2201 0.1012 0.1004 0.1470 0.2443 0.1974 0.2049 







Table A.5.71 Debt ratio change and stock price effect, based on different industries 
 
Note, MDR: market-based debt ratio, BDR: book-based debt ratio, Net equity issuance/asset =(sale stock-repurchase stock)/total asset, IDR: Implied debt ratio, IDRt-
1,t≡Dt-1/(Et-1·(1+stock returnt-1,t)+Dt-1), SR: stock return, log(1+annual stock return), SPEt-1,t=IDRt-1,t-MDRt-1, speed2t: target2t-MDRt-1, target2: „market-based target 
debt ratio‟ calculated using OLS. The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. *** significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * 
significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: MDRt 


























































Adj-R2 0.8206 0.7930 0.8228 0.8003 0.7922 0.8479 0.8252 0.7317 0.7983 








Table A.5.71 Continued 
 
 Panel A: MDRt 


























































Adj-R2 0.8292 0.7579 0.7369 0.5697 0.7309 0.8205 0.6867 0.8194 0.7468 
Obs 4629 983 1625 2484 378 1163 1947 360 878 
 Panel A: MDRt 


























































Adj-R2 0.8485 0.9176 0.6977 0.5727 0.6209 0.5833 0.6438 0.718 0.7531 





Table A.5.71 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 












































































Adj-R2 0.2216 0.1934 0.0959 0.3476 0.0838 0.0883 0.1614 0.0594 0.1232 
Obs 125 860 1714 46 94 373 84 121 165 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


























































Adj-R2 0.1246 0.1039 0.2190 0.2958 0.3263 0.0732 0.2152 0.2353 0.2894 
Obs 1860 370 372 617 114 272 413 85 318 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 


























































Adj-R2 0.3865 0.0456 0.2191 0.3634 0.1826 0.1877 0.2022 0.2352 0.3740 





Table A.5.71 Continued  
 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.1895 0.1763 0.0760 0.1109 0.2392 0.1329 0.0997 0.0294 0.1677 
Obs 239 2159 4302 242 713 567 395 518 570 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.1468 0.1569 0.1922 0.1289 0.0980 0.0828 0.1478 0.2447 0.2053 
Obs 4625 983 1622 2482 378 1163 1944 360 877 
 Panel C: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.2260 0.0687 0.1123 0.1546 0.0978 0.0703 0.1034 0.1452 0.1997 





Table A.5.71 Continued  
 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 



















































Adj-R2 0.0016 0.0114 0.0073 0.0116 0.0109 0.0194 0.0000 0.0000 0.0408 
Obs 260 2254 4383 246 750 583 406 526 568 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0153 0.0283 0.0104 0.0068 0.0161 0.0034 0.0178 0.0909 0.0027 
Obs 4659 1050 1672 2476 390 1191 1969 366 917 
 Panel D: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0152 0.0033 0.0016 0.0149 0.0173 0.0031 0.0162 0.0116 0.0180 









Table A.5.71 Continued  
 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0581 0.0000 0.0151 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0221 0.0168 0.0212 
Obs 165 1451 2486 184 436 473 232 384 416 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs 2805 856 1535 2216 313 885 1634 353 867 
 Panel E: Net equity issue / assett 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.0021 0.0234 0.0136 0.0068 0.0041 0.0057 0.0000 0.0025 






Table A.5.72 Capital structure adjustment speed comparison, based on different industries 
 
Note, BDR: book-based debt ratio, MDR: market-based debt ratio, speed1= target1t-BDRt-1, speed2= target2t-MDRt-1, target1: book-based target debt ratio calculated 
using OLS, target2: market-based target debt ratio calculated using OLS. The coefficient values are λ (capital structure adjustment speed) in Panels A and B. The 
coefficient values of „capital structure adjustment speed‟ in Panels C and D are (1-λ). Thus, the adjustment speed λ is (1-coefficient). In calculating Panels C and D, we 
use all 7 capital structure determinants though we do not report those coefficients here. The full industry names are defined in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. *** 
significance at 0.01 level, ** significance at 0.05 level, * significance at 0.1 level 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0265 0.0934 0.0835 0.0931 0.1031 0.0504 0.1150 0.0119 0.0085 
Obs 139 916 1748 57 95 406 94 125 171 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0360 0.00574 0.0202 0.0520 0.1141 0.0296 0.0112 0.2338 0.0591 
Obs 1982 396 469 1131 128 324 511 92 396 
 Panel A: ∆BDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0000 0.1153 0.0866 0.2637 0.0746 0.2264 0.0626 0.1149 .0652 




Table A.5.72 Continued 
 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 



















































Adj-R2 0.0091 0.0725 0.0621 0.0073 0.0732 0.0254 0.0715 0.0400 0.0196 
Obs 135 874 1719 50 94 393 92 121 165 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 







































Adj-R2 0.0329 0.0649 0.0613 0.0859 0.0000 0.0257 0.0741 0.0519 0.1068 
Obs 1877 373 374 630 120 310 438 90 322 
 Panel B: ∆MDRt 























































Adj-R2 0.0206 0.0369 0.0964 0.1122 0.0665 0.1261 0.1083 0.0934 0.0719 





Table A.5.72 Continued 
 
Note, BDRt-1 is instrumented in Panel C. The options of small robust small and twostep are used for xtabond2 command, and the sub-options of eq(level) and 
laglimits(1 2) for gmm-style, and of eq(level) for iv-style.   
 Panel C: BDRt 
Sys-
GMM 







































AR(1) -2.93*** -2.40** -3.00*** -0.63 -1.39 -2.01** -2.03** -1.54 -2.14** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 40 39 41 41 41 41 
Obs 139 923 1759 58 95 410 94 130 172 
 Panel C: BDRt 







































AR(1) -2.19** -2.70*** -3.37*** -3.27*** -2.15** -2.49** -3.74*** -1.68* -2.20** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 







Table A.5.72 Continued 
 
Note, BDRt-1 is instrumented in Panel C. The options of small robust small and twostep are used for xtabond2 command, and the sub-options of eq(level) and 
laglimits(1 2) for gmm-style, and eq(level) for iv-style.   
 Panel C: BDRt 







































AR(1) -1.72* -1.04 -1.64 -1.07 -3.46*** -3.09*** -4.92*** -5.85*** -6.20*** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 39 40 41 38 41 31 41 41 41 







Table A.5.72 Continued  
 
Note, MDRt-1 is instrumented in Panel D. The options of small robust and twostep are used for xtabond2 command, and the sub-options of eq(level) and laglimits(1 2) 
for gmm-style, and of eq(level) for iv-style.   
 Panel D: MDRt 
Sys-
GMM 







































AR(1) -3.00*** -3.68*** -3.05*** . -1.31 -3.33*** -2.37** -1.67* -2.47** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 40 38 41 41 41 41 
Obs 136 896 1745 58 94 400 94 130 170 
 Panel D: MDRt 







































AR(1) -6.18*** -3.33*** -3.56*** -4.32*** -2.02** -2.81*** -3.15*** -1.51 -3.39*** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 








Table A.5.72 Continued  
 
Note, MDRt-1 is instrumented in Panel D. The options of small robust small and twostep are used for xtabond2 command, and the sub-options of eq(level) and 
laglimits(1 2) for gmm-style, and eq(level) for iv-style. 
 Panel D: MDRt 







































AR(1) -1.80* -1.54 -2.39** -1.30 -3.97*** -2.21** -6.29*** -6.46*** -7.08*** 





















Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Inst No 38 40 41 38 41 31 41 41 41 
Obs 120 106 273 135 1209 457 3430 2073 3143 
 
 
 
 
